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Levers of Law Reform: Public Goods
and Russian Banking
Patricia A. McCoy*
Today, a half-decade after the demise of the Soviet Union, Russia wobbles
precariously between economic transformation and civil strife. After five
painful years of market reforms, inflation is down, unemployment is
falling, and real incomes are rising. But for many, that progress is too
little, too late. Citizen resentment is smoldering, catapulting the
communists into the forefront of the summer 1996 presidential elections
and fueling fears of a coup, dissolution of the parliament, martial law or
civil war. To its vast credit, Russia avoided those catastrophes and
successfully navigated the elections, but its political stability remains
fragile.
This anxious state of affairs thus raises the question whether
commercial law reforms designed to enforce market discipline in Russia
were too late.1 There has been general agreement, both among adherents
of the "big bang" theory of reform and those who preferred to see economic
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1. By law reforms designed to enforce market discipline, I mean statutes, rules and
other laws that promote market efficiency by penalizing financial losses. In the banking
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provisions. See, e.g., infra notes 38-41 and accompanying text. Although privatization
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change proceed at a slower pace, that market-oriented laws in Russia
cannot be adopted off-the-rack from Western legal codes. There has not
been a consensus, however, on the optimal speed and sequencing of
market discipline laws.
Some Western advisers subscribe to the view that market discipline
laws should have been implemented quickly, both to hasten the creation of
new jobs and to avoid the market scandals that could discredit reforms.
Others believe that economic liberalization had to precede market
discipline laws, and that any attempt to rush through such laws would
have been doomed from the start. Those proponents assume, in essence,
that market discipline reforms could not take place until the political
institutions and psychological attitudes conducive to reform had taken
root.
Much hangs in the balance of this debate. At stake is the credibility of
economic reforms, the welfare of individual citizens and the very survival
of Russian democracy. Accordingly, now that reforms in Russia have been
underway for five years and President Yeltsin's first term is at an end, it is
well and meet to consider whether the transition could have been less
painful had accelerated law reforms enforced market discipline.
There is no easy answer to this question. Central planning was an
abject failure and left the Soviet economy in ruins, generating mass
protests for radical economic liberalization. At the same time, Russia, of
the newly-independent states, lived under communist rule the longest and
had the least entrepreneurial heritage to fall back on from its pre-
revolutionary, tsarist days. Russia has no tradition of democracy, and
democratic institutions are still in their infancy. Civil society, which was
brutally suppressed under communism, is only beginning to take on life.
Unlike in post-war Germany orJapan, moreover, the old leadership was not
put down through military conquest and resurfaced in new positions. Far
from being written on a tabula rasa, then, market discipline reforms in
Russia are heavily freighted with the past.
Nowhere has this been more true than in the reform of Russian
banking. The Russian Federation enacted major bank privatization
legislation in December 1990, a year before the Soviet Union even
disbanded. The 1990 legislation, however, did little to impose market
discipline on the banking system or on borrowers. In particular, the 1990
laws were notable for failing to prohibit self-dealing by bank directors and
shareholders. No accident, that omission was symptomatic of the entire
Soviet approach to finance, in which the banking system served to
subsidize state priorities rather than allocate funds to their most
productive use. Soon after enactment of these laws, the fruits of that
omission became apparent as the old communist-era factory managers
successfully maneuvered, in violation of basic precepts of sound banking,
to gain control of private banks and to milk those banks for subsidies
veiled as low-interest loans.
A scant half-decade later, however, the situation has changed
significantly. New legislation has begun to address bank conflicts of
Vol. 30
1997 Levers of Law Reform
interest, the Central Bank of Russia has dosed hundreds of banks that
failed due to delinquent loans to shareholders, and central bank loan
subsidies to former state-owned firms have largely stopped. By any
account, these developments represent a sea change. Undeniably, those
reforms have also proved highly divisive, triggering armed conflict,
constitutional crisis and the ouster of three central bank chairmen. With
democratic principles hanging in the balance, banking reforms have
survived so far, but their durability remains in doubt.
The course of banking law reforms in Russia raises fundamental
questions for students of law reform in formerly planned economies. What
social, economic and political conditions caused the drafters of the initial
1990 legislation to be impervious to conflict-of-interest concerns? Given
those conditions, what accounted for the significant subsequent turnabout
in legal norms and the dislodging of entrenched interests that those
reforms represented? Was conditional financing from the International
Monetary Fund, or instead domestic pressure, primarily responsible for
reform? Could the resulting reforms have been accelerated and, if not,
why? Finally, what was the cost of delayed reforms and what are their
future prospects?
In analyzing these problems, it is useful to consider the theory of
public goods. Public goods are benefits to a group such that if one
member enjoys the benefit, all other members of that group will necessarily
enjoy it as well. In capitalist systems, the concept of private property
results in a sharp demarcation between public goods that must be shared
with others and private goods that may be consumed alone. In the Soviet
Union, however, most goods except consumer durables were provided in
the form of public goods, both due to the collectivist ethos and strict
prohibitions on private ownership. In the household sphere the state
provided workers with their housing and livelihoods as well as
innumerable other benefits. In the commercial sphere the state was the
generous and sole legitimate provider of financing to state-owned
enterprises.
The transition from a command to a market economy thus raised
unique problems of public goods for banking law and policy. In the Soviet
command economy, firms regarded financing as a public good that
government banks supplied. Soviet finance, however, hastened the decline
of the Soviet economy by diverting financial resources from efficient
enterprises to inefficient uses. Thus, a major challenge in the Russian
transition to market-based banking was to develop a banking system that
would redirect funds to their best use.
To do that, it was necessary to alter firms' and citizens' expectations
that the government would continue to provide subsidized financing in the
form of a public good. That expectation collided with a key tenet of market
discipline, that firms should not receive credit unless they are creditworthy
and have the financial wherewithal to repay their loans. The Soviet system
of finance likewise collided with other market tenets, namely that the price
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of credit should be calibrated for risk and that the market, not the
government, allocates capital most efficiently.
Market-oriented banking codes have attempted to deal with concerns
about efficient allocation of credit by adopting loan underwriting norms,
by limiting loans of last resort, and by regulating conflicts-of-interest so as
to forestall borrowers from operating banks as captive financing arms.
When bank privatization legislation was enacted in Russia in 1990,
however, such provisions were unimaginable. In 1990, prices were still
controlled and nearly all domestic constituencies (apart from a handful of
reform economists) felt they had nothing to gain and everything to lose
from a halt to subsidies. State-owned firms that were insolvent could not
qualify for market-based credit, and their solvent counterparts were less
skilled in competing for financing on the market than in lobbying the
government for funds. Thus, at the beginning of Russian reforms, there was
a social consensus in favor of subsidies and against market-based finance.
Given that seemingly unassailable consensus on the one hand and the
disastrous economic effects of Soviet finance on the other, the difficult
question was whether market discipline reforms could be instituted in
Russia in a manner consistent with democratic norms. This Article
examines that question through the prism of public goods, from the start
of the reform process through the end of President Yeltsin's first term in
August 1996. While a few legal scholars have employed public goods
analysis in the post-communist context,2 none has yet consciously used
that analysis to examine situations in which there was broad social
consensus against reform. Indeed, most discussions of public goods
assume that opposing viewpoints already exist3 and focus on the
prerequisites and consequences of mobilizing those latent opposing views.
The transition to market discipline in Russia, however, presented a very
different problem: how to generate dissent in the face of a social
consensus that was economically dysfunctional, and how to do so through
democratic means.
Public goods theory offers a theoretical explanation of how to institute
market discipline laws through democratic means in post-communist
countries that lack a pre-revolutionary capitalist tradition. The Russian
experience suggests that at the outset of reforms there will be political
support for laws protecting private property and improving consumer
choice (such as privatization laws). But there will be little initial support
for laws designed to enforce market discipline (such as bans on
government subsidies and bankruptcy laws) because no organized group
will perceive any advantage from such measures. As subsidies fuel
2. For early, useful works in this regard, see Robert D. Cooter, The Theory of Market
Modernization of Law, 16 INT'L REv. L. & EcON. 141 (1996);Jonathan R. Macey & Enrico
Colombatto, Public Choice Theory and the Transition Market Economy in Eastern Europe:
Currency Convertibility and Exchange Rates, 28 CORNELL INT' LJ. 387 (1995); Paul B.
Stephan III, Barbarians Inside the Gate: Public Choice Theory and International Economic
Law, 10 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 745 (1995).
3. See, e.g., JAMEs M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULtocK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT:
LOGIcAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTrruTIONAL DEMOCRACY 31-39 (1962).
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inflation, however, the public will demand relief. Likewise, the more
entrepreneurial elements of the business community will come to realize
that inflation will not slow unless subsidies are halted. As the business
community's perception of subsidies as a public good in infinite supply
begins to change, stronger firms and banks can be expected to oppose
subsidies.
The effect of such reforms upon Russian democracy, however, remains
uncertain and gives grounds for both optimism and pause. As recent
experience has shown, the social toll of Russian monetary and banking
reforms has been incalculable. Public confidence in the commercial
banking system was never strong to begin with and has been shaken by the
failure of hundreds of Russian banks burdened by delinquent shareholder
loans. The stoppage of subsidies put millions of Russians out of work, at
least in the short term, and caused their real incomes to drop. Since 1993,
political in-fighting over the cessation of subsidies has been nearly
constant, resulting in market crises and President Yeltsin's October 1993
armed assault on the parliament. Recently, nonetheless, Russia
successfully completed two rounds of presidential elections and voted
resoundingly, despite the pain of anti-subsidy policies, against a return to
communism. Thus, Russian democracy is alive but terribly frayed.
I embark upon this analysis with several normative assumptions. For
the sake of simplification, I assume that potential consumers of public
goods tend to maximize their economic self-interest more often than not in
economic policy matters. Particularly in matters such as joblessness and
banking, such a motive cannot be overlooked. I further assume that the
Soviet economy had collapsed by 1990-91, that communist central
planning had failed and that the larger social good would be best served in
Russia if, in the long run if not in the short run, capital was redirected
toward more efficient uses. Finally, I proceed on the assumption that
democracy is of crucial importance in Russia and that one task of legal
scholarship should be to examine how commercial law reforms can be
accomplished with the least individual pain, consistent with democratic
values.
In undertaking this analysis I am also mindful that public goods
theory has distinct limitations. Public goods theory cannot describe the
complex Russian reality in its entirety, particularly given data constraints,
the rapidly changing conditions in Russia, and the limited Western
understanding of Russian conditions and mores.4 It can, however, provide
a useful heuristic tool for understanding certain aspects of that reality.
Public goods theory has also been criticized for ignoring motivations
such as altruism, collectivism and ideology. That is certainly a
fundamental concern in post-communist economies such as Russia, which
4. John Maynard Keynes remarked in a similar vein in 1925:
[Tihe economic system of Soviet Russia [in the early 1920s] has undergone and
is undergoing such rapid changes that it is impossible to obtain a precise and
accurate account of it .... Almost everything one can say about the country is
false and true at the same time.
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followed in the wake of strongly ideological systems. There can be no
doubt that lingering communist norms impeded the adoption of market
discipline in Russia.5 At the same time, it is remarkable that the on-going
transition from subsidies to market discipline was accomplished largely
(although not entirely) through democratic means and in the face of
communist ideology. It is important not to overstate this proposition,
because democratic tenets were breached at several points during those
reforms and communist ideals still live on in large segments of the Russian
populace today. Nevertheless, voters resoundingly rejected a return to
communism in the 1996 Russian presidential elections. From a theoretical
perspective, then, public goods analysis can provide useful insights into the
degree to which communist ideology lost sway during the progress of
economic reforms.
Public goods theory has also been censured as morally impoverished
by appearing to sanction narrow self-interest over the pursuit of the
broader social good.6 In leveling that reproach, moral critics of public
goods theory often mistake its descriptive claims for normative claims.
Certainly, public goods theory, as a descriptive tool, will often identify
outcomes in which narrow group interests prevail at the expense of the
broader polity. But that will not always be the case. In other contexts,
public goods theory will identify outcomes that are wealth-maximizing in
the aggregate sense and that thus serve the larger public good. That is
particularly the case in transition economies where severe macroeconomic
shocks can serve as a catalyst for defeating rent-seeking by old communist
elites in favor of broadly beneficial law reforms.
Section I of the Article provides an overview of the theory of public
goods and explores its significance for the transition from communism to a
market economy. Section II discusses the Soviet system of financing and
the Soviet perception of financing as a public good. Section III employs
public goods theory to examine how Soviet-era managers co-opted the
drafters of the 1990 bank legislation to include provisions which enabled
those managers to capture private banks and use those banks as a conduit
for state subsidies. Section IV uses public goods analysis to examine how
the former Party elite wrested control of the refinance facilities of the
Central Bank of Russia to assure continued access to subsidies once bank
privatization was underway. In Section V, the Article examines how the
economic repercussions of subsidies after economic liberalization,
including inflation and financial crises, altered perceptions about the
nature of subsidies as a public good so as to generate domestic support for
market discipline reforms. Section VI considers the future course of those
JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, A SHORT VIEW OF RussiA 18-19 (1925).
5. 1 would like to particularly thank Tobias M.C. Asser for his insights into the role
of ideology in economic reforms in Russia.
6. Compare, e.g., Mark Kelman, On Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the
Theoretical and "Empirical" Practice of the Public Choice Movement, 74 VA. L. REv. 199
(1988), with Geoffrey Brennan & James M. Buchanan, Is Public Choice Immoral? The
Case for the "Nobel" Lie, 74 VA. L. Rev. 179 (1988).
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reforms and their implications for Russia's future stability. The Article
concludes by discussing the larger theoretical ramifications of recent
Russian events for the theory of public goods.
I. Public Goods Theory and Transition Economies
While no one theory can settle the question of the optimal timing and
sequencing of commercial law reforms in post-communist economies such
as Russia, public goods theory may offer hitherto unrecognized insights
into those issues. Public goods analysis holds out intriguing possibilities
in this regard because former communist regimes such as the Soviet Union
were organized to provide the bulk of goods in public rather than private
form. Public goods theory has particular relevance to banking law reforms
in Russia, both because banking reforms necessarily involve economic
decisions and because subsidies by the central planning authorities pro-
vided the bulk of financing in the Soviet Union. As such, Soviet financing
was a quintessential public good that was provided by the state.
Public goods theory, in brief, examines the economic incentives that
encourage or thwart the provision of public goods. Such goods are benefits
that must be provided to all members of a group if they are to be provided
to any member of that group at all. Roads and clean air are examples of
public goods, as are cash subsidies, entry barriers, tax loopholes, restraints
on product substitutes and price regulation. Private firms such as banks
and manufacturers may prize public goods because those goods can pro-
vide unique sources of revenue that can only be secured through the exer-
cise of coercion by the state. While such goods can be valuable whether a
firm is profitable or in decline, public goods in the form of subsidies are an
especially attractive source of revenue when a firm's market activities are
losing money.7
A principal task of public goods theory is to identify when individuals
will organize in pursuit of a public good. As scholars have recognized,
public goods present unique organizational problems because the individ-
uals who pay for public goods cannot exclusively enjoy their benefit. Eve-
ryone in the group may want to enjoy that benefit, but ordinarily will not
want to pay for their fellow members' shares. Conversely, each member
knows that if someone else pays for the benefit, he or she will enjoy it cost-
7. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS 14 (2d ed. 1971); Jonathan R. Macey, Transaction Costs and the Nor-
mative Elements of the Public Choice Model: An Application to Constitutional Theory, 74
VA. L. REV. 471, 477-78 (1988); Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5
BELL J. ECON. & MGmr. ScI. 335, 343 n.20, 344 (1974); George J. Stigler, The Theory of
Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGmrT. Sci. 3, 4-6 (1971). See generally
BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 3, at 283-95; ROBERT E. McCoRMICK & ROBERT D.
TOLSON, POLITICIANS, LEGISLATION, AND THE ECONOMY 8, 16-18, 22 (1981) (analyzing the
topic as one of wealth transfers); DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 16-18 (1979);
Edward L. Rubin, Beyond Public Choice: Comprehensive Rationality in the Writing and
Reading of Statutes, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 (1991); Robert D. Tollison, Public Choice and
Legislation, 74 VA. L. REv. 339, 34243 (1988) (surveying literature). The discussion in
this Article is limited to public goods provided by government.
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free, giving rise to the familiar free-rider problem.8
Given that problem, one of the principal aims of public goods theory
is to identify the circumstances in which one or more members of a group
will have incentives to pay for a benefit, such as low inflation, that fellow
members will also automatically enjoy. According to the theory, groups are
most likely to mobilize in favor of a public good when the personal gain to
one or more group members exceeds the total cost of obtaining the bene-
fit.9 The policy that will prevail will depend, in part, on how much oppos-
ing parties spend, whether the costs outweigh the benefits, and whether the
individual costs are relatively small and easily masked.
In addition to these considerations, instituting market discipline laws
in transition economies poses a more basic, antecedent public goods con-
cern. Public goods theory, as it has been discussed with respect to mature
capitalist economies, takes it as a given that social differences of opinion
exist over which public goods the government should provide. The the-
8. See, e.g., OLSON, supra note 7, at 20-21. Edward Rubin has criticized the free-
rider analysis for "sanitizing" traditional interest-group theory of its normative criticisms
of privilege and class. See Rubin, supra note 7, at 11.
9. Early works posited that this is most likely to occur in small groups, particularly
groups marked by a fair degree of inequality and where one or more members stand to
gain a disproportionate share. Those same works predicted that large groups are least
likely to take action to obtain a public good because no one individual stands to benefit
enough personally to shoulder the cost to the entire group. Mancur Olson has argued in
this regard that large groups will successfully organize lobbying campaigns for public
goods only when they are able to attract members either through coercion or through
individual side benefits, such as cheap insurance or technical advice and education.
Absent such side benefits, small groups would be expected to lobby more effectively for
public goods than large groups. Large groups would be more likely to lapse into inac-
tion, representing a failure of collective action. See OLSON, supra note 7, at 33-34, 44, 49-
63, 132-33; MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS: ECONOMIC GROWTH,
STAGFLATION, AND SOCIAL RIGIDITIES 41 (1982) [hereinafter OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE
OF NATIONS]. See also GeorgeJ. Stigler, Free Riders and Collective Action: An Appendix to
Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. EcoN. & MGMT. Sci. 359, 362 (1974).
This version of public goods theory has since been questioned for underestimating the
ability of larger groups to mobilize in furtherance of their shared goals. See, e.g., RUSSELL
HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 38-49 (1982); Geoffrey P. Miller, Public Choice at the Dawn
of the Special Interest State: The Story of Butter and Margarine, 77 CALIF. L. REv. 83, 85
(1989); Rubin, supra note 7, at 12-13; Lars Uddhn, Twenty-Five Years with The Logic of
Collective Action, 36 ACTA SOCIOLOGIcA 239, 241 (1993). Critics have noted that large
organizations engage in collective action far more often than the theory would predict.
Some critics also maintain that voting under the theory should present collective action
problems, because voting is the quintessential situation in which one individual's act is
unlikely to make a noticeable difference in outcome. Nonetheless, voters do turn out in
impressive numbers and on occasion make their collective protests heard. See, e.g.,
DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRiCKEY, LAw AND PUBUC CHOICE: A CRIICAL INTRODUC-
TION 23-24, 28-29 (1991); Richard A. Posner, supra note 7, at 340-41; Eric A. Posner, The
Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal Sanctions on Collective Action,
63 U. CHI. L. REv. 133, 139 n.12 (1996). In response, other commentators have pointed
out that voting makes sense either because it requires relatively little expenditure of
effort, because it satisfies a desire for civic participation or both. See OLSON, THE RISE
ANDECLINE OF NATIONS, supra, at 28-29; Edward L. Rubin, Public Choice in Practice and
Theory, 81 CAL. L. REv. 1657, 1668 (1993) (reviewing FaBER & FRIcCEY, supra). See also
Dwight R. Lee, Politics, Ideology, and the Power of Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REv. 191, 193-
95 (1988).
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ory's stated task is then to examine whether and when latent groups will
organize to lobby for public goods that are in their respective self-interests.
But what if there is broad social consensus in favor of a public good that
has proven economically ruinous on a macroeconomic level? Does public
goods theory suggest a way to cut the Gordian knot so as to mobilize self-
interest in aid of the larger social good? And if so, does it do so in a way
that does not undermine democratic mores, let alone the very fabric of
society?
This is the problem that confronted Russian banking reforms in the
early 1990s and that still confronts those reforms today. Given the abject
failure of Soviet finance, an overriding goal of market-based law reforms in
Russia was to transform the finance system from one that rewarded ineffi-
ciency through subsidies to one that rewarded efficiency through market
discipline. The difficulty, however, was how to achieve that change in the
face of near-universal opposition and countervailing ideological mores.
When Russia's bank privatization law was passed in December 1990,
there were few private enterprises and most firms were owned by the state.
Numerous state-owned firms were insolvent or teetering on the brink of
financial ruin and adamantly opposed a stoppage of subsidies. Those
firms had little experience competing in the market, had few wares or serv-
ices that anyone wanted to buy and had little chance of securing market-
based finance. With their market revenues dwarfed by their expenses,
those firms (and their managers) were desperate for government subsidies
to survive.
Individual citizens likewise opposed a subsidy cut-off because the
overwhelming number of those individuals worked for those same state
firms and were dependent on those firms for their livelihoods. In addition,
the collectivist ethos of sacrifice for the common good still persisted (albeit
in a weakened and oft-discredited form) and citizens harbored deep suspi-
cions toward "speculation" and "profiteering." Hence, at the outset of
reforms in Russia the social consensus in favor of subsidies and against
market discipline measures seemed well-nigh insuperable.
From a market point of view, however, Russian finance needed to
transform itself from a system that did not allocate scarcity to one that did.
A major task of market-based law reforms was thus to create an environ-
ment in which support for market discipline could emerge from the old
pro-subsidy consensus. To accomplish such a change in a democratic
manner called for nothing short of a radical overhaul of public attitudes.
To examine how such a transformation could occur, it is useful to
make a foray into an obscure corner of public goods theory involving the
distinction between what economist Mancur Olson has termed inclusive
and exclusive public goods. Some public goods, such as air, are inclusive
public goods in the sense that they are in superabundant supply and will
not decline in any perceptible amount per person, regardless of the size of
the group. Other public goods, known as exclusive public goods, are visi-
bly scarce in the sense that people believe the per capita share of those
goods will decline as the number of recipients increases. Per capita shares
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can decline either because the individual share is smaller or because the
marginal cost to the beneficiary that is associated with that share exceeds
its marginal benefit.10 ,
Consequently, a group that is considering an exclusive public good
will face two choices: either to maximize the per capita shares of its mem-
bers by capping the size of the group or to forego the exclusive public good
altogether in favor of an inclusive good. If the group decides to cap its size,
it can do so either by designating a sub-group of beneficiaries or by win-
ning the adoption of entry barriers designed to bar new membership and to
encourage existing members to leave. If, on the other hand, the group
decides that seeking an exclusive public good is too costly, it can simply
pursue an inclusive public good.
These dynamics mean that interest groups seeking exclusive public
goods are more prone to internal fissures and are less stable than groups
that seek inclusive public goods. A group that reserves exclusive benefits
for some but not all of its members risks alienating those members who
will not receive the benefits. By the same logic, groups that lobby for exclu-
sive public goods can expect opposition from other groups that are denied
those goods.
Thus, the internal cohesion of a group can depend on which type of
public good the group is pursuing, or, to be more precise, on which type of
public good the group believes it is pursuing. As the latter statement sug-
gests, there is a strong psychological element to the distinction between
inclusive and exclusive goods. Goods are exclusive when group members
believe that expanding the group will reduce their own share of the good.
Similarly, goods are inclusive when group members believe that the good is
sufficiently abundant that their own share will not shrink even if the group
expands. The few scholars who have written on this subject in the context
of mature capitalist societies have tended to assume that the distinction
between inclusive and exclusive public goods is relatively static. In other
words, theorists have tended to assume that citizens will by and large agree
on the degree to which a good is abundant or scarce."1
In transition economies, however, any such assumption is misplaced.
In comparison with their counterparts in mature capitalist societies, Soviet
citizens and enterprises were more prone to regard certain public goods,
including financing, as commodities in infinite supply. Put differently,
before the breakup of the Soviet Union, financing was generally viewed as
an inclusive public good. There was little public perception that money
was a scarce resource or that subsidies to one firm adversely affected subsi-
10. See OLSON, supra note 7, at 36-38; OLSoN, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS,
supra note 9, at 67; HARDIN, supra note 9, at 17-20; Udhn, supra note 9, at 241. Because
all goods, strictly speaking, are scarce, the terms inclusive and exclusive goods refer less
to a dichotomy and more to a range of possibilities arrayed along a continuum.
11. For discussions of these aspects of public goods, see OLSON, supra note 7, at 36-
38; OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS, supra note 9, at 67; Posner, supra note 7, at
354-55; Stigler, supra note 7, at 4; Ud~hn, supra note 9, at 241. Note that entry barriers
can either be used to maximize the per capita value of an exclusive public good or as a
substitute for an exclusive good.
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dies to other similarly-situated firms. Similarly, there was little public
appreciation that subsidies exacted an economic toll in the form of
shortages and inefficiency. 12
Thus, at the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the commonly-held view
that subsidies were an inclusive public good could be expected to result in
specific organizational dynamics. Most state-owned firms could be
expected to prefer subsidies to non-cash public goods because their other
sources of revenue had dried up. Under the guise of privatizing the bank-
ing sector (thus appeasing popular sentiment in favor of economic liberali-
zation), those firms could be expected to lobby for early banking
legislation that would allow them to capture banks and to use those banks
as a conduit for continued government subsidies. The cost-push effect of
those subsidies, however, would aggravate inflation and erode the buying
power of the subsidies that failing firms had just won. Those firms and the
banks they controlled could then be expected to seek legal caps on the total
number of subsidy claimants.
Such pro-subsidy sentiment would mobilize immediately because the
old organs of power-ministries, state enterprises and those organizations
sympathetic to the Communist Party that were not subsequently out-
lawed-emerged from communism bloodied but well-organized. That coali-
tion had long since absorbed the startup costs of lobbying and thus could
seek legislation for only a small marginal expenditure. 13
Thus, public goods theory would expect pro-subsidy forces to have a
substantial lead in lobbying and early banking legislation to bear their
mark. Conversely, the theory would suggest that anti-subsidy sentiment
would not coalesce overnight and would face significant organizational bar-
riers. In Russia, those impediments were particularly high because Russia
emerged out of the ruins of the old Soviet Union almost bereft of civil soci-
ety. The Soviet Union had forcibly repressed most voluntary group activi-
ties, save for groups that were organized and sanctioned by the state or the
Party. Similarly, private businesses had historically been outlawed and
legitimate private sector activity in Russia in 1990 was negligible despite
some nominal liberalization in the late 1980s. 14 As a consequence, in
1990, the entrepreneurial sector that might have served as an ally to the
pro-subsidy forces was only beginning to materialize. In the interim, the
pro-subsidy coalition seized the opportunity to mold the 1990 bank legisla-
tion to its objectives.
12. Cf. Anders Aslund, The Gradual Nature of Economic Change in Russia, in CHANG-
ING THE ECONOMIC Sysrm IN RussIA 19, 27 (Anders Aslund & Richard Layard eds.,
1993); THOMAS E. OWEN, RussIAN CORPORATE CAPITALISM FROM PETER THE GREAT TO PE-
ESTROIKA 98 (1995).
13. See Macey & Colombatto, supra note 2, at 400, 412; Jonathan R. Macey, Public
Choice: The Theory of the Firm and the Theory of Market Exchange, 74 CoRNELl L. REV.
43, 46-47 (1988); Udthn, supra note 9, at 242.
14. The black market economy was an important exception, but that economy pur-
sued profits through other means, particularly criminal conduct. See infra notes 25-26,
61 and accompanying text.
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Simultaneously, however, the demise of the U.S.S.R. caused Russia to
experience a rapid succession of economic shocks that would later prove to
be a catalyst for attitudinal change. By late 1991, price controls had
resulted in such severe food shortages that hunger was rampant and some
citizens were near starvation. With the economy on the verge of a collapse,
newly-elected President Yeltsin had little choice but to deregulate most
prices, which he did on January 1, 1992. Food soon returned to the
shelves, but prices rapidly surged to levels approaching hyperinflation.15
Due to those economic shocks, public goods theory would predict an
attitudinal rift in the Russian business community, with ripple effects in
the public at large. The worst-off firms could be expected to cling to subsi-
dies because they had no other significant source of income, having noth-
ing that customers wanted to buy. Conversely, as subsidies fueled
inflation, the better-off firms would come to realize that their marginal
harm from inflation outweighed their marginal gain from subsidies. What
were once seen as limitless subsidies would suddenly be seen by those
firms as scarce resources whose overuse carried severe negative external
consequences. To couch the phenomenon in public goods terms, Russian
entrepreneurs would begin to view subsidies as exclusive rather than inclu-
sive once they realized that any gains from added subsidies would be more
than wiped out by inflation. Public goods theory would therefore expect
stronger firms eventually to support new, inclusive public goods in the
form of reduced inflation and an across-the-board halt to subsidies.
Such opposition would take time to materialize, however. After the fall
of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the entrepreneurial sector was free
to organize politically, but high organizational costs continued to discour-
age the formation of an anti-subsidy coalition. New enterprises needed
time and funds to launch their business operations; they could scarcely
afford to divert their resources early on to finance and mount a political
campaign.16 Likewise, political mobilization entailed high, fixed startup
costs that the established pro-subsidy lobby had already absorbed.
In addition, the entrepreneurial sector faced high informational barri-
ers to organizing against subsidies. Some time would have to pass before
inflation's effects were felt and before market principles were sufficiently
familiar so that the link between inflation and subsidies was understood.
Even after the fall of communism, information often remained closely held
and financial transparency was seriously wanting. In-bred lack of trust
and fears of a communist comeback also discouraged organizing. For
these reasons, public goods theory would expect opposition to subsidies to
be slower to form.
Nonetheless, public goods theory would predict an anti-subsidy lobby
to organize eventually. The catalyst would occur as viable firms realized
that inflation was eroding their working capital and that inflation would
15. See infra notes 139-41 and accompanying text.
16. See Macey & Colombatto, supra note 2, at 410. Cf. Anders Aslund et al., How to
Stabilize: Lessons from Post-Communist Countries, 1 BROOIGNGs PAPERS ON ECON. AcrWn'
217, 254 (1996).
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not drop until subsidies came to a halt. A subsidy halt would also bolster
the position of those firms by eliminating their weaker competitors. Simi-
larly, a backlash could be expected to develop among firms that were
excluded from subsidies, as their competitors successfully lobbied for
measures designed to hoard state subsidies for themselves. With the pas-
sage of time, the stronger segments of the Russian business community
would accumulate capital to foot the bill for lobbying. Thus, entrepreneurs
who were excluded from subsidies or who concluded they would be better
off with low inflation would eventually lobby hard for measures to drive
down inflation, most notably a halt to subsidies in favor of other, inclusive
public goods.17
As for the general public, the deeply ambivalent loyalties of most vot-
ers would be up for grabs and subject to manipulation by both sides. Pro-
subsidy firms could coerce voter support by withholding workers' wages
and laying blame on the government.' 8 That tactic could generate a back-
lash, however, if workers learned that management corruption and graft,
rather than nonpayment of subsidies, was responsible for their wage
arrears. Conversely, anti-subsidy forces could capitalize on public outrage
over inflation to lobby against inflationary subsidies. In the short term,
such a campaign would garner widespread support because citizens'
purchasing power had dropped and low, fixed prices under communism
had been the norm.19 Once the effects of a subsidy halt were felt in the
form of job loss, however, popular demands for subsidies would increase
and would foment political unrest. Thus, public attitudes about inflation
and subsidies would be deeply mixed and volatile.
In sum, public goods theory suggests that in post-communist coun-
tries, economic dislocation had to occur before any appreciable support
could develop for market discipline laws. Those reforms could not have
occurred at the outset, because the original 1990 Russian bank privatiza-
tion legislation predated the surge of inflation by more than a year.
Instead, public goods analysis indicates that market discipline laws could
be accomplished through the democratic process, but not until the
onslaught of market forces (in the Russian case, inflation) had effected atti-
tudinal change.
17. Cf. Aslund et al., supra note 16, at 256 ("as new interest groups develop and a
free press emerges, placing more checks on the leader's behavior... then the incentive
to inflate will be reduced").
18. See Stephan, supra note 2, at 749.
19. Macey and Colombatto noted in this regard:
[A] nation's monetary policy, exchanged by the politician for support from a
distributional coalition, may dramatically increase costs to individuals. In such
a case, the costs to the individual of obtaining information about the policy and
organizing to oppose it may be less, perhaps even significantly less, than the per
capita cost of the legislation. Because of these increased costs, previously unin-
formed citizens and individual opponents to the legislation will coalesce into
effective distributional coalitions to oppose the legislation.
Macey & Colombatto, supra note 2, at 402. See also id. at 406-09, 412.
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II. Soviet Banking and Finance
The state-owned firms that emerged from Soviet communism had a crip-
pling dependence on financing in the form of a government-sponsored,
public good. That dependence, which was deeply rooted in Soviet finance
practices, paralyzed Russian banking reforms from 1990 to 1993 and con-
tinues, in a lesser but still virulent form, to rear its head today. To under-
stand the roots and tenacity of that dependence, it is necessary to examine
the functions and operations of Soviet finance.
In the Soviet Union under Stalinism, the state expropriated nearly all
means of production and byways of exchange. As a result, Soviet firms
regarded supplies and sales as public goods to be ordained by central plan-
ners, rather than as market phenomena subject to supply and demand.
Soviet firms were equally dependent on the government to provide financ-
ing. Under communism, the regime was the sole legitimate provider of
financing. As a result, firms regarded financing as a public good and
looked to the government to provide it. Furthermore, firms regarded
financing as an inclusive public good, i.e., one in near-infinite supply,
because Soviet banks normally extended financing without regard for
profit, loss or repayment. When the U.S.S.R. disbanded, Soviet firms thus
had little incentive to reject the old form of finance in favor of market-based
approaches that allocate financing according to scarcity and
creditworthiness.
A. Central Planning and the Control Functions of Money
In modern market-based economies, individual firms and consumers have
broad autonomy to make their own economic decisions, subject to avail-
able information and funds. In contrast, under Soviet communism-the
state dictated, to the maximum possible extent, what to make, what to sell
and what to buy. The overriding achievement of Soviet central planning
was to strip individual citizens of economic choice and consolidate virtu-
ally total economic power in the hands of the state. The state, in turn, was
subservient to the Communist Party and the Party's economic and political
goals. 20
In public goods terms, Soviet central planning had two dramatic
effects. First, it tilted the Soviet economy to an unprecedented degree away
from private goods such as consumer durables in favor of public goods,
most notably heavy industry and defense. In addition, many goods that
ordinarily would be provided as private goods in market-based economies
were provided as public goods in the U.S.S.R. Sometimes this was to pre-
vent private wealth accumulation by consumers, as in the case of housing
and other real property. In other circumstances, it served to prevent wealth
accumulation by private suppliers.
21
20. See 1 INTERNATIONAL MoNETrARY FUND ET AL, A STUDY OF THE SoviEr EcONOMY 8
(1991) [hereinafter IMF].
21. Cf. id. at 10 (describing restrictions on private capital accumulation).
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To achieve this transformation, the Soviet economy required an
unprecedented degree of authoritarian central control. That control was
wielded in the first instance by the central planning agency Gosplan, which
issued one-year and five-year plans dictating what goods firms were to pro-
duce. Gosplan measured success largely according to the volume of pro-
duction, with little emphasis on earnings and cost recovery.2 2 Gosplan's
directives were mandatory and unauthorized departures (in theory) were
not to be brooked. 23
Although Gosplan measured success by physical output rather than by
profitability, money was nevertheless essential to avoid the inconvenience
of barter. Money provided Soviet citizens with purchasing power, as it
does in the West. Money similarly furnished a unit of account that facili-
tated the exchange of products and services.2 4
In other respects, however, money in the official Soviet economy dif-
fered sharply from money in market economies. The most significant dif-
ference was that money did not allocate scarce resources by directing them
to the highest bidder. Instead, prices were bureaucratically fixed under
central planning without regard for supply or demand. Thus, Soviet money
was passive because it did not independently set prices so as to allocate
scarcity.25
The uniquely passive character of Soviet money had several important
ramifications. Citizens regarded low, fixed prices as a public good that the
government was expected to provide. As a result, the Soviet system masked
inflation and Soviet citizens had little experience with inflationary dynam-
ics. As is well-known, however, price controls meant that goods were in
chronically short supply because prices were too low to induce suppliers to
manufacture enough to meet demand. Shortages posed problems not only
for consumers, but also for industries, whose managers could only redress
supply bottlenecks by interceding with higher-ups or colluding in illicit
22. See PAUL R. GREGORY & ROBERT C. STUART, SOVIET ECONOMIC STRucTuRE AND PER-
FORMANCE 183 (3d ed. 1986).
23. See 0. KUSCHPETA, THE BANKING AND CREDr SYSTEM or: THE USSR 1, 50-52, 143
(1978); James Gale, A Historical Perspective on the Banking and Financial System in the
Union of Soviet Socialistic Republics (USSR), in BANKING AND FINANCIAL SYSTEMS IN
SELECTED COUNTRIES 149, 150 (James Gale ed., 1995); infra notes 26, 61 and accompany-
ing text.
24. See GEORGE GARVY, MONEY, FINANCIAL FLOWS, AND CREDrr IN THE SOVIET UNION
42-43 (1977); KUSCHPETA, supra note 23, at 13, 220. Money had less purchasing power
for Soviet firms, whose buying activities were strictly regulated by the state, than it did
for consumers. See infra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
25. See GARvY, supra note 24, at 36, 4243, 48-51; KUSCHP~tA, supra note 23, at 160-
61, 225, 229. There were unofficial free markets where supply and demand determined
prices, most notably the black market and markets for produce grown by collective
farms. See GARvY, supra note 24, at 39; KuscH rA, supra note 23, at 239; Gregory Gross-
man, Sub-Rosa Privatization and Marketization in the USSR, ANNALs Am. AcAD. POL. &
Soc. Sci. 44, 47 (1990). The Soviet government outlawed the black market and
restricted the truck farm market as much as possible.
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barter, rather than through price adjustments. 26
A final difference between Soviet money and money in market econo-
mies was that the state did not allow firms to stockpile cash as a store of
wealth. Rather, idle money was siphoned back into the coffers of the
state.27 Just as scarce goods and property expropriation prevented individ-
ual wealth accumulation, confiscation of bank accounts prevented wealth
accumulation by firms.
In order for this closed economy to work, the Soviet central plan had to
be financed and financial controls had to be instituted to thwart deviations
from the plan. The Soviet banking system was instrumental in both of
those tasks.
B. The Soviet Monobank System
Lenin envisioned that a "single State Bank, the biggest of the big, with
branches in every rural district, in every factory, will constitute as much as
nine-tenths of the socialist apparatus."28 By the late 1920s, in accordance
with Lenin's vision, the Soviet government confiscated all private banks in
Russia and consolidated them into a unitary bank that was state-owned
and state-controlled. 29
After the private banking sector was liquidated and consolidated, the
Gosudarstvenny bank, or U.S.S.R. Gosbank (the State Central Bank),
became the principal Soviet bank. Over time, the Soviet government estab-
lished a handful of additional state banks to serve the needs of specific
sectors. Of the sector banks, the most prominent were Prombank (later
renamed Stroibank) for commerce and industry, Vneshtorgbank for foreign
trade, and Sberbank for private household savings. All three operated as
arms of Gosbank and were subordinate to it. Taken as a whole, Soviet
banking was thus a monobank system in which central and commercial
26. As Mancur Olson has pointed out, the supply bottlenecks came to be so severe
that factory managers often were forced to collude in illegal supply swaps simply to
satisfy quotas:
[Iln the Soviet-type countries sometimes a factory manager could not even get
his work done-could not fulfill his quota--without engaging in quasi-legal or
illegal deals to obtain inputs. The whole system of Soviet-style planning was so
market-contrary that even the high officials-and perhaps especially high offi-
cials- had to violate the rules and the plan in order to comply with the orders
and targets they were given.
Mancur Olson, Jr., Therapies for Corruption, Fragmentation, and Economic Retardation
12 (1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); accord Vadim Radaev, On
Some Features of the Normative Behavior of the New Russian Entrepreneurs, 37 PROBS.
ECON. TRA'smoN 17, 20 (1994) ("although in these tough times no one dared to engage
in a sit-down strike, it was clear that if even half of the [central planners'] instructions
had been observed, all activity would have come to a standstill").
27. See KuSCHPMrA, supra note 23, at 221; Macey & Colombatto, supra note 2, at 389;
infra note 59 and accompanying text.
28. Vladimir 1. Lenin, Can the Bolsheviks Retain State Power?, in 26 VLADIMIR 1. LENIN,
CoLEL= WomS 106 (Yuri Sdobnikov & George Hanna trans., Progress Publishers
1964), quoted inJANos KORNA, THE SOCIAUST SYsTEM: THE PoLrIcAL ECONOMY OF COM.
MUNiSM 132 n.2 (1992) (emphasis in original).
29. See KUSCHPtrA, supra note 23, at 24-38.
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bank functions were combined and competition among banks was
suppressed.30
In its role as the Soviet central bank, Gosbank had some of the func-
tions of a traditional Western central bank. Gosbank, for example, issued
notes and coins, regulated currency circulation and served as the central
clearinghouse for payments. It maintained foreign exchange reserves and
discounted foreign payments. Gosbank also served as the central reposi-
tory for the collection and disbursement of government revenues. 31
In other respects, the central bank functions of Gosbank differed radi-
cally from those of central banks in Western countries. Gosbank regulated
the money supply through confiscation rather than through monetary tools
such as the discount rate or sales of government securities.32 Similarly,
because the monobank system eliminated any need for the supervision of
autonomous private banks, Gosbank had no supervisory apparatus in
place.
Gosbank's other role was as Russia's leading commercial bank.
Unlike Western commercial banks, however, Gosbank did not operate
according to profit. Rather, Gosbank operated as an arm of the state in
furtherance of the central plan, without regard to profit.3 3 In carrying out
that mission, Gosbank had two main tasks. Gosbank played an essential
part in achieving the plan by supplying financing and by monitoring firms
to assure that they reached production quotas. Additionally, Gosbank was
responsible for suppressing private monetary exchanges that could divert
resources from the plan.
C. Gosbank's Role in the Administration of the Central Plan
1. Provider of Financing
As the financial arm of the Soviet government, Gosbank was responsible
for providing the necessary financial support and oversight to carry out the
central plan. One of Gosbank's primary functions in that regard was to
finance state-owned enterprises through the provision of credit.
Nominally, Gosbank extended financing in the form of loans condi-
tioned on repayment. In deciding whether to extend credit, Gosbank prin-
cipally asked whether a firm had met its production targets and whether
the central plan authorized the expenditure in question. In theory, Gos-
bank also was supposed to consider the prospects for repayment according
to the Soviet principle of "economic accountability" or khozraschet, which
specified that firms could not spend more than they earned and were
30. See GAnvy, supra note 24, at 53, 64-72; 1 IMF, supra note 20, at 361-62;
KUSCHP'rA, supra note 23, at 24-38, 45, 54-65, 208; KATHLEE J. WooDy, SovIEr BANKING
AND FI NANCE 29-31 (1990); Susanna V. Pullen, Note, United States Foreign Banking and
Investment Opportunities: Branching Out to the Russian Federation, 8 TRANSNAT'L LAW.
159, 166-67 (1995). See generally GARvY, supra note 24, at 52-75.
31. See GARvy, supra note 24, at 52-53.
32. Id. at 52-53, 59-60; Kuscl-rTA, supra note 23, at 54-55.
33. See KoRAi, supra note 28, at 131-32.
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responsible for paying their debts. 3 4 In reality, Gosbank approved low-
interest loans for almost any proposed transaction if the firm was meeting
its quotas and the transaction was authorized by the plan. Where that was
the case, Gosbank normally issued loans without regard to the borrower's
risk profile or ability to repay.35
As such, the concept of creditworthiness was foreign to Soviet bank-
ing.36 In a functioning market economy, credit decisions steer scarce sup-
plies of credit away from money-losing ventures toward the most
creditworthy users. For the most part in the Soviet Union, in contrast, Gos-
bank issued credit at trivially low interest rates regardless of the borrower's
ability to repay. 37
Thus, Soviet banking was premised on what the Hungarian economist
J~nos Kornai terms "soft budget constraints." The terms soft and hard
budget constraints describe the degree to which the external economic envi-
ronment tolerates losses by firms instead of driving insolvent enterprises
into bankruptcy. The less tolerance shown to losses, the harder the budget
34. See HAROLDJ. BERMAN,JUSTICE IN THE U.S.S.R.: AN INTERPRETATION OF SoviET LAW
110-11 (rev. ed. 4th prtg. 1976), GAgvy, supra note 24, at 114; KORNAI, supra note 28, at
145. In a similar vein, Soviet civil law contemplated secured loans. Collateral provi-
sions had limited usefulness, however, because collateral consisted solely of the assets
that were financed. Other income-generating assets, such as buildings and equipment,
were exempt from use as security. See GARVY, supra note 24, at 114; KuscHParA, supra
note 23, at 235; Richard E. Ericson, The Classical Soviet-Type Economy: Nature of the
System and Implications for Reform, J. ECON. PEasP., Fall 1991, at 17; Simon Johnson et
al., New Banks in the Former Soviet Union: How Do They Operate?, in CHANGING THE
ECONOMIC SYSTEM IN RUSSIA, supra note 12, at 183, 186.
35. See GARVY, supra note 24, at 115-16; KUSCHPETA, supra note 23, at 152, 183, 235;
RONA-D I. MCKINNON, THE ORDER OF ECONOMIC LIBERAuZATION 125 (1991); Johnson et
al., supra note 34, at 185-86. Cf. GREGORY & STUART, supra note 22, at 183; PETER RUT-
LAND, THE POLTICS OF ECONOMIC STAGNATION IN THE SOVIET UNION 168 (1993) (khozras-
chet (cost accounting) was undermined by "the party's deep-seated ideological fear of
increased reliance on money and market-type forces").
36. See GARvY, supra note 24, at 115-16; KUSCHPTA, supra note 23, at 235;Johnson
et al., supra note 34, at 185-86; V. Sundararajan, Central Banking Reforms in Formerly
Planned Economies, FIN. & DEv., March 1992, at 10, 11. Instead of penalizing nonpay-
ments through denials of future credit, Gosbank sought to induce loan repayment
through higher credit lines, better loan terms and bonuses to firm managers. See
BERMAN, supra note 34, at 113-14; GAxvy, supra note 24, at 117; KUSCHPETA, supra note
23, at 152.
Kuschpta ascribed the Soviet aversion to creditworthiness analysis in part to Stalin's
ban on statistical analysis:
In Stalin's time general economic doctrine was almost exclusively concerned
with explaining and analysing property relations. Price theory and other micro-
economic problems were totally neglected. Stalin's dogmatism even impeded
the development of planning theory and methods: remember Stalin's prohibi-
tion of mathematical methods and mathematical statistics in compiling data
and plans. It is no wonder that no economic criteria were used in the planning
and that a paradoxical situation under which inefficient enterprises were
favoured and the efficient ones had to work under unfavourable conditions was
the practical result.
Id. at 241 (footnotes omitted).
37. See Ronald I. McKinnon, Taxation, Money, and Credit in a Liberalizing Socialist
Economy, in THE EMERGENCE OF MARxE ECONOMIES IN EASTERN EUROPE 112 (Christopher
Clague & Gordon C. Rausser eds., 1992) [hereinafter EMERGENCE].
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constraint.38
Where budget constraints are hard, firms are expected to earn more
than they spend and to go out of business if they cannot pay their debts.
Similarly, banks that enforce hard budget constraints lend only to firms
that can repay out of future revenues. In a regime of hard budget con-
straints, banks impose credit limits, vary interest rates according to risk,
report credit ratings, collect overdue loans and deny credit to firms that
have defaulted on past loans. Thus, where firms operate under hard
budget constraints, their growth potential depends upon their ability to
attract investment (including credit) or to plow back savings into fueling
future growth. The ability to attract credit depends, in turn, upon credit
history and present and future profitability. Further, firms know they will
face extinction through bankruptcy if their financial condition declines to
the point where their liabilities exceed their assets.3 9 Thus, as Kornai
noted, hard budget constraints are "a form of economic coercion: proceeds
from sales and cost of input are a question of life and death for the firm."40
In contrast, where budget constraints are soft, as was true in the Soviet
Union, earnings and cost controls are not "a question of life and death." In
economies where soft budget constraints predominate, firms expect to get
bank loans regardless of future profitability or repayment ability. Simi-
larly, banks do not allocate credit according to risk through credit limits or
interest surcharges.4 1 Instead, as Kornai has noted, troubled firms
"whine' for credit that actually includes a veiled grant_" 4 2 In such regimes,
when firms default banks do not institute collection but rather often
advance additional funds. Firms know too that they will not face bank-
ruptcy if they become insolvent because the state will bail them out with
cash subsidies or subsidized loans.43
Soviet banking was specifically designed to generate the state subsi-
dies that are characteristic of soft budget constraints. If a firm failed to
repay its loans, Gosbank had the hypothetical authority to sanction the
firm through cash penalties, credit caps and closer oversight of manage-
ment.4 4 In reality, however, where sanctions "conflict[ed] with the need to
keep the particular enterprise operating," they were "unlikely to be pushed
very far."4 5
38. See JANos KoRNAI, CONTRADICTIONS AND DILEMMAS: STUDIES ON THE SOCIALIST
ECONOMY AND SoclrY 12-15, 48, 143-44 (1986). See also Macey & Colombatto, supra
note 2, at 389, 391-92 & n.34.
39. See KORNAI, supra note 38, at 12-13, 36-40.
40. Id. at 38.
41. See McKinnon, supra note 37, at 112.
42. KoRNAI, supra note 28, at 142.
43. See KoRNAI, supra note 38, at 13, 41-44; KoRNAI, supra note 28, at 140, 142;
Ericson, supra note 34, at 19-22; Sundararajan, supra note 36, at 11. See generally Gross-
man, supra note 25.
44. See GAivy, supra note 24, at 117-18; KUScHPErA, supra note 23, at 182-84.
45. GARvy, supra note 24, at 117. See also KUSCHParA, supra note 23, at 183-84; Paolo
Miurin & Andrea Sommariva, The Financial Reforms in Central and Eastern European
Countries and in China, 17 J. BANKING & FIN. 883, 895 (1993). Gosbank had its own
perverse incentives to excuse nonpayment because delinquent payments triggered
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Instead, directors of ailing firms routinely secured extra financing by
appealing to higher-ups to intercede with Gosbank for additional funds.
Such rent-seeking, as Kornai noted, required "a lot of legwork, searching
for connections and supporters," and consumed time that otherwise could
have been spent on improving production and sales.46 Rent-seeking was so
lucrative, however, that pleas for state aid were the normal modus
operandi.47
Thus, bank loans in the Soviet Union almost always operated as subsi-
dies rather than as constraints on firm conduct. Credits flowed freely to
implement physical production targets in the central plan, regardless of
efficiency or risk.48 This free flow of subsidies had several important
consequences.
One obvious effect was that firms viewed finance in the U.S.S.R. solely
as a public good. As a result, Soviet managers emerged from communism
with no experience in securing private finance. To the contrary, they were
conditioned to seek finance solely from the government. Finance was thus
politicized, something to be accomplished through bureaucratic
intercession.
Further, because soft budget constraints predominated, managers
viewed financing as an inclusive public good. That was because nothing in
the Soviet experience gave managers reason to believe the subsidies to
other firms in equal need would reduce subsidies to their own firms. Con-
sequently, Soviet managers saw no harm and every advantage in working
collectively to obtain subsidies. For the same reason, Soviet managers had
no reason to consider subsidies less desirable than other forms of public
goods.
Finally, because Gosbank fixated on physical production targets
rather than on repayment prospects, Gosbank defined the monitoring
aspects of its work as tracking physical production rather than overseeing
loan repayment. Those surveillance activities required strict central con-
trol of payments and cash reserves.
2. Monitoring Performance Under the Central Plan
Gosbank, in coordination with Gosplan, monitored production quotas by
tracking financial activity in each firm's bank accounts. Gosbank accom-
higher interest charges and penalty payments that Gosbank booked as paper income
under its accounting rules. See WooDY, supra note 30, at 54.
46. See KoRNa, supra note 28, at 142 n.19.
47. See GAtvy, supra note 24, at 47, 116-17; KoRNAi, supra note 28, at 142 & n.19;
WooDy, supra note 30, at 27; Olson, supra note 26, at 20 n.18. Cf. Sergei A. Vasiliev,
Economic Reform in Russia: Social, Political, and Institutional Aspects, in CHANGING THE
EcoNoMic SYsrim IN RussiA, supra note 12, at 72, 73 ("Lodging a complaint with the
powers-that-be, that is, the boss, the chief, or the superior administrator, was the most
natural way of upholding one's rights in Russia."); V.V. Vitrianskii, Contract as a Means
for Regulating Market Relations: The Draft Civil Code (First Part) of the Russian Federa-
tion, 20 REv. CarF. & E. EuR. L. 649, 649 (1994) (noting that Soviet managers who were
aggrieved by breaches of contract habitually appealed to the government for help in lieu
of suing their contract partners).
48. See GARvy, supra note 24, at 36; KoRNAi, supra note 38, at 44.
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plished this surveillance through a compulsory system of bank accounts
and transfer payments designed to insure that firm payments did not evade
Gosbank's scrutiny.
Under that system, all state enterprises had to maintain accounts with
Gosbank or one of the sector banks into which their revenues had to be
deposited.49 Each account was divided into sub-accounts that were
earmarked for specific expenses. Enterprises could only use funds in a
particular sub-account to pay for designated expenses and could not shift
these funds to another sub-account. Funds reserved for raw materials, for
example, could not be spent on equipment.50
Gosbank was able to track money flows because it served as the exclu-
sive clearing agent for the transfer payment system. Gosbank maximized
its surveillance capabilities by requiring firms to make payments through
inter-account transfers and by prohibiting firms from paying in cash.51 In
the process of clearing paymeits, Gosbank could tell how much a firm
earned and how much the firm spent and on what. Because finished prod-
ucts were to be sold under the plan at a fixed percentage above cost, Gos-
bank's analysis of firm revenues and expenditures furnished a rough-and-
ready indicator of whether production targets were being fulfilled.5 2
In sum, Gosbank used its position as the exclusive clearing agent for
payments to keep tabs on who was paying how much for what. These
supervisory powers served not only to track the fulfillment of quotas, but
also to root out deviant economic conduct at variance with the plan.
D. Gosbank Techniques for Suppressing Deviations from the Plan
For central planning to work, not only was it important for targets to be
met, it was crucial to stamp out private market transactions that could
divert financial resources from the central plan. The state, and in particu-
lar Gosbank, employed a variety of techniques to funnel money out of pri-
vate hands and back into the coffers of the state.
The consumer market, for example, represented a threat to central
planning because consumer choice, through the black market and other-
49. See GARRy, supra note 24, at 56; KUSCHPkrA, supra note 23, at 75.
50. See DANIEL GROS & ALFRED STEINHERR, WINDS OF CHANGE: ECONOmnc TRANSITION
IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 52 (1995); KORNAI, supra note 28, at 132-33; KUSCHP TA,
supra note 23, at 75, 179.
51. See KUSCHPTA, supra note 23, at 72-73; McKinnon, supra note 37, at 111. As a
result, the payment circuits for firms and households were largely separate and distinct.
Firms made all of their payments (except for wages) through non-cash means such as
payment orders, letters of credit, and checks. See KusCHPtTA, supra note 23, at 76-80.
The consumer system, in contrast, operated primarily with cash, although consumers
could make transfer payments for utility bills and rent. Workers received their wages in
cash and paid cash for the few goods they could find on the shelves. See id. at 73, 160-
61, 177; Ned C. Hill & Sviatoslav Slavinski, The Emergence of Commercial Banking in
Russia, TMA J., July-Aug. 1994, at 36, 37; McKinnon, supra note 37, at 111-12; Sun-
dararajan, supra note 36, at 10-11. See also infra note 139.
52. See GARVY, supra note 24, at 42,46-47; GREGORY & STUART, supra note 22, at 183;
KORNAI, supra note 28, at 133; KUSCHP TA, supra note 23, at 73, 229; McKINNoN, supra
note 35, at 124-25; Ericson, supra note 34, at 17; Gale, supra note 23, at 153.
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wise, represented a diversion of resources from state priorities and state
control. Consequently, the state sought to suppress consumer choice as
much as possible by maintaining low wages and bare shelves.53 Although
Soviet citizens were low-paid by Western standards, they nevertheless had
large cash surpluses because consumer goods were artificially underpriced
and in notoriously short supply. As a result of suppressed consumer
demand, consumer purchases were negligible and Soviet households had
high rates of forced savings.54
Although Soviet citizens were flush with rubles, they had extremely
limited options as to what to do with their cash. Essentially, citizens were
limited to keeping surplus rubles under their mattresses or depositing
them with the state-owned savings bank, Sberbank, the only available vehi-
cle for investment. The state exhorted citizens to deposit their surplus
funds with Sberbank and enticed them to do so with deposit guarantees.
Over the years, household deposits at Sberbank became an increasingly
important source of short-term loans to the state. Thus, low wages, empty
stores and high savings combined to pump idle consumer funds out of the
private economy and back into the hands of central planning.55
Similarly, the banking system was designed to suppress independent
economic decisions by firms and their managers that could result in devia-
tions from the plan.56 Firms could only obtain credit from the state-owned
banks and were forbidden from securing credit from suppliers or private
financiers. 57 Similarly, firms could not spend funds in their state bank
accounts as they wished. By law, their access to those accounts was
blocked; Gosbank limited how much enterprises could withdraw from
their bank accounts and what those funds could buy.58 Likewise, the rule
requiring firms to pay through inter-account transfers instead of in cash
was designed to prevent unauthorized purchases that could not be traced.
These restrictions had the sum effect of extracting the maximum pos-
sible revenues from individual firms for the financing of the overall plan.
As revenues mounted in a particular firm's account, Gosbank raked off the
surplus and transferred those funds to unprofitable firms that needed extra
funds to fulfill their targets. Essentially, the system of blocked bank
53. See KUSCHPtrA, supra note 23, at 1, 93, 161, 177, 179, 219-21, 225; Olson, supra
note 26, at 14.
54. See CARLO CoTTARELLi & MARIO I. BLEJER, FORCED SAVINGS AND REPRESSED INFLA.
TION IN THE SOVIET UNION: SOME EMPIRICAL RESULTS iii (IMF Working Paper No. WP/91/
55, 1991); 1 IMF, supra note 20, at 39; KUScHP ra, supra note 23, at 239; Marek Dabrow-
ski, The First Half Year of Russian Transformation, in CHANGING THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM IN
RusSIA, supra note 12, at 1, 3; Hill & Slavinski, supra note 51, at 38 ("Russian house-
holds saved 32 percent of their disposable income in 1992 mainly because there just
was not much to purchase .... ").
55. See GAuvy, supra note 24, at 64-66; KUSCHP~rA, supra note 23, at 73, 87, 89-91,
219-20.
56. See KUSCHPETA, supra note 23, at 73, 177; Ericson, supra note 34, at 16-17.
57. See KoRNAI, supra note 28, at 546; KUSCHPatA, supra note 23, at 47, 54.
58. See KORNA, supra note 28, at 132-33; McKinnon, supra note 37, at 111-12;Jeffrey
D. Sachs & David Lipton, Remaining Steps to a Market-Based Monetary System in Russia,
in CHANGING THE ECONOMIC SYsTEM IN RussA, supra note 12, at 127, 136.
1997 Levers of Law Reform
accounts enabled the Soviet government to levy taxes through confiscation
and freely reallocate those revenues to money-losing firms.5 9
Gosbank's confiscation of deposits fostered economic ruin by creating
perverse incentives for successful firms. Firms that did well saw their reve-
nues raked off and transferred to less efficient firms. Thus, subsidies
penalized the best firms and rewarded the worst. But far from convincing
successful managers that subsidies were scarce, this incentive structure
simply convinced them that their subsidies would increase if their firms
lost money too. From a financial standpoint, then, inefficiency was the
only rational objective.
Gosbank's confiscatory practices similarly fueled official corruption
by instilling incentives to engage in illicit, non-cash barter. To evade the
restrictions on cash withdrawals that facilitated state confiscation, manag-
ers hoarded inventory, rather than selling it, for use in elaborate barter
schemes. Sometimes this was necessary to achieve production quotas;
more often it was done as a means of private gain.60
While barter deals were one of the few ways in which managers gained
entrepreneurial experience, such deals also fostered disregard for the law
because they entailed pilferage. As barter schemes multiplied and became
harder to hide, managers developed elaborate webs of payoffs, both to
superiors and to officials of Gosbank, as protection against prosecution
and punishment. Over time, managers and higher-ups became so
enmeshed in illicit conduct that the whole fabric of Soviet law was
undermined.6 1
As inefficiency and corruption mushroomed, the Soviet economy rot-
ted to its core, hastening the U.S.S.R.'s demise. That did not mean, how-
ever, that a functioning market economy would necessarily rise out of the
ashes of communism. To the contrary, lingering Soviet practices and atti-
tudes created severe barriers to banking sector reform and reform of the
economy at large.
59. See GAvY, supra note 24, at 116; KuscHPrirA, supra note 23, at 79-80, 109-10,
131, 138-39, 230; McKinnon, supra note 37, at 110-12; Sundararajan, supra note 36, at
11. .As noted by one commentator:
[T]here is nothing puzzling in the fact that Soviet-type regimes normally
required state enterprises to make all payments through the state banking sys-
tem and whenever possible tried to keep enterprises from using or holding cur-
rency-[which] facilitated extraction by the center and made retention of profits
by the enterprise more difficult.
Olson, supra note 26, at 14, 25-26.
60. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text, infra note 61 and accompanying
text.
61. See Olson, supra note 26, at 10-12, 22-25; Merton J. Peck, in WHAT IS To BE
DONE? PROPOSALS FOR Ta SoviEr TRANSITION TO THE MARKET 1, 3 (Merton J. Peck &
Thomas J. Richardson eds., 1991); Paul B. Stephan III, Toward a Positive Theory of Priva-
tization-Lessons from Soviet-Type Economics, 16 IN'A REv. L. & ECON. 173, 178-81
(1996); Sundararajan, supra note 36, at 11. While Gosbank had authority to limit future
credits and report a firm to central authorities if it suspected that firm of hoarding, see
KoRNAI, supra note 28, at 133, that authority eroded over time due to the profusion of
protection payments. See Olson, supra note 26, at 10-12, 22-25.
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E. The Public Goods Legacy of Soviet Central Planning
From the standpoint of the transition to a market economy, the subjective
expectations that communism fostered proved to be one of the most vexing
impediments to reform. Those expectations were a direct legacy of Stalin's
nationalization of virtually the entire Soviet economy. As a result, Soviet
firms had to look to the government for goods that market economies
would normally provide privately. By negating private ownership while
ignoring scarcity, Soviet communism achieved an unprecedented expan-
sion of the concept of public goods.
The expectation that the government would be the principal provider
of financing (and of a generally unprecedented range of public goods) cre-
ated a knot of obstacles to banking system reform. First and foremost, it
politicized industrial finance. The only way managers knew how to get
finance was through the lobbying of higher-ups. Thus, managers had
neither the inclination nor the skills to compete for private finance in the
marketplace.
Compounding matters, the prevalence of soft budget constraints
meant that finance in reality took the form of subsidies, not loans, and was
available regardless of a firm's financial shape. Indeed, the worse off the
firm, the more likely the subsidy. Thus, financing turned on a host of
political factors inimical to economic efficiency. As ever-increasing num-
bers of firms concluded that subsidies were more lucrative than positive
balance sheets and cost controls, a vicious cycle arose. Perversely, under
communism, efficiency came to be seen as a hindrance to financing, rather
than a prerequisite, because surpluses were removed from successful firms.
As the general condition of firms declined, subsidy demands became
increasingly desperate and widespread.
Soviet enterprises thus emerged from communism in the worst possi-
ble shape: with dire financing needs and badly impaired competitiveness.
Not being accustomed to market discipline, moreover, managers did not
regard subsidies as in scarce supply. Rather, in the view of individual man-
agers, there was no reason why subsidies to one firm should reduce subsi-
dies to any other firm in need. Consequently, Soviet-style subsidies were
regarded as the quintessential inclusive public good.
It was therefore predictable that immediately after the fall of commu-
nism subsidy demands would be loud and encounter virtually no opposi-
tion, either internally among firms or from the citizenry at large. Soviet
citizens could be expected to favor subsidies as essential to keeping their
jobs. Because of the Soviet system's success in repressing inflation, more-
over, the public did not link subsidies with shortages and other trade-offs.
Among firms, subsidies had a powerful allied voice because the political
relationships that were needed to secure government finance at the minis-
tries and with Gosbank were already well-cemented. Consequently, bar-
ring the power structure's overthrow, the subsidy lobby, with its inbred
relationships and entrenched ways of dealing, could be expected to survive
communism intact and to impede the transition to a banking system pre-
mised on rewards for efficiency and penalties for losses.
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III. Reform and Liberalization
The general deterioration of the Soviet economy in the 1980s did not spare
Soviet banking. By 1987, the Soviet banking system was on the verge of a
massive breakdown. Gosbank's continual advance of funds to loss-generat-
ing firms had caused those firms to proliferate and money-making firms to
run operating deficits, or "go into the red." As enterprise revenues dried
up, so did funds for subsidies, and Gosbank began to experience losses. 6 2
In desperation, the Soviet government took its first tentative steps toward
banking system reforms in 1987.
Given the widespread social affinity for subsidies and the antipathy to
hard budget constraints in Russia, the key question was whether the early
legislation would promote or resist market discipline through banking
norms. Under the theory of public goods, resistance could be expected for
two reasons: first, because the pro-subsidy lobby was already organized;
second, because it had no effective opposition.
In the Soviet Union, a pro-subsidy lobby was already mobilized in the
form of the nomenklatura.63 The nomenklatura were well-connected and
well-organized to lobby for financial assistance from the state. Further,
they were marked by hierarchical distinctions of status, wealth and power
that gave the nomenklatura's highest members a disproportionate stake in
reforms. In contrast with post-war Germany and Japan, moreover, the
members of the old communist elite were not barred from new positions of
power, either due to military occupation, prosecution or political suppres-
sion. Accordingly, the nomenklatura could be expected to assert a powerful
voice in favor of a banking system designed to serve as a continued conduit
for state subsidies.
The nomenklatura were able to exploit the absence of effective opposi-
tion to subsidies during the first phase of reforms. While reform econo-
mists in Russia and abroad sought to dismantle subsidies, their campaign
was an uphill fight. There was a broad social consensus in favor of contin-
ued financial lifelines. Compounding matters, members of the nomen-
klatura who ran factories had the distinct ability to exploit this sentiment at
the polls by withholding workers' paychecks and blaming it on lack of sub-
sidies.6 4 In the meantime, the old Soviet system of repression had stunted
private association and expression and thus had suppressed any nascent
opposition to the managers.6 5  As Mancur Olson has noted,
entrepreneurial firms were too new, too few and too disorganized during
the final years of the Soviet regime to provide an effective political counter-
62. See WooDy, supra note 30, at 27; 1. Blinov et al., Will Banks Continue as Genera-
tors of Inflation?, PROBS. EcoN. TRANsmoN, May 1992, at 76-79.
63. The nomenklatura consisted of Party members and government officials. Boris
Rumer, New Capitalists in the U.S.S.R., CHAUENGE, May-June 1991, at 19-20.
64. See infra notes 176-77 and accompanying text.
65. See AND'Rs ASLUND, How RussIA BECAME A MAR= ECONoMY 7, 308 (1995). Cf.
ANDERS AsLUND, POST-CoMMUNIS ECONOMIC REvOUnTIoNs: How BIG A BANG? 63 (1992)
("[I]n Russia, the power of the state enterprise directors appeared to be increasing in the
summer of 1992, one year after democratization; the reason was that civil society was so
poorly developed, providing few organized counterweights to the old industrial lobby.").
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weight to subsidy demands by the nomenklatura.66
Thus, public goods theory suggests that the nomenklatura would exert
influence disproportionate to their size in the earliest stages of economic
and political liberalization, when competing private groups had not yet
formed. That prediction was borne out by early bank reform legislation
between 1987 and 1990.
A. Banking Law Reforms During Perestroika
The Soviet Union paved the way for later, more radical reforms by spinning
off Gosbank's commercial bank functions in 1987 to a new group of com-
mercial banks.67 In the new two-tier bank system that resulted, Gosbank
continued to act as the Soviet central bank, supervising the money supply
as well as the newly-authorized commercial banks. The second tier was
formed by assigning Gosbank's commercial bank functions to five new
state-owned banks that were the successors to the old sector banks. The
new banks were the Bank for Industrial Construction (Promstroibank),
successor to the old Stroibank; Sberbank; the Bank of Foreign Economic
Activity (Vneshekonombank), successor to the old Vneshtorgbank; the
Agro-Industrial Bank (Agroprombank); and the Bank for Housing, Munici-
pal Services and Social Development (Zhilsotsbank). Their customer bases
continued to be divided along sectoral lines. Promstroibank served heavy
industry, Sberbank served households, Vneshekonombank handled foreign
trade, debt and currency dealings, Agroprombank served farms and farm
industries, and Zhilsotsbank served light industry and the service sector.68
66. See Olson, supra note 26, at 29.
67. See generally Inna Vysman, Note, The New Banking Legislation in Russia: Theoret-
ical Adequacy, Practical Difficulties, and Potential Solutions, 62 FoRDHMui L. REv. 265
(1993).
68. See 1 IMF, supra note 20, at 363; 2 IMF, supra note 20, at 111-14; WOODY, supra
note 30, at 28, 31; Blinov et al., supra.note 62, at 79-80; Gale, supra note 23, at 152; Hill
& Slavinski, supra note 51, at 38; Johnson et al., supra note 34, at 186; Christopher
Osakwe, Modern Russian Law of Banking and Security Transactions: A Biopsy of Post-
Soviet Russian Commercial Law, 14 WHrrnER L. REv. 301, 320-25 (1993). The old
Vneshtorgbank was revived in 1990 as Vneshtorgbank of Russia (Foreign Trade Bank).
Today, Vneshtorgbank of Russia is owned by the Central Bank of Russia. See Banks and
Banking Business in the RSFSR Act 1990, ch. V, art. 37 (Russ.), available in Westlaw,
Ruslegisline Database, 1990 WL 485325 (Dec. 2, 1990); Central Bank Head Elected Chief
of Foreign Trade Bank, MONITOR (Dec. 27, 1995) <http://www.jamestown.org/Monitor/
mondec/122795.htm>; Osakwe, supra, at 320, 323-25.
Vneshekonombank collapsed upon the fall of the Soviet Union in December 1991.
Those assets that did not disappear were frozen and much of Vneshekonombank's oper-
ations were then transferred to Vneshtorgbank of Russia. SeeJonas Bernstein, Nickel For
Your Thoughts?, RussIA Ra'v., Feb. 26, 1996, at 22, 23 (stating that some assets went to
Vneshtorgbank); PeterJ. Pettibone &Juliette M. Passer-Muslin, Russian Banking and Cur-
rency Regulations: Overview of the Russian Banking System, 1 PMuAE SCH. J.E. EUR. L.
709, 716 n.1 (1995) (stating that all assets went to Vneshtorgbank); Yeltsin Issues Decree
on Bank of Foreign Economic Activity, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROAnCASTs, Jan. 28,
1994, quoting Ivan Zhagel, President Has Decided to Resurrect USSR Vneshehonombank,
Izvasr, Jan. 18, 1994, at 2; Ivan Zhagel, $8 Billion Frozen by Soviet Government Is Begin-
ning to Be Returned to Russian Enterprises, lzvEsr, May 17, 1994, at 1, reprinted in
CURRENr DIG. Posr-Sovi-r PREss, June 15, 1994, at 18. Vneshekonombank had been
scheduled to be phased out in any case after it completed debt service on the old debts of
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The 1987 reforms had two ostensible goals: to tighten credit disci-
pline and to facilitate the financing of the government budget. In a stab at
hard budget constraints, the specialized banks received new powers,
including the authority to oversee management decisions, to grant better
terms to creditworthy borrowers and to deny new advances to delinquent
borrowers. By the late 1980s, overall credit to firms had dropped, advances
to delinquent borrowers had been cut and overdue loans reportedly had
shrunk 69
Still, the 1987 reforms were considerably more cosmetic than real
because they denied crucial credit discipline techniques to commercial
banks. Commercial banks could not calibrate interest rates according to
risk, because the government still set interest rates centrally. Similarly,
while commercial banks had the power on paper to conduct creditworthi-
ness analyses, they could not interfere with production. In reality, then,
the 1987 reforms posed little serious threat to the continuation of soft
budget constraints.
The 1987 bifurcation of the monobank system similarly fostered a
false impression of competition. The formation of the specialized banks
did little to promote competition because each institution had monopoly
rights over a specific segment of the banking market.70 Nonetheless, the
Soviet Union's half measures in 1987 at least gave lip service to the possi-
bility of competitive reforms. One year later, in 1988, the first such
reforms arrived, when the Soviet government passed the 1988 Law on
Cooperatives, authorizing the formation of private cooperatives, either in
the form of subcontractors to state enterprises or spin-offs from state
firms.71
As a condition of the 1988 legislation, the nomenklatura who planned
on running the new private cooperatives demanded separate banking serv-
ices of their own. Fearful that the five specialized banks would refuse to
serve the new cooperatives, factory heads and Party officials demanded
authority to form their own banks. In response to those demands, the Law
the former Soviet Union. Instead of dismantling Vneshekonombank, however, the Rus-
sian parliament converted it to a Russian state-owned commercial bank in 1992. See
Osakwe, supra, at 323, n.50. Today, Vneshekonombank operates in a reduced role as
the state-owned bank principally responsible for servicing the foreign debt. The institu-
tion has recently come under fire for speculating with funds transferred from the budget
to pay off foreign creditors. See Natalia Gurushina, Head of Vneshekonombank Dismissed,
OMRI DAILY DIG. (Feb. 13, 1996) <http://www.omri.cz/Publications/Digests/9602/
Digest/960213.html>; Story of a Dismissal That Came as No Surprise, KOMmERSANT-DAILY,
Feb. 10, 1996, at 1, 6, reprinted in CuRRENT DIG. POST-SovrT PRms, Mar. 6, 1996, at 17-
18; Ivan Zhagel, Savings Bank Can Be Sold, IzvEstA, May 11, 1995, at 1, reprinted in
CuRRENTr DIG. Posr-SovIEr P.Ess, June 7, 1995, at 15.
69. See 1 IMF, supra note 20, at 25, 33, 364; WooDy, supra note 30, at 29-30. Bank-
ruptcy laws soon followed. See Paul R. Williams & Paul E. Wade, Bankruptcy in Russia:
The Evolution of a Comprehensive Russian Bankruptcy Code, 21 Rev. CENT. & E. EUR. L.
511 (1995).
70. See 1 IMF, supra note 20, at 25, 33, 364. Cf. McKiNoN, supra note 35, at 145-
47.
71. See Law on Cooperatives in the USSR, No. 8998-XI (May 26, 1988) (U.S.S.R.)
(available on Kodecks, translation on file with author).
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on Cooperatives authorized the first private commercial banks in Russia
since Lenin's time.72
Under the Law on Cooperatives, cooperatives were permitted to form
new private banks to serve both their own banking needs and those of their
customers and members. The cooperative banks had authority to serve
borrowers not served by the specialized banks and had marginally greater
independence in choosing borrowers and interest rates. Soon, cooperative
banks expanded into a wide variety of activities besides deposit-taking and
lending, including the underwriting of cooperative securities, leasing, fac-
toring, barter brokerage and the formation of financial syndicates. 73 By
mid-1990, approximately 280 new cooperative banks had been formed in
Russia.74
Despite those developments, by late 1990 competition in the Russian
banking industry remained moribund. Private banks accounted for only
five percent of total credit. True to the cooperatives' fears, the specialized
banks hoarded credit for the state-owned sector, impeding the ability of
new private enterprises to obtain financing.7 5 Tight credit was further
exacerbated by the government's insistence on interest rate controls, both
for deposits and for loans. As the infant private sector clamored for credit,
pressures for greater bank liberalization continued to mount. Envious of
the newly-formed cooperatives, state-owned enterprises and ministries
demanded the right to found their own private banks.76 Matters came to a
head when, in 1990, Russia and the other Soviet republics accelerated their
quest for independence from the U.S.S.R.
B. The 1990 Legislation
In the turbulent last days of 1990, the new Russian parliament enacted
major new legislation, launching the Russian banking industry down the
path of privatization. The Law on the Central Bank, enacted on December
2, 1990, authorized a new central bank for the Russian Federation, in
direct defiance of Gosbank. 77 The Law on Banks and Banking, enacted
that same date, decreed the privatization of most Russian commercial
72. See Law on Cooperatives in the USSR, supra note 71, art. 23, pt. 5; Rumer, supra
note 63, at 20. See generally RuTLAND, supra note 35, at 215-16 (describing how the
nomenklatura captured cooperatives to protect their privileges); Stephan, supra note 61,
at 179-80 (same).
73. See Law on Cooperatives in the USSR, supra note 71, art. 23, pt. 5; 1 IMF, supra
note 20, at 31-32, 364-65; 2 IMF, supra note 20, at 110-11, 114-15; Boris Fedorov, Mone-
tary Policy and Central Banking in Russia, 3 E. EuR. CONST. REv. 60, 60 (1994);Johnson et
al., supra note 34, at 186-87. See also Jacek Rostowski, Problems of Creating Stable Mone-
tary Systems in Post-Communist Economies, 45 EUR.-AsIA STUD. 445, 446 (1993) (discuss-
ing cooperatives).
74. McKINN oN, supra note 35, at 145-47 (citing Yulia Babicheva et al., Commercial
Banks: A Game Without Rules, Bus. USSR, July-Aug. 1990, at 36).
75. See 2 IMF, supra note 20, at 110-11.
76. Cf. Rumer, supra note 63, at 20-21.
77. RSFSR Central Bank (Bank of Russia) Act 1990, (Dec. 2, 1990) (Russ.) [hereinaf-
ter Law on the Central Bank], in TRADE & COMMERCIAL LAws OF THE RussiA FEDERATION:
OFFICIAL CODIFICATION WITH COMMENTARY, booklet 7, at 18 (Academy of Jurisprudence
of the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation et al. eds., 1994) [hereinafter OFF.
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banks and authorized them to freely compete for customers. 78 For the first
time in memory, citizens and firms were free to patronize any bank they
liked 79 (in contrast with the past assignment of banks) and to maintain
bank accounts at more than one bank.80 Together, the two laws formalized
and liberalized the two-tier banking system first instituted in 1987.
The 1990 banking laws resulted from a unique confluence of events
on three separate fronts. The first front was the economy, which was in
dire straits. As the failure of central planning and the inadequacy of piece-
meal Soviet reforms became more and more apparent, public pressure
mounted for full-scale privatization. Under intense pressure, in mid-1990
President Gorbachev finally acceded to public demands for a full-fledged
transition to a market economy. Soon, four groups of academics were jock-
eying to persuade the U.S.S.R Supreme Soviet to advocate their individual
plans for reform. When the warring reform groups were unable to reach a
compromise, President Gorbachev issued his own reform guidelines,
which the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet approved on October 19, 1990. The
Gorbachev guidelines called for an immediate overhaul of the banking sys-
tem as the first step in a multi-stage plan for reform.8 '
The second front consisted of the old nomenklatura, who were shrewd
enough to see that the social forces propelling economic privatization and
the dismantling of central planning could not be stopped. Although indus-
try privatization did not get underway until late 1992, the nomenklatura
knew it was inevitable and decided to control it and to profit from it by
owning and running state industrial firms that were slated to be priva-
tized.82 While the power of the nomenklatura was diminished, they were
organized and presumed to be in control of the army, and thus represented
a threat of civil war. As such, the nomenklaturd were in a strong position to
control newly-privatized state firms. The same was true for their ability to
CIAL CODIFICATION WITH COMMENTARY], also available in Westlaw, Ruslegisline Database,
1990 WL 485325. See generally GROS & STmNHER, supra note 50, at 382.
78. Banks and Banking Business in the RSFSR Act 1990 (Dec. 2, 1990) (Russ.) [here-
inafter Law on Banks and Banking], in OcFICIAL CODIFICATION WITH COMMENTARY, supra
note 77, booklet 7, at 1, also available in Westlaw, Ruslegisline Database, 1990 WL
485325.
79. Law on Banks and Banking, supra note 78, ch. IV, art. 29.
80. Id. ch. VI, art. 38.
81. See 1 IMF, supra note 20, at 61-66; Stuart Brown, Federalism and Marketization in
the Soviet Union: Lessons from Economic Theory, in THE PosT-SoviEr ECONOMY: SovIEr
AND WESTERN PERSPECTIVES 132, 134 (Anders Aslund ed., 1992) [hereinafter THE POST-
SOvIET ECONOMY]. One of the most radical plans was penned by Grigory Yavlinsky (a
1996 presidential candidate and leader of the reform-minded Yabloko Party), Boris
Fedorov and the late Stanislav Shatalin, among others. See G. YAVLINSKY ET AL, 500 DAYS
(TRANsrTON TO THE MARET) (David S. Kushner trans., 1991). For a general description
of the forces militating for banking reform during this period, see Blinov et al., supra
note 62.
82. See Leonid Grigoriev, Ulterior Property Rights and Privatization: Even God Can-
not Change the Past, in THE POST-SovIET EcONOMY, supra note 81, at 196, 203; Katharina
Pistor &Joel Turkewitz, Coping with Hydra-State Ownership After Privatization, in 2 COR-
PORATE GOVERNANCE IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND RussiA 192, 205 (Roman Frydman et al.
eds., 1996); Rumer, supra note 63, at 20-22 ("[A] motto that is quite widespread is 'we
may be losing political power-but we're gaining economic power.').
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shape the new banking industry so as to assure continued state financing,
either directly from the government or through private banks as
intermediaries.
The third front consisted of mounting tensions between the central
U.S.S.R. government and reform-minded republics such as the Russian Fed-
eration. These tensions fostered rivalries conducive to banking reforms. In
1990, that friction resulted in the first free parliamentary elections in the
Russian Republic since 1918. That same year, the Russian Republic suc-
ceeded in wresting key economic powers from the central Soviet govern-
ment. As the Russian Republic struggled for economic autonomy,
Gosbank's allegiance to the Soviet government became a major battle-
ground for control.83
Almost immediately, the new Russian Parliament engaged its rival, the
U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet, in a race to privatize the banking industry. The
Russian Parliament won that race on December 2, 1990, with its enactment
of the Law on the Central Bank and the Law on Banks and Banking.84
Nine days later, on December 11, 1990, the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet
enacted its own competing version of those two laws. 85 The Russian ver-
sions survived the breakup of the Soviet Union and remain in effect, as
amended, in Russia today.86
1. The Law on the Central Bank
In the Law on the Central Bank, the Russian Parliament designated the new
Central Bank of Russia (the "Bank") as the central bank for the Russian
Federation, with responsibility for currency stability, international
reserves, national monetary policy, bank supervision and payments.87 The
Bank officially opened for business in late 1990.88
Certain aspects of the Law on the Central Bank were patterned after
Western banking laws and incorporated significant elements of market
reform. For example, the Russian Supreme Soviet expanded the monetary
powers of the Central Bank of Russia to include central bank functions that
83. See ROMAN FRYDMAN ET AL., THE PRIVATIZATION PROCESS IN RUSSIA, UKRAINE AND
THE BALTIC STATES 4 (1993); GERHARD POHL & STUN CL.AEssENs, BANKS, CAPITAL MARKETS,
AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: LESSONS FROM RUSSIA FOR EASTERN EUROPE 5 (World Bank
Policy Research Working Paper No. 1326, July 1994); Blinov et al., supra note 62, at 86-
87; Osakwe, supra note 68, at 313. Cf. GROS & SmlNHm.R, supra note 50, at 382; Ste-
phan, supra note 61, at 180.
84. See supra notes 77-78.
85. U.S.S.R. State Bank Act 1990 (Dec. 11, 1990) (copy on file with author); U.S.S.R.
Law on Banks and Banking Business Act 1990 (Dec. 11, 1990) (copy on file with
author).
86. See Andrei I. Kazmin, The Contours of a New Banking System in the Dissolving
Soviet Union, BANKARCHIV, Feb. 1992, at 113, 114 & n.1. The Union versions were
superseded upon the demise of the Soviet Union.
87. See Law on the Central Bank, supra note 77, ch. I, arts. 1, 5; Constitution of the
Russian Federation § I, ch. III, art. 75(1), in OFFICIAL CODIFICATION WITH COMMENTARY,
supra note 77 ("The monetary emission shall be the exclusive responsibility of the Cen-
tral Bank of the Russian Federation."); id. art. 75(2) ("The protection and stability of the
ruble is the main function of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation . .
88. See Fedorov, supra note 73, at 60.
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Gosbank previously had not performed. The act gave the Bank explicit
authority to use direct and indirect tools of monetary control, including
discount rate policies, refinance quotas, open market sales of government
securities and mandatory reserves (funds that banks must keep on reserve
with the central bank in non-interest bearing accounts).8 9 Similarly, the
law gave the Bank expanded supervisory powers over commercial banks,
including the power to license commercial banks and to prescribe financial
norms.90 The law further empowered the Bank to formulate standard rules
of accounting, to require banks to submit periodic financial reports, to
examine banks and to enforce bank legislation through sanctions.9 1
Nevertheless, other aspects of the Law on the Central Bank perpetu-
ated soft budget constraints and bore the distinct mark of the nomen-
klatura. For example, while the law contained provisions relieving the
Central Bank of Russia of liability for Russian Federation obligations, it did
so only for those obligations that the Bank chose not to assume. 92 Simi-
larly, the 1990 law only prohibited the Bank from printing money to
finance the state deficit "directly."93 Indeed, a sister provision specifically
authorized the Bank to make loans on ordinary market terms to the Minis-
89. Law on the Central Bank, supra note 77, ch. III, arts. 13-15. See also 1 IMF, supra
note 20, at 370-71; Viktor Ivanov, New Law on Central Bank Adopted: Central Bank Vic-
tory Was Foreordained, KOMMERSANT-DmLY, Jan. 28, 1995, at 1, 3, reprinted in CURRmrr
DIG. Pos-Sovir PaEss, Feb. 22, 1995, at 22 (describing implementation of new central
bank laws). For a general description of direct and indirect monetary and credit instru-
ments, see DONALD J. MATHIESON & RICHARD D. HAAS, ESTABLISHING MONETARY CONTROL
IN FINANCIAL SYSTEMs WITH INSOLVENT INsnru-noNs 24, 18-23 (IMF Paper on Policy Anal-
ysis and Assessment No. 94/10, June 1995); Fedorov, supra note 73, at 60-64.
90. Such norms include minimum capital standards; capital/asset ratios; mandatory
reserves; limits on loans to one borrower; limits on major credit risks; standards on
capital adequacy and liquidity, currency, interest and other risks; minimum loss
reserves; and limits on equity holdings. See Law on the Central Bank, supra note 77, ch.
VI, arts. 22-28. See also Amendments and Addenda to the RSFSR Central Bank (Bank of
Russia) Act, RF Federal Act No. 65-FZ, ch. X, arts. 61-71, 73 (Apr. 12, 1995) (Russ.),
available in Westlaw, Ruslegisline Database, 1995 WL 320349; EUROPEAN BANK FOR
RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, TRAIT.smON REPORT 1995, at 156 (1995) [hereinafter
TRANSrTON REPORT 1995]; Kazmin, supra note 86, at 116-17. By law, banks must be
licensed by the Central Bank of Russia before they accept deposits. See Law on Banks
and Banking, supra note 78, ch. II, art. 11; Civil Code of the Russian Federation, pt. 2,
art. 835 '1 1 (1996).
91. See Law on the Central Bank, supra note 77, ch. VII, arts. 30-33; Law on Banks
and Banking, supra note 78, ch. VII. Sanctions included monetary fines, increased cen-
tral bank reserves, recapitalization directives, replacement of management, operating
restrictions, appointment of an interim administrator, bank reorganization, bank liqui-
dation and license revocation. See Law on the Central Bank, supra note 77, ch. VII, art.
33. See also Natalia G. Markalova, Contemporary Banking Legislation in the Russian Fed-
eration, 122 CORP. COUNSEL'S INT'L ADVISER 122-02, 122-04 (1995). License revocation
was authorized for banking law violations, insolvency, falsehoods in the license applica-
tion, start-up delays of more than one year after licensing, unauthorized bank activities
and breaches of the antimonopoly laws. See Law on Banks and Banking, supra note 78,
ch. II, art. 18. Under the 1990 laws, license revocation was tantamount to liquidation
and was only to be used if breaches were not cured. See id.; Law on the Central Bank,
supra note 77, ch. VII, art. 33.
92. See Law on the Central Bank, supra note 77, ch. I, art. 2.
93. See id., ch. II, art. 11.
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try of Finance to finance budget shortfalls, in amounts not exceeding limits
set by parliament.94 Coupled with provisions making the Bank "accounta-
ble" to parliament,95 the 1990 law thus left the Bank politically vulnerable
to parliamentary demands to fund the government deficit.
Other provisions authorized the Central Bank of Russia to serve as a
lender of last resort in a fashion that left the Bank susceptible to subsidy
demands by private industries and banks. As lender of last resort, the
Bank received authority under the 1990 law "to refinance banks by offering
them short-term credits at the Bank of Russia interest rate," as long as those
credits were secured by collateral. 96 But in contrast with Western banking
practices, the Bank was authorized to extend such credits not only to
insure liquidity, but also to supplement the deficient deposit bases of pri-
vate banks.97 In practice, thus, the lender of last resort provisions paved
the way for thinly veiled central bank subsidies masquerading as loans.
As these provisions suggest, in order to gain support for the legisla-
tion, the drafters had to walk a precarious line between divesting the state
of control over banking and allowing the apparatchiks of the dying Soviet
regime to control access to bank funds, both to finance their companies
and to enrich themselves through rake-offs and graft. That same tension
marked the Law on Banks and Banking.
2. The Law on Banks and Banking
In tandem with the Law on the Central Bank, the Law on Banks and Bank-
ing set forth the statutory framework for privatization and regulation of the
fledgling commercial banking industry in Russia.98 The same political
compromises that appeared in the Law on the Central Bank were evident in
the Law on Banks and Banking.
One obvious example can be seen in the law's equivocal provisions on
commercial bank control. On the one hand, the 1990 law paid lip service
to privatization by outlawing certain types of state involvement in commer-
cial banks, including the financing of charter capital and day-to-day man-
agement. 99 On the other hand (save for the latter provisions and
94. See id., ch. IV, art. 17. See also Kazmin, supra note 86, at 115; Vysman, supra
note 67, at 267.
95. See Law on the Central Bank, supra note 77, ch. I, art. 1; infra notes 165-66, 203
and accompanying text.
96. See Law on the Central Bank, supra note 77, ch. III, art. 14; id., ch. IV, art. 16(a).
97. See Melanie L. Fein, Emerging Russian Banking System Is Unique; But Changes to
Law May Adopt Western Standards, RussiA & COMMONWEALTH Bus. L. REP., Jan. 11, 1993,
available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Allnws File.
98. For comprehensive summaries of this law, see Juhani Laurila, Russian Banking
Legislation and Supervision, in RussiA's FINANCIAL MARKETS AND THE BANKING SECTOR IN
TRANsrrIoN 83 (Jouko Rautava ed., 1996); Pettibone & Passer-Muslin, supra note 68, pas-
sim; Vysman, supra note 67, at 268-74.
99. On the topic of financing, the law provided that legislators, their executive bod-
ies, political parties and specialized public funds could not contribute funds to the char-
ter capital of a bank See Law on Banks and Banking, supra note 78, ch. I, art. 10. On
the topic of management, the law made commercial banks independent of the executive
and administrative branches in day-to-day operating decisions and officials of those
branches were specifically banned "from taking part ...in the governing bodies of
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provisions restricting foreign ownership of banks),100 the law did not
restrict the identity of founders or shareholders. Nothing prevented the
Central Bank of Russia from later acquiring holdings in private banks.
Similarly, nothing prevented industrial enterprises, former Party
apparatchiks or factory managers from obtaining control stakes in banks.
In view of these provisions, it comes as no surprise that the 1990 law
was devoid of any provisions regulating conflicts of interest and self-deal-
ing. Nothing in the 1990 law limited bank loans to bank shareholders,
officers or directors. 10 1 Nor could the Central Bank of Russia deny or
revoke a bank license due to concerns over insider loans.10 2
Hence, the 1990 law was specifically designed to elicit the support of
the nomenklatura in return for the right to capture banks for use as private
financing arms. The 1990 laws paved the way for privatization of the Rus-
sian banking industry by assuring the nomenklatura that the bank funds
they had come to regard as an entitlement would not be cut off. Armed
with the legal wherewithal to capture banks, the nomenklatura proved more
than equal to steering the course of privatization.
IV. The Appearance of Marketization
With the passage of the 1990 laws, the commercial banking sector in Rus-
sia underwent privatization at breakneck speed. On January 2, 1991, the
Russian Federation registered 1,085 private banks that were spin-offs from
the old Soviet banks.103 Today, when former state-owned banks, collective
banks." Id., ch. I, art. 8. The law further specified that commercial banks were not
liable for state debts and the state was not liable for the debts of commercial banks,
unless otherwise provided. See id., ch. I, art. 7.
100. See id., ch. I, art. 4.
101. As one bank vice president told the author in St. Petersburg in April 1994, "Why
else would I work at a bank?" Cf. 2 IMF, supra note 20, at 115 ("[t]he concept of conflict
of interest does not appear to be well developed in the USSR, and there are currently no
regulations to avoid it").
102. See Law on Banks and Banking, supra note 78, ch. II, arts. 12, 17-18.
103. See Blinov et al., supra note 62, at 87. Today, Sberbank, Vneshtorgbank of Russia
and Vneshekonombank of Russia are the only specialized banks in which the state
retains a formal ownership interest. The Central Bank of Russia owns 51% of Sberbank.
See Natalia Gurushina, New Chairman for Sberbank, OMRI DAILY DIG. (Jan. 25, 1996)
<http://wwv.omri.cz/Publications/Digests/DigestIndex.html>. Cf. Mikhail Berger, Cen-
tral Bank Uses Savings Bank to Show Exactly What a Controlling Block of Shares Is, lzvas-
mt, Jan. 25, 1996, at 2, reprinted in CuRmi'r DIG. PosT-SovIEr PREss, Feb. 21, 1996, at
16-17. See also supra note 68 and accompanying text. The Central Bank of Russia and
the Finance Ministry have sought exclusive access to Sberbank's deposits for the financ-
ing of the government deficit, to the exclusion of commercial loans. See Carlotta Gall,
Sberbank Fights State Encroachment, Moscow TiMas, Nov. 27, 1994, at 53. Cf. Poul F.
Larsen, A Penny Saved. . ., RUssIA REv., July 15, 1996, at 22. In 1995, the Duma took
steps to correct this situation by ordering Sberbank to privatize while prohibiting the
Bank from participating in Sberbank's activities. See Ivan Zhagel, Savings Bank Can Be
Sold, IzvEsTiA, May 11, 1995, at 1, reprinted in CuRRmrr DIG. Posr-SoviEr PRss, June 7,
1995, at 15. Despite this directive, the Bank has delayed Sberbank's privatization, citing
depositor concerns that deposit insurance would vanish upon privatization. In July
1995, the Duma enacted a law requiring special legislative approval before Sberbank
could transfer shares. See Andrei Grigoryev & Svetlana Lolayeva, Property: Only the
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banks and new institutions are included, there are roughly 2,000 licensed
commercial banks in Russia.' 0 4 By divesting its state-owned banks, Russia
deliberately opted for a liberal proliferation of new private banks at the
risk of weak capitalization and subsequent bank failures. Through its
aggressive course, Russia privatized its banking system much more quickly
than some of the Soviet Union's former satellites in central and eastern
Europe, which simply split their former state-owned banks into a central
bank and several smaller, state-owned commercial units.10 5
By first appearances, the Russian banking industry transformed itself
into a decentralized market-based system. The proliferation of Russian
commercial banks alone suggests the dimension of this change. Deposi-
tors now have freedom to select their banks and borrowers have the legal
freedom to shop for lenders. Most medium- and large-sized banks offer
wire transfers, correspondent account services, letters of credit, hard cur-
rency accounts and even credit cards. 10 6
On closer examination, however, the transition to a market model of
banking was less successful than it might seem at first blush. On the liabil-
ity side, competition failed to attract significant private deposits to com-
mercial banks. On the asset side, banks endangered their solvency by
making loans with scant regard for creditworthiness or profits.
These problems dashed the hopes of economists who had looked to
Russian commercial banks as the engine for financing the new private sec-
tor in Russia. In mature capitalist economies, banks normally share that
task with the securities markets. In Russia, however, the difficulties of rely-
ing on the capital markets for financing are many and well-known. The
Deputies Will Be Able to Sell the Savings Bank-Depositors Still Have Guarantees; the Own-
ers Still Have the Bank, SEVODNYA, July 8, 1995, at 1, reprinted in CURRENT DIG. POST-
SoviEr PREss, Aug. 2, 1995, at 18.
104. See Natalia Gurushina, Banking System Review, OMRI DAILY DIG. (Nov. 26, 1996)
<http://www.omri.cz/Publications/Digests/DigestIndex.html>.
105. See POL & CIAassas, supra note 83, at 2-3; TRANSITION REPORT 1995, supra note
90, at 161-62.
106. As Kornai aptly noted:
The banking system of a reform economy looks similar at first sight. The central
influence of the state-the vertical link-is undeniably strong, but the impres-
sion, nonetheless, is that the managers and officials here are dealing with
money; bank deposits come into being, loans are made, current accounts are
run, checks and transfers are written, interest is calculated, bonds and shares
are handled, and so on. All these indicate commercial transactions, horizontal
relations, and "business," in other words, the presence of market coordination.
This impression is reinforced by the structural changes undergone by the bank-
ing system during the process of reform. Tendencies toward decentralization
appear. Some of them are connected with the growth of regional autonomy;
separate banks are set up for each region. The rest are directed at replacing the
earlier monobank with a two-level banking system, with the Central Bank operat-
ing as the upper tier and mutually independent commercial banks as the lower.
So the impression is given that the decentralization has been accompanied by
the appearance of competition among the commercial banks.
Koamm, supra note 28, at 544 (emphasis in original). See also Mikhail Lapidus &
Michael D. Corbin, Banks and the Free Market in the Former Soviet Union, Bus. CREDIT,
June 1994, at 25.
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Russian stock market is in its infancy and rife with deterrents to invest-
ment, including clouds on stock ownership, rigged prices, weak or absent
secondary trading markets, and rampant fraud. 107 The Russian corporate
bond market barely exists.10 8 Consequently, many commentators looked
to the Russian banking industry to supply the bulk of Russia's corporate
financing needs. 10 9
To date, however, the Russian banking industry's track record has
been disappointing. Russian banks are wary of lending to start-up busi-
nesses. When they do, the loans usually bear prohibitively high rates of
interest. 110 As a result, new businesses in Russia normally finance their
107. Cf. Andrei A. Baev, Is There a Niche for the State in Corporate Governance?
Securitization of State-Owned Enterprises and New Forms of State Ownership, 18 Hous. J.
INT'L L. 1, 46-47 (1995). See generallyJ. Robert Brown, Jr., Of Brokers, Banks and the Case
for Regulatory Intervention in the Russian Securities Markets, 32 STAN. J. INT'L L. 185, 197-
200 (1996) [hereinafter Brown, Of Brokers]; J. Robert Brown, Jr., Order From Disorder:
The Development of the Russian Securities Markets, 15 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 509 (1994);
Claudia Morgenstern, Capital Markets Development and Financing Russia's Transforma-
tion, in RussIA: CREATING PRIVATE ENTERPRISES AND EFFiCENT MARIErs 89 (Ira W. Lieber-
man & John Nellis eds., The World Bank, 1995); Natal'ia Shmeleva, Reforma
Sobstvennosti i Finansovaia Sistema, 11 SVOBODNAIA MYSL' 57 (1993), reprinted as Prop-
erty Reform and the Financial System, 37 PROBS. ECON. TRANSION 25, 32 (1994).
108. Natasha Mileusnic, You Liked GKOs? Then You'll Love Corporates, RussiA REv.,
Mar. 25, 1996, at 21.
109. See, e.g., Hans J. Blommestein &Jean R. Lange, Balance Sheet Restructuring and
Privatisation of the Banks, in CENTRE FOR CO-OPERATION wrrH THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIES IN
TRANSITION Er AL., TRANSFORMATION OF THE BANKING SYSTEM: PORTFOLIO RESTRUCTURING,
PRIVATISATION AND THE PAYMENT SYSTEM 13, 15-16 (1993). Cf. ANDY MULLINEUX, BANKING
SECTOR RESTRUCTURING, DEBT CONSOLIDATION AND SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES
IN TRANSITIONAL ECONOMIES 4-5 (U. Birmingham Dep't of Econ. & Int'l Fin. Group Work-
ing Paper IFGWP-95-05, 1995); Edgar Ortiz, Take-off Into Development and Emerging
Capital Markets: Stages of Financial Development and Equity Financing, in INTERNATIONAL
FINANCE IN THE NEv WORIL ORDER 71, 73, 81 (H. Peter Gray & Sandra C. Richard eds.,
1995); OuvIER B HAcRDu Er AL., REFORM IN EASTERN EUROPE 75 (1991) (the "high rate of
domestic saving, if maintained, is likely to go to the emerging sector") [hereinafter
REFORM IN EASTERN EUROPE]; Tamar Frankel, Foreword, 13 B.U. INT'L LJ. 295, 303 (1995)
("[t]he proper functioning of the emerging market economy requires the establishment
and maintenance of a strong, private banking system"). For pessimistic views of the
financing roles of banks, see GUILLERMO A. CALvo & MANMoHAN S. KUMAR, MONEY
DEMAND, BANK CREDIT, AND ECONOMIC PEROmANcE IN FORMER SOCIALIST ECONOMIES 26,
29 (IMF Working Paper No. 94/3,Jan. 1994) (discussing Poland and Hungary); GERARD
CAPRIO, JR. & ROSS LEVINE, REFORMING FINANCE IN TRANSITIONAL ECONOMIES: AVOIDING
THE PATH FROM SHELL MONEY TO SHELL GAMES 13 (World Bank, Policy Research Working
Papers WPS 898, 1992); Stanley Fischer, Prospects for Russian Stabilization in the Sum-
mer of 1993, in ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION IN RUSsIA 8, 16 (Anders Aslund ed., 1994);
McKinnon, supra note 37, at 109, 121; Richard Portes, Quotation of the Month: "Now
That the Transformation Traps Have Been Recognized, There Should Be Less Likelihood of
Getting Caught," TRANSITION, Oct. 1994, at 13, 14 (World Bank Policy Research Dep't);
Alfredo Thorne, Eastern Europe's Experience with Banking Reform: Is There a Role for
Banks in the Transition?, 17J. BANING & FIN. 959, 960-61, 998-99 (1993).
110. See Lidia Lukyanova, The Troubles of Small Businesses in Russia, PRISM, pt. 3 (Apr.
5, 1996) <http://www.jamestown.org> ("[t]he negative experience of the principal bank
specializing in small business services, Mezhekonomsberbank-currently on the verge of
bankruptcy-goes a long way toward explaining most banks' general distrust of the
financial reliability of small businesses"). Cf. Andrei Grigoryev, The Past Year Marked the
End of the Speculative Era, SEVODNYA, Dec. 31, 1996, at 5, reprinted in CuRRENr DIG. Post-
SOVIET PREss, Feb. 12, 1997, at 10 (Russian commercial banks preferred to speculate in
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operations from retained profits, rather than from external financing.111
There are numerous reasons for this state of affairs, not the least of
which are Russian banks' understandable difficulties in assessing
creditworthiness and obtaining assurances of repayment. Credit reporting
services are practically non-existent and there are few if any sources of
publicly available information about prospective corporate borrowers.
Businesses lack track records of success under the new economic regime
and banks lack experience in evaluating creditworthiness. 112 To com-
pound matters, bank collateral laws are in their infancy, 113 collateral regis-
tries barely exist, collateral ownership is highly uncertain 1 4 and judicial
enforcement of collateral and bankruptcy rights is haphazard at best. 115
foreign currency and government bonds). A 1995 World Bank survey showed that sixty-
four percent of new ventures surveyed had received a bank loan between 1992 and 1994,
compared with eighty-four percent of pre-existing firms during the same period. See
Andrea Richter & Mark E. Schaffer, Growth, Investment and Newly-Established Firms in
Russian Manufacturing 5-6 Uune 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
111. See CAPRiO & LEVINE, supra note 109, at 13; COLINJONES, BANKING AND FINANCIAL
SECTORS IN EAST AND CENTRAL EUROPE 12 (Financial Times Management Report 1993);
TRANSITION REPORT 1995, supranote 90, at 87, 91-92; Leonid Khotin, Old and New Entre-
preneurs in Today's Russia, 43 PROBS. Posr-COMMUNIsM 49, 55 (1996); Morgenstern,
supra note 107, at 90; Mark E. Schaffer et al., Bank-Enterprise Relations and Credit Allo-
cation in Russia 12 (June 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). Ronald
McKinnon presaged this development. See McKinnon, supra note 37, at 121-23. For
proposed solutions to this financing impasse, compare id. at 121-24 (would initially halt
bank loans and require businesses to expand through retained earnings) with HUGH
BREDENKAMP, CONDUCTING MONETARY AND CREDrr POuCY IN COUNTRIES OF THE FORMER
SovIET UNION: SOME ISSUES AND OPTIONS 17-20, 22 (IMF Working Paper No. WP/93/23,
1993) (would limit bank loans to enterprises that had current audited financial state-
ments and a model business plan).
112. Cf. CALvo & KUMAR, supra note 109, at 27, 29; STANLEY FISCHER & ALAN GELB,
ISSUES IN SOCIALIST ECONOMY REFORM 9 (World Bank Policy, Research, and External
Affairs WPS 565, 1990); KENNETH KLETZER &JORGE RoLDos, THE ROLE OF CREDIT MAR-
KETS IN A TRANSITION ECONOMY wIm INCOMPLETE PUBLIC INFORMATION iii (IMF Working
Paper No. WP/96/18, 1996); ANDY MULLINEUX, PROGRESS WrI FINANCIAL SECTOR
REFORM IN Six TRANSFORMING ECONOMIES 24 (U. Birmingham Dep't of Econ. & Int'l Fin.
Group Working Paper IFGWP-95-04, 1995); EDMUND S. PHELPS ET AL., NEEDED MECHA-
NISMS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCE IN EASTERN EUROPE 25 (European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development Working Paper No. 1, 1993); Johnson et al., supra note
34, at 185, 194-95; Jacek Rostowski, Dilemmas of Monetary and Financial Policy in Post-
Stabilization Russia, in ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION IN RUSSIA, supra note 109, at 72;
David Rudnick, First Sort Out the Banks, EUROMONEY, Mar. 1994, at 157, 158; Vysman,
supra note 67, at 278. As a result, Russian banks have "tended to favor those borrowers
who had large fixed assets that could serve as collateral," i.e., large formerly state-owned
enterprises. See ROMAN FRYDMAN & ANDRZEJ RAPACZYNSKI, PRIVATIZATION IN EASTERN
EUROPE: Is THE STATE WITHERING AWAY? 130 (1994).
113. See Johnson et al., supra note 34, at 187, 194-95.
114. The newly enacted Russian Civil Code attempts to redress this problem. See
generally Civil Code of the Russian Federation, pt. 1, arts. 25, 65 (1993).
115. See ASLUND, How RUSSIA BECAME A MAluR ECONOMY, supra note 65, at 169, 211;
Bernard S. Black et al., Corporate Law From Scratch, in 2 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN
CENTRAL EUROPE AND RUSSIA, supra note 82, at 245, 292; TRANSITION REPORT 1995, supra
note 90, at 114-15; Vysman, supra note 67, at 278. See generally Peter Rutland, Bank-
ruptcy Data, OMRI DAILY DIG. (Mar. 28, 1996) <http://www.omri.cz/Publications/
Digests/Digestlndex.html> (noting that although Russian courts declared 459 enter-
prises bankrupt in 1995 and another 1,103 firms voluntarily declared bankruptcy that
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Because formal enforcement is more important for longer-term contracts,
enforcement problems discourage longer-term capital investment loans. 16
In addition, many of the old state-owned banks that underwent priva-
tization were saddled with operating losses inherited from Soviet times.
Rather than write off those losses, the Russian government simply appor-
tioned them among the state-owned banks when it came time to priva-
tize.1 17 High inflation and negative real interest rates eventually wiped out
those losses.' 1 8 In the short term, however, the effect was to sap operating
funds, reducing the funds available for lending and encouraging burdened
year, no large-sized enterprise had been declared bankrupt). In theory, the Law on
Banks and Banking gave banks the right to secure loans with collateral and to force
insolvent borrowers into bankruptcy. See Law on Banks and Banking, supra note 78, ch.
IV, arts. 32-34. For a description of procedures for the enforcement of bankruptcy
rights, see generally Russian Federation Insolvency (Bankruptcy) of Enterprises Act,
Russian Federation Act No. 3929-1, Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Decree No.
3930-1, arts. 1, 10(1) (1992), available in Westlaw, Ruslegisline Database. But a 1994
survey found that while virtually all bank loans in Russia were collateralized, collateral
provisions were of questionable value because banks rarely took legal action to seize
secured assets. See Schaffer et al., supra note 111, at 2, 7.
Instead, many banks rely upon private security forces to collect collateral, spawning
violence and vigilantism. See, e.g., Black et al., supra, at 63. Baidina and Baidin describe
the enforcement problems in detail:
For example, these kinds of situations are not unusual: A borrower gets credits
in several banks using the same property as collateral, a building for example.
In case of default, several banks start claiming the same building; what results is
a fight among the banks rather than between the bank and the borrower. The
situation becomes even more complicated when the property is a plot of land,
because it is very difficult to determine .the rightful owner under current law.
Legal recourses for foreclosing on a mortgage are quite cumbersome, and it is
even more difficult to force a firm to declare bankruptcy to settle debts to credi-
tors. These actions can only be brought in a court of arbitration, and the flood
of such cases has brought relatively long delays in having cases heard (at least
three months). In a fluid situation such as Russia's, this is long enough for
property to become unsaleable or for the debtor to disappear.
Oksana Baidina & Evgeniy Baidin, Houses Built On Sand, EAsr/Wasr LaErrJuly 1995,
at 1, 9 (Okno Consulting, Ann Arbor, Mich.). For cogent descriptions of legal enforce-
ment difficulties in the Russian commercial environment, see James P. Nehf, Empower-
ing the Russian Consumer in a Market Economy, 14 MICH. J. INr'n L. 739, 804-13 (1993);
Paul H. Rubin, Growing a Legal System in the Post-Communist Economies, 27 CORNELL
INr' L.J. 1, 27-33, 41-42 (1994). The new Russian Civil Code seeks to strengthen collat-
eral protections, among other things, by authorizing registration procedures, establish-
ing priorities for junior liens and permitting executions of levy in certain circumstances
by agreement without resort to court. See Civil Code of the Russian Federation, pt. 1,
arts. 164-165, 329 c' 1, 334-358 (1993). See also Civil Code of the Russian Federation,
pt. 2, art. 813 (1996) (acceleration clause); Lane H. Blumenfeld, Russia's New Civil Code:
The Legal Foundation for Russia's Emerging Market Economy, 30 IN'L LAw. 477 (1996).
Nevertheless, other provisions of the Civil Code dilute collateral protections by subordi-
nating security interests to tort and wage claims. See Civil Code of the Russian Federa-
tion, pt. 1, art. 64 (1993); see also Williams & Wade, supra note 69, at 529-30.
116. See Rubin, supra note 115, at 1, 14.
117. See MICHAEL S. BORISH ET AL., RESTRUCTURING BANKS AND ENTRmPISES: REcENT
LESSONS FROM TRANSrnoN COuNTRIES 16 (World Bank Discussion Paper No. 279, 1995).
Cf. Blinov et al., supra note 62, at 87-88; YAVLiNSKY Er AL., supra note 81, at 34 (propos-
ing in the 500-day plan that "the balance sheets of state banks shall be divided; all
transactions shall be passed through correspondent accounts").
118. See Blommestein & Lange, supra note 109, at 17-18.
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banks to flout sound banking practices in exchange for higher rates of
return.1 19
But beyond these problems lay more fundamental difficulties. The
apparent market tilt of Russian commercial banking veiled the fact that
major segments of the Russian banking industry continued to serve as con-
duits for Soviet-style soft budget constraints. The large majority of Russian
banks practiced Soviet banking as usual, but in a new guise. That was the
direct legacy of the ownership structure of most Russian commercial
banks.
A. Market Failure and the Resurgence of the Nomenklatura
Approximately two-thirds of private Russian banks today are organized as
partnerships, while the remaining banks are organized as joint-stock com-
panies. 120 In either case, organizers of new Russian banks are required to
contribute specified amounts of capital by law. By surface appearances,
then, stakeholders in Russian banks put their own -funds at risk and the
pursuit of profit should be their overriding motive.
In all too many instances, however, new Russian banks subordinated
profit-seeking to other goals, such as providing subsidies to failing private
industries or economic demands by the state. Why those banks resisted
market principles is apparent when the ownership origins of Russian com-
mercial banks are examined.
Private banks in Russia are of three distinct types. The first consists of
banks previously owned by the state.121 During privatization, the banks'
traditional customers-state-owned enterprises themselves slated for priva-
tization-acquired controlling stakes in those banks.122 The second type
consists of other banks formed by government ministries and state-owned
firms. Generally, these banks were created either from the financial admin-
istrations of one-time government ministries or local branches of state-
119. See BORISH Er AL., supra note 117, at 16; TRANSITION REPORT 1995, supra note 90,
at 20, 153; Kazmin, supra note 86, at 117. Cf. CALvo & KUMAR, supra note 109, at 27;
CAPRIO & LEvINE, supra note 109, at 18; FISCHER & GELB, supra note 112, at 27-28; MATH-
IESON & HAAs, supra note 89, at 8-9; McKinnon, supra note 37, at 121; Anthony Saunders
& Andrea Sommariva, Banking Sector and Restructuring in Eastern Europe, 17J. BANKING
& FIN. 931 (1993); Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Design of Financial Systems for the Newly
Emerging Democracies of Eastern Europe, in EMERGENCE, supra note 37, at 161, 170-74.
120. Markalova, supra note 91, at 122-03.
121. In 1990 Agroprombank and Zhilsotsbank were converted into joint-stock compa-
nies. Promstroibank followed suit in 1991. SeeJohnson et al., supra note 34, at 186. See
also Craig Mellow, Upstarts and Mother Wolf, THE BANKER 14, 14-15 (May 1993); Osakwe,
supra note 68, at 322; RussIA's LEADING COMMERcIAL BANKS 81-82 (Martin McCauley ed.,
1994); Russian Banks; Overgrown and Under Financed, EcONOMIsT, July 18, 1992, at 84.
Stolichny Savings Bank acquired Agroprombank in late 1996. See Poul F. Larsen,
Stolichny Opens Russia's First Private Savings Bank, RUSSIA REV., Dec. 16, 1996, at 23. In
the meantime, Zhilsotsbank went out of business and its branches were spun off into
new commercial banks. See Brown, Of Brokers, supra note 107, at 202.
122. See Khotin, supra note 111, at 50, 53-54; Mellow, supra note 121, at 14-15; Rud-
nick, supra note 112, at 158, 160; Vysman, supra note 67, at 279.
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owned banks that split off on their own.123 The last type consists of banks
created from scratch (often, however, with capital supplied by the state).
These most resemble independent commercial banks. 124
In January 1991, when bank privatization began, state-owned enter-
prises and government ministries moved aggressively to seize control of
state-owned banks. The sorry financial shape of these state-owned firms
made captive financing essential. When the command economy unraveled,
Russian industry went into a free-fall as trade parmers reneged on their
debts, demand for outmoded products plummeted and the Soviet trade alli-
ance fell apart.' 25 Hemorrhaging losses, state-owned firms took full advan-
tage of the provisions in the 1990 laws that made captive banks available
for the taking.
The minimum capital provisions of those laws made the taking easy.
UntilJuly 1, 1993, only five million rubles were required to start a commer-
cial bank in Russia (approximately equal to $5,000 in late May of 1993),
and even that amount was soft because intangibles such as the banking
experience of managers counted toward capital. As inflation soared, start-
ing a bank became less costly than starting a kiosk, and sometimes the
state even supplied the capital.' 26 Over 2,000 banks sprang into existence
123. Examples include Mosbusinessbank, formerly a branch of Zhilsotsbank ICB in
St. Petersburg and the Commercial Bank of Western Siberia, once branches of Prom-
stroi; Avtovaz Bank, formed by the company that manufactures Lada cars; and Unex-
imbank. See POHL & CLAESSENS, supra note 83, at 7; Bernstein, supra note 68, at 23; Olga
Kryshtanovskaya, The Financial Oligarchy in Russia, Izvasm , Jan. 10, 1996, at 5,
reprinted in CuRRENT DIG. Posr-Sovir PREss, Feb. 21, 1996, at 1, 2; Rumer, supra note
63, at 19, 21-22; Russian Banks; Overgrown and Under Financed, supra note 121, at 84;
Vysman, supra note 67, at 279. Estimates of the number of such banks vary but in any
event are substantial. Former Central Bank of Russia chairman Viktor Gerashchenko
estimated in 1993 that "[miore than one-third of the small banks were created from
divisions of former state specialized banks." Viktor V. Gerashchenko, Tekushchie
Zadachi Denezhno-Kreditnoi Politiki i Tendentsii Razvitiia Bankovskoi Sistemy RF, 7 DEN'GI
I KREDrr 14 (1993), reprinted as Current Problems of Monetary and Credit Policy and Devel-
opmental Tendencies in the Banking System of the Russian Federation, 30 RussIAN & E. EUR.
FIN. & TRADE 7, 11 (1994); see also The Emerging Russian Commercial Bank Sector, BisrNs
BuLLErIN (Int'l Trade Adm., U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Washington, D.C.), Dec. 1993-Jan.
1994, at 1, 3 (estimating that 700 banks are spinoffs of the old sector banks); Russian
Banks; Overgrown and Under Financed, supra note 121, at 84 (estimating that four-fifths
of Russian commercial banks are owned by state-run enterprises). Many banks flouted
the legislative ban on using funds from political and governmental organizations for
purposes of bank capital, while others complied with the ban by recapitalizing and reor-
ganizing their boards. See Kazmin, supra note 86, at 116; Vysman, supra note 67, at 279.
124. POHn. & CLA.ssENs, supra note 83, at 6-8; Celeste E. Greene, A Regulatory Frame-
work for Commercial Banking in Russia, 12 INT'L TAx & Bus. lAw. 63, 66-68 (1994);
Johnson et al., supra note 34, at 186, 188; Hill & Slavinski, supra note 51, at 38, 41;
Kryshtanovskaya, supra note 123, at 3; Mellow, supra note 121, at 14-15; Rostowski,
supra note 73, at 446; Rudnick, supra note 112, at 157, 158. Credobank, Inkombank,
Bank Stolichny, Menatep and Kommerzbank are examples of commercial banks started
from scratch. See POHn. & CLAssE's, supra note 83, at 7; Kryshtanovskaya, supra note
123, at 3; Mellow, supra note 121, at 15.
125. See JoN s, supra note 111, at 11; Blommestein & Lange, supra note 109, at 17.
126. See Hill & Slavinski, supra note 51, at 41; Central Bank of the Russian Federa-
tion, Russia's Central Bank Report, May 28, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Arcnws File (reporting that the official exchange rate for the ruble on May 28, 1993 was
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during that period, at least eighty percent of which were severely under-
capitalized by Western standards.' 27 Thus, during the first two years of
994 rubles to the dollar). See generally Greene, supra note 124, at 87-89. As Dmitri
Tulin, then the deputy governor of the Central Bank of Russia, lamented: "A situation
where entrepreneurs face the choice of either buying a good car or setting up a bank is
paradoxical and abnormal." Leyla Boulton, Russia Attempts to Flush Out Weak Banks,
THE FiNNA. PosT, Feb. 22, 1994, at 10.
The Central Bank of Russia increased the minimum capital requirement for new
banks effective February 1993, March 1994 and May 1996 respectively to 100 million
rubles (approximately $65,000), two billion rubles ($1.1 million at then-prevailing
rates) and two million European Currency Units (ECU) ($2.48 million). See RF Central
Bank Telegram No. 47-94, Minimum Authorized Capital of Newly Registered Banks, TI1 1, 4
(Feb. 21, 1994), available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Sovleg File; RF Central Bank Tele-
gram No. 3-93, Banking Licenses (Jan. 6, 1993), available in LEXIS, Europe Library,
Sovleg File; POHL & C.ssFNs, supra note 83, at 9; Gerashchenko, supra note 123, at 11;
Hill & Slavinski, supra note 51, at 41; Rudnick, supra note 112, at 157; Russia Raises
Minimum Capital Rules, Sets New Licensing Regulations for Banks, 66 Banking Rep. (BNA)
757 (Apr. 29, 1996). Effective July 1, 1993, existing banks had to have capital of 100
million rubles and banks must raise their capital to five million ECU byJanuary 1, 1999.
Any bank that cannot meet the five million ECU requirement by that date will be
restricted to the domestic market if its capital is at least one million ECU. See Natalia
Gurushina, Central Bank Tightens Its Grip on Commercial Banks, OMRI DAILY DIG., Mar.
5, 1997, <http://www.omri.cz/Publications/ Digests/Digestlndex.html>. Further,
under the Bank's current requirements, no more than 20% of a new bank's minimum
capital may consist of tangible assets and no more than 1% may consist of intangible
assets. After the first two years of a bank's operation, the ratio of tangible assets to
minimum capital must fall to ten percent. See RF Central Bank Telegram No. 47-94,
supra, TI 4, 7-8; RF Central Bank Telegram No. 3-93, supra; TRIANsMoN REPORT 1995,
supra note 90, at 56; Markalova, supra note 91, at 122-06; Pettibone & Passer-Muslin,
supra note 68, at 710; Rudnick, supra note 112, at 157.
Aleksandr Khandruev, first deputy chairman of the Central Bank of Russia, stated in
March 1996 that increased capital requirements made it "practically impossible" to
license a new bank today in Russia. Peter Rutland, Tight Monetary Policy Will Continue,
OMRI DAILY DIG. (Mar. 20, 1996) <http://www.omri.cz/Publications/Digests/Diges-
tIndex.htm>. Among existing banks, over forty percent were sorely undercapitalized as
of mid-1995, with capital below 500 million rubles (100,000 ECU). See TRANsrrION
REPORT 1995, supra note 90, at 160. The new minimum capital requirements put pres-
sure on undercapitalized banks to merge with larger institutions. See Elif Kaban, IMF
Warns of Banking Risk, Moscow TIMES, Oct. 20, 1994; Julie Tolkacheva, Stolichny to
Merge With Union Bank, Moscow TiMEs, Oct. 8, 1995, at 27. Because legislation gov-
erning the closure of undercapitalized and insolvent banks has not yet passed, the Bank
principally has addressed that problem through license revocations and voluntary merg-
ers of small, poorly capitalized banks into bigger banks. Consolidation seriously got
underway in 1994, when approximately fifty percent of all banks liquidated became
branches of larger banks, either through sale of a controlling block of shares or sale of
their customer base. See Baidina & Baidin, supra note 115, at 12-13; Rutland, supra. By
the fall of 1994, the 65 largest banks controlled seventy percent of all Russian banking
assets. See ECONOMICA WEEKLY BRIEF, Oct. 29-Nov. 4, 1994 (on file with author). See
also The Emerging Russian Commercial Banking Sector, supra note 123, at 3. Such merg-
ers picked up pace after the inter-bank crisis of August 1995. See Claudia Rosett, Rus-
sia's Bank System Begins to Revive With Cautious Borrowing, Lending, WAiL ST. J., Aug. 29,
1995, at All.
127. See Michael S. Borish et al., Postsocialist Bank Restructuring-Lessons Learned,
TRANsrnoN (The World Bank, Washington, D.C.), Jan.-Feb. 1995, at 8, 10-11; Hill &
Slavinski, supra note 51, at 41; Markalova, supra note 91, at 122-03; Rudnick, supra note
112, at 157. See generally Blommestein & Lange, supra note 109, at 16.
As a result of initially low capital requirements, most Russian banks remain quite
small. At the World Economic Forum in January 1994, then-Central Bank of Russia
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reform, even ailing manufacturing firms could afford to found a bank.
As a result, large segments of the Russian banking industry are client
banks, owned and run by former state-owned enterprises and ministries
that have now been privatized. 128 Most of the newly privatized firms, in
turn, are owned and run by members of the old-line Party elite who are
imbued with Soviet norms. 129 As Anders Aslund described the mentality
of the party-elite-turned-managers:
[They] seem to have all the characteristics that one would like to avoid: they
have little knowledge of economics; they are firmly moulded by the old
Soviet command economy; they know nothing of the outside world; their
purpose for coming into power is to gain wealth for themselves and their
narrow constituency.130
Thus, in many instances the legal form of banks and firms changed,
but their economic behavior did not. Because very little capital was at risk,
insider loans, rather than return on equity, were the primary motivating
factor behind the formation of a majority of Russian banks.131 Moreover,
with bankruptcy laws rarely enforced, borrower-shareholders knew that
they were unlikely to be shut down if they could not repay their loans.132
Client banks thus faced intense pressures from their shareholders and
boards to compromise profits in order to perpetuate the old Soviet system
of soft budget constraints.
To be sure, not all commercial banks in Russia were controlled by bor-
rower-clients. A small minority of Russian banks were created without ties
to the old albatross businesses. But even of those, fewer than twenty,
according to the World Bank, have made significant strides in damping
chairman Gerashchenko said that of the 2,000-plus private Russian banks, only one
hundred or so were "serious institutions." Peter Mackler, Russia Wants to Limit Foreign
Bank Presence, AGENCE FRNCE PRssE, Jan. 31, 1994, available in LEXIS, Europe Library,
Allnws File. As an additional consequence, Louise Shelley, an expert on Russian mafia
infiltration, has concluded that the "possibility of establishing a bank in Russia with
very low capital requirements allow[ed] many questionable individuals to establish
banking institutions." Louise Shelley, Post-Soviet Organized Crime and the Rule of Law,
28 JOHN MARSHALL L. REv. 827, 831 (1995). See also Svetlana P. Glinkina, Privatizatsiya
and Kriminalizatsiya, II DmomRzATsIYA 385, 391 (1994).
128. See 2 IMF, supra note 20, at 114-15; POHL & CLAESSENs, supra note 83, at 6-7;
Greene, supra note 124, at 66; Mellow, supra note 121, at 14-15; Schaffer et al., supra
note 111, at 3, 13.
129. See Pistor & Turkewitz, supra note 82, at 205 (in a majority of privatized, for-
merly state-owned enterprises in Russia, "insiders acquired 51 percent of their com-
pany's shares").
130. Aslund, supra note 12, at 19, 33.
131. See id. at 32. Cf. Black et al., supra note 115, at 253; V. Mekhriakov, The Russian
Banking System, 39 PROBS. ECON. TPaNsrnoN 82, 84 (1996); Vasiliev, supra note 47, at 77.
For their part, managers of former state-owned banks were predisposed to lend to their
traditional industrial customers by habit, personal loyalties and, in many cases, expecta-
tions of continued kickbacks. See PHrips Er AL., supra note 112, at 25.
132. See KoRNAi, supra note 28, at 539, 546; Blommestein & Lange, supra note 109, at
16. See generally Newton Davis, Note, Russian Bankruptcy and Enterprise Sell-off. Creat-
ing a User-Friendly System, 2 PAMKE SCH. J.E. Eut. L. 59 (1995); Patrick Legros & Janet
Mitchell, Bankruptcy as a Control Device in Economies in Transition, 20 J. CoMP. ECON.
265 (1995); Williams & Wade, supra note 69, at 511-32.
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down on shareholder loans. 133
Thus, the resurgence of the nomenklatura assured that most commer-
cial banks in Russia would be run on the basis of political and economic
clout, rather than market principles. The resulting clamor for massive sub-
sidies by banks and their owners created intense demands for the govern-
ment to respond in kind.
B. The Weak Deposit Base of Russian Commercial Banks
Compounding these problems was the Russian banking industry's depen-
dence on government funding, due to the industry's weak deposit base. In
Russia today, most commercial banks have difficulty attracting private
deposits, particularly household deposits. 134 These difficulties hamper the
Russian banking industry's ability to channel private savings into the pri-
vate investment sector and thus serve as a genuine financial intermediary.
The reasons for these difficulties are numerous and complex, complicating
the task of building a traditional deposit base.
The first major impediment to attracting deposits consists of custom-
ers' long-standing allegiance to their Soviet-era banks.135 This problem is
particularly pressing for household deposits, because Russian citizens his-
torically depended upon Sberbank for all of their banking needs. Before
the reforms, Sberbank was the only bank that served individual citizens
and Sberbank continues to hold a high percentage of individual deposits
today.136 In addition to familiarity and habit, Sberbank offers consumers
distinct advantages that other banks do not. It is convenient, with over
133. See Greene, supra note 124, at 68. Cf. Rudnick, supra note 112, at 158. Oleg
Kharkhordin and Theodore Gerber commented in this regard in their study of St. Peters-
burg managers: "Instead of dealing with new private commercial banks, directors
tended to rely on the former ministerial banks, which had by then also been transformed
into independent banks.! Oleg Kharkhordin & Theodore P. Gerber, Russian Directors'
Business Ethic: A Study of Industrial Enterprises in St Petersburg, 1993, 46 EuR.-AsiA STui-
'Es 1075, 1076 (1994).
134. Between 1993 and 1995, household funds on deposit at uninsured private banks
doubled, but their aggregate amount remained small. Compare Fein, supra note 97 (in
1993, "fo]nly about 5 percent of the deposits of individuals in Russia [were] held by
Russian commercial banks"), with Pettibone & Passer-Muslin, supra note 68, at 717 n.3
(in early 1995, "Russian commercial banks held only 10% of the deposits of individu-
als"). See also 2 IMF, supra note 20, at 114 (discussing period between 1988-1990). Cf.
Johnson et al., supra note 34, at 196 ("for Kiev banks we find commercial banks' liabili-
ties are mostly equity," instead of short-term deposits). In 1996, Russian citizens held
an estimated $20 billion of their savings in cash instead of in bank accounts. See
Michael R. Gordon, Russian Shepherd of Mutual Funds, N.Y. TiMES, Mar. 8, 1996, at D2;
Poul F. Larsen, Somehow, Someway, Russian Banks Pay Handsomely on Deposits, RussIA
REv., Feb. 10, 1997, at 24.
135. See Sundararajan, supra note 36, at 12 (the ability of commercial banks "to com-
pete for deposits" is "limited, owing to the dominance of specialized banks that existed
prior to the reform").
136. See Fein, supra note 97 (95%); Larsen, supra note 134, at 24 (70%); Betsy McKay,
Reinventing Russian Banks, CENT. EuR. ECON. REv. 26, 27 (Oct. 1996) (70%); Pettibone &
Passer-Muslin, supra note 68, at 717 n.3 (90%); Stanislav Yevgenyev, The Savings Bank
Between the Past and the Future, Moscow NEws, May 20, 1994 (two-thirds); Ivan Zhagel,
Savings Bank Can Be Sold, lzvEsrm, May 11, 1995, at 1, reprinted in Cuierr DIG. PosT-
SoviET P.ess, June 7, 1995, at 15 (two-thirds).
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40,000 branches in a country where branch offices are otherwise rare.137
More importantly, Sberbank deposits are fully backed by an implicit gov-
ernment guarantee, unlike deposits at other commercial banks.138 Given
137. See Hill & Slavinski, supra note 51, at 38. Cf. Kazmin, supra note 86, at 119. In
major cities, Sberbank has branches in almost every neighborhood. See Astrid Wend-
landt, Savings Rise, RUSSIA REV., Feb. 24, 1997, at 26.
138. See Law on Banks and Banking, supra note 78, ch. VI, art. 41; Civil Code of the
Russian Federation, pt. 2, art. 840, 1 1 (1996); Fein, supra note 97; Pettibone & Passer-
Muslin, supra note 68, at 717 n.3; Vysman, supra note 67, at 280. See generally Guil-
lermo A. Calvo & Manmohan S. Kumar, Part I Financial Markets and Intermediation, in
FINANCIAL SECTOR REFORMS AND EXCHANGE ARRANGEMENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE 26-27 (IMF
Occasional Paper 102, 1993) (discussing the advisability of deposit insurance in former
socialist countries); Giorgio Szeg6, Introduction, 17 J. BANKING & FIN. 773, 776-81
(1993) (same). The Central Bank of Russia has attempted to safeguard individual
deposits at other banks by capping total household deposits at the amount of the bank's
capital, through high mandatory reserves and through supervision and enforcement. See
Bank of Russia, Instruction No. 169: On Measures to Ensure the Fulfillment by Commercial
Banks of Obligations to Depositors (May 24, 1995) (available on Kodecks; translation on
file with author); Andrei Grigoryev, Central Bank Steps Up Oversight of How Depositors'
Money Is Handled, SEVODNYA, June 3, 1995, at 3, reprinted in CURRENT DIG. POsT-SOvIEr
PRESS, June 28, 1995, at 19. To that end, the Bank also issued new licensing rules effec-
tive April 19, 1996 that require new banks to be in sound financial condition and to
have at least two years of experience in handling the deposits of legal entities before they
can accept deposits from individuals. Russia Raises Minimum Capital Rules, Sets New
Licensing Regulations for Banks, supra note 126, at 757.
Although the 1990 legislation instructed the Central Bank of Russia to institute univer-
sal deposit insurance, the Bank has not done so to date. See Law on the Central Bank,
supra note 77, ch. I, art. 6; id. ch. VI, art. 29; Law on Banks and Banking, supra note 78,
ch. VI, art. 39. See also Amendments and Addenda to the RSFSR Central Bank (Bank of
Russia) Act, RF Federal Act No. 65-FZ, ch. X, art. 71 (Apr. 12, 1995) [hereinafter 1995
Amendments to the Law on the Central Bank], available in Westlaw, Ruslegisline
Database, 1995 WL 320349; Amendments and Addenda to the Banks and Banking Busi-
ness in the RSFSR Act, RF Federal Act No. 17-FZ, ch. VI, art. 38 (July 21, 1995) (Russ.)
[hereinafter 1995 Amendments to the Law on Banks and Banking], available in Westlaw,
Ruslegisline Database, 1996 WL 135282; Civil Code of the Russian Federation, pt. 2,
art. 840 (1996); Fein, supra note 97; Markalova, supra note 91, at 122-05. In November
1995, the Duma approved a bill for mandatory deposit insurance which President Yelt-
sin refused to sign into law. The Bank and the government opposed the bill because it
authorized the deposit insurance fund to borrow from the government if the fund exper-
ienced shortfalls. The Bank's opposition was also fueled by the fact that under the bill
the fund would have independent powers to examine and monitor insured banks. See
Yelena Medvedeva, Federation Council Supports President, Central Bank and Finance Min-
istry, KOMMERSANT-DAmLY, Dec. 13, 1995, at 2, reprinted in CURRENT DIG. PosT-SovIET
PRESS, Jan. 10, 1996, at 19; Peter Rutland, Protection for Depositors and Investors, OMRI
DAILY DIG. (Mar. 22, 1996) <http://www.omri.cz/Publications/Digests/DigestIndex.
html>.
Another reason vhy the government has opposed universal deposit insurance is due
to its potential fiscal consequences. The Law on Banks and Banking authorizes the
Bank, Sberbank's majority owner, to finance budget shortfalls from Sberbank's deposit
base. See Law on Banks and Banking, supra note 78, ch. VI, art. 41. The amount of
household deposits that are available for financing the government budget is maximized
so long as Sberbank has a monopoly on deposit insurance. Sberbank's special status in
this regard has reduced "competition for household deposits, so as to maintain the pre-
emption of household savings for financing of the budget." 1 IMF, supra note 20, at 371.
Cf. McKinnon, supra note 37, at 114 ("liberalizing socialist governments typically cover
their revenue shortfalls by borrowing from the (state) banking system which funds itself
by issuing modest-yield saving deposits and liquid cash balances to households").
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widespread (and justified) public fears about bank failures, the ability to
offer deposit guarantees gives Sberbank an obvious competitive edge.
Nonetheless, all Russian banks, including Sberbank, suffered from a
massive outflow of deposits after prices were deregulated in 1992. Until
price liberalization, Russians had high levels of bank savings because there
was little to buy. But when the Yeltsin administration deregulated prices in
early 1992 and goods suddenly appeared on the shelves, Russian consum-
ers withdrew their deposits en masse in order to make purchases. 139 The
resulting surge in pent-up demand was worse than in almost any recent
peacetime economy bar Brazil. 140
When consumers flooded the retail market with rubles in 1992 and
1993, inflation erupted. By the end of 1992, consumer spending had
helped propel inflation to over 2,000% per annum and the deposit outflow
had worsened. 141 In theory, under the 1990 legislation, commercial banks
were free to combat withdrawals by offering competitive interest rates on
deposits. 142 In practice, to profit on the spread between loans and depos-
its, most banks did not pay competitive interest on deposits until the latter
half of 1992 and Sberbank declined to do so until the latter half of
1993.143 The victims were depositors, who watched their deposits dwindle
139. See Hill & Slavinski, supra note 51, at 38; Kimio Uno, Privatization and the Crea-
tion of a Commercial Banking System, in WHAT Is To BE DONE? PROPOSALS FOR THE SOVIET
TRANSITION TO THE MARKET, supra note 61, at 149, 170-71. The large majority of con-
sumer prices were deregulated in a presidential decree of December 3, 1991 entitled
"Measures to Liberalize Prices," which took effect onJanuary 2, 1992. See ASLUND, How
RussIA BECAME A MARKEr ECONOMY, supra note 65, at 139-40.
In contrast with the United States, moreover, Russian consumers normally do not use
bank accounts to make payments because bank payments in Russia are notoriously
unreliable and individuals traditionally have paid in cash. See Sachs & Lipton, supra
note 58, at 136; BruceJ. Summers, The Development of a Market-Based Payment System in
Russia, in TRANSFORMATION OF THE BANKING SYSTEM: PORTFOLIO RESTRUCTURING,
PRIVATisATION AND THE PAYMENT SYSTEM, supra note 109, at 182; Sundararajan, supra note
36, at 12. See generally DAVID B. HUMPHREY, PAYMENT SYSTEMS: PRINCIPLES, PRACTICE, AND
IMPROVEMENTS (World Bank Tech. Paper No. 260, 1995); GABRIEL SENSENBRENNER & V.
SUNDARARAJAN, THE PAYMENTS SYSTEM AND ITS EFFECTS ON MONETARY OPERATIONS: RECENT
EXPERIENCE IN THE RussAN FEDERATION (IMF Working Paper No. 94/133, Nov. 1994);
David Folkerts-Landau et al., Payment System Reform in Formerly Centrally Planned Eco-
nomics [sic], 17 J. BANING & FIN. 849 (1993). The bank settlement provisions of the
new Russian Civil Code represent a recent attempt to improve the bank payment system.
See Civil Code of the Russian Federation, pt. 2, ch. 46 (1996).
140. See Ardo Hansson, The Emergence and Stabilization of Extreme Inflationary Pres-
sures in the Soviet Union, in THE POST-SovIET ECONOMY, supra note 81, at 76-77. Cf. GROS
& STEINHERR, supra note 50, at 155.
141. Cf. TRANSrnON REPORT 1995, supra note 90, at 186.
142. See Law on Banks and Banking, supra note 78, ch. IV, art. 28. The new Russian
Civil Code authorizes banks to set interest rates on deposits by contract. Civil Code of
the Russian Federation, pt. 2, arts. 834 1 1, 838-839 (1996).
143. Notwithstanding the 1990 laws, the government had capped interest rates well
below inflation as an anti-inflationary device until January 1992. See David Fairlamb,
Moscow's Financial Crisis, INSTrrUTIONAL INVESTOR, Jan. 1992, at 81, 83; Hill & Slavinski,
supra note 51, at 38; Mellow, supra note 121, at 17. In late 1991, the Central Bank of
Russia also limited the spread between deposits and loans to three percent. Banks
responded by charging higher fees to offset government caps on interest charged on
loans. A few banks, such as Menatep and Avtovazbank, also evaded interest caps on
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in value as inflation raged out of control. In response, consumers with-
drew their savings in droves and converted them into household goods or
hard foreign currency, which were superior stores of value.144
In its effort to curb inflation, the Russian government then worsened
public mistrust of banks through its repeated, ill-fated attempts to freeze
deposits and confiscate bank notes. 145 Although these attempts were in
deposits by selling deposit certificates, shares and share certificates offering higher rates
than Sberbank. The Bank finally deregulated interest rates on deposits and loans in
January 1992. See Kazmin, supra note 86, at 120-21 & n.12. Cf. Joseph L. McCarthy, In
Moscow, a Banking Revolution, AM. BANKER, Nov. 8, 1991, at 2A.
After commercial banks finally raised their rates in late 1992, Sberbank suffered an
exodus of household depositors. Upon urging by reformers, and in an effort to stem
deposit outflows, Sberbank finally began paying positive real interest rates on savings in
late 1993. Mellow, supra note 121, at 17; Yevgenyev, supra note 136 (by the end of 1993,
Sberbank was offering 120% per annum on time deposits).
144. See Rostowski, supra note 112, at 60-66; Summers, supra note 139, at 182 ("In
periods of high inflation, the value the public attaches to money diminishes, to the point
where money loses its usefulness as a store of value and medium of exchange. Under
these circumstances, public preferences would shift to a more primitive system, based
on barter, or a system based on use of foreign currencies."); Uno, supra note 139, at 171.
Between February 1992 and March 1993, the real value of bank accounts dropped 17%
based on the consumer price index and 44% based on the wholesale price index. See
Rostowski, supra note 112, at 66 (citing Russian Economic Trends, May 1993). Inflation
reduced the value of household savings from 37% of gross national product in 1990 to
less than 2% of GNP by year-end 1993. See POHL & CLAESSEN S, supra note 83, at 6.
In May 1993, the Constitutional Court ruled that the erosion of savings had been
unconstitutional and constituted a debt by the government to the Russian people. In
1995, President Yeltsin signed a law indexing savings to inflation and requiring the
government to reimburse depositors for the inflationary erosion of their accounts. The
law contains no implementation provisions, leading some to dismiss it as nothing more
than "moral consolation." See Laura Belin, Panskov: Indexing Savings Would Take Years,
OMRI DAILY DIG. (Apr. 13, 1995) <http://www.omri.cz/Publications/Digests/Diges-
tIndex.hml>; Leonid Bershidsky, Repayment of Lost Savings Is Made Law, Moscow
Times, Apr. 9, 1995, at 32; Penny Morvant, Yeltsin Signs Savings Law, OMRI DAILY DIG.
(May 11, 1995) <http://www.omri.cz/Publications/Digests/DigestIndex.html>. Subse-
quently, however, under pressure to win reelection, President Yeltsin signed a decree to
implement the compensation of lost savings; payments to elderly depositors began in
June 1996. See Penny Morvant, Sberbank Begins to Compensate Savers, OMRI DAILY DIG.
(June 11, 1996) <http://Nvw.omri.cz/Publications/Digests/Digestlndex.html>; RF Pres-
idential Decree No. 494, On Measures for Restoration of Deposits of Citizens of the
Russian Federation (Apr. 8, 1996); Savings Pledges Used to Attract Voters, DOING Busnass
IN EAsRN EUROPE, Apr. 1996. at 88.
145. In late 1990, the government floated but rejected a plan to impose a partial freeze
on enterprise accounts. 1 IMF, supra note 20, at 65. Instead, inJanuary 1991, the Bank
froze household bank accounts and declared 50-ruble and 100-ruble bank notes void,
triggering hysteria as people rushed to exchange their bills. Depositors were only
allowed access to their accounts for limited monthly withdrawals. Public outcry forced
the Bank to lift the freeze the following month. ASLUND, How RussiA BECAME AMAr
ECONOMY, supra note 65, at 130; GROS & STEINHriR, supra note 50, at 161; 1 IMF, supra
note 20, at 65;JOHN WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC OPENING OF EASTERN EUROPE 83 (1991);
Petr 0. Aven, Appendix A: Economic Policy and the Reforms of Mikhail Gorbachev-A Short
History, in WHAT Is To BE DoNE? PROPOSALS FOR THE SovIEr TRANSrnON TO THE MARKEr,
supra note 61, at 205. Later that year, public confidence took another blow when the
failing Vneshekonombank froze hard currency accounts on instructions from the gov-
ernment. See Hill & Slavinski, supra note 51, at 42; Geoff Winestock, Trade Grows in
Vnesh Bonds, Moscow TIMES, Mar. 3, 1994.
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part motivated by a legitimate desire to curb inflation and prop up shrink-
ing tax revenues, 146 the public perceived confiscatory measures as a dis-
turbing throwback to Soviet times, when the government routinely blocked
enterprises' access to their bank accounts. The recent confiscations were
neither long-lived nor successful, 14 7 but caused incalculable damage to the
public trust in the banking system.
Russian citizens have additional reasons to avoid depositing their
funds in bank accounts. Fears continue to abound that the government
conducts surveillance by monitoring individuals' bank accounts. Some
also fear that their deposits will be reported to tax collectors, or to the
mafia for protection money demands. 148
Two years later, in July 1993, panic struck when the Central Bank of Russia
announced on a Saturday morning that bank notes predating 1993 would no longer be
good the following Monday. Although President Yeltsin immediately issued a decree
permitting citizens to exchange the old bills, public confidence in the banking system
was badly shaken. Viktor Gerashchenko, then-chairman of the Bank, engineered the
ruble-note confiscation. Cf. ASLUND, How RussiA BECAME A MARKET ECONOMY, supra
note 65, at 56, 129-30; JONATHAN STEELE, ErENAL RussiA 359-62 (1994). See generally
Uno, supra note 139, at 172; Barry R. Weingast, The Economic Role of Political Institu-
tions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development, 11J. L., ECON. & ORGAN-
IZATION 1, 1 (1995) ("[t]hriving markets require not only the appropriate system of
property rights and a law of contracts, but a secure political foundation that limits the
ability of the state to confiscate wealth"). Since then, rumors of deposit freezes have
periodically cropped up and precipitated bank runs. See, e.g., Freeze Scare Prompts Fran-
tic Run on Banks, Moscow TIMEs, Jan. 15, 1995, at 57; Peck, supra note 61, at 3, 14.
146. Cf. ASLUND, How Russia BECAME A MAR Er ECONOMY, supra note 65, at 129-31;
McKinnon, supra note 37, at 115-16.
147. See Aven, supra note 145, at 179, 205. The Russian Civil Code now states that
for demand deposits, "the bank shall be obliged to pay out the deposited amount or a
part of it on the depositor's demand," subject to liability for damages. Civil Code of the
Russian Federation, pt. 2, arts. 837 1 2, 840 I 1, 4 (1996).
148. Russian statutes forbid banks from disclosing information about natural per-
sons' accounts to tax collectors, government officials or private individuals. See Law on
Banks and Banking, supra note 78, ch. III, art. 25; see also Civil Code of the Russian
Federation, pt. 2, art. 857 (1996). Mafia figures, however, have used those privacy provi-
sions offensively to shield their infiltration of banks. Banks are key to mafia operations,
both for money-laundering and as the target of financial frauds. Russian mafia have
infiltrated an uncertain percentage of banks (estimates range anywhere from ten to
eighty percent) by infiltrating bank management and by extorting protection payments.
Bankers who refuse to cooperate are "tamed" through threats, kidnapping or murder. In
1995 alone, over fifty Russian bankers and businessmen were slain in contract killings,
including the heads of Tekhno-Bank, Mosbiznesbank and the St. Petersburg offices of
Inkombank and Agroprombank. Upon infiltrating banks, mafia figures steal billions of
rubles, either by obtaining funds through fake letters of credit or by diverting loan pro-
ceeds from their intended purpose and transferring the funds abroad. Bank personnel
and officials of the Central Bank of Russia have been found to receive kickbacks of up to
30% in exchange for their cooperation and silence. See, e.g., Another Moscow Banker
Murdered, MONITOR (Nov. 10, 1995) <http://www.jamestown.org>; Mikhail Berger, Want
a Loan? You Need to Pay the 'Gangster Tax,' Moscow TIMEs, Apr. 9, 1995, at 35;
Glinkina, supra note 127, at 390-91; Charles Hecker, Raids Are Common, Say Russian
Bankers, Moscow TIMEs, Dec. 7, 1994; Here's an Offer You Can't Refuse, RussiA Ray., Feb.
12, 1996, at 17; Rensselaer W. Lee, III, The Organized Crime Morass in the Soviet Union,
11 DEMOKATIZATsrIYA 392, 393-94 (1994); Shelley, supra note 127, at 828, 831-32; Arkady
Vaksberg, The 'Mafiya' and its Threat to Civil Society in Russia, CIS LAw NoTEs, Apr.
1994, at 13, 14-15; Aleksandr Zhilin, The Financial Crime of the Century, PRISM, pt. 1,
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These problems have left the Russian banking industry starved for
household deposits. As a result, many private Russian banks are heavily
dependent on short-term loans from the Central Bank of Russia for their
regular source of funds.14 9 In that capacity, the Bank not only acts as a
lender of last resort in emergencies requiring back-up liquidity, but also as
a lender of "first resort" by providing (along with the inter-bank loan mar-
ket) a major, routine source of bank finance. 150
This dependence on central bank financing has a number of undesir-
able effects. It exerts inflationary pressures by placing demands on the
Central Bank of Russia to issue more money. It means that the banking
(Dec. 1, 1995) <http://www.jamestown.org>. See generally Daniel McGrory, Civilizing
the Russian Underground Economy: Requirements and Prospects for Establishing a Civil
Economy in Russia, 5 TRANSNAT'L L. & CowraM. PROBS. 65 (1995).
In an effort to root out mafia operations and tax evasion, President Yeltsin has issued
a series of decrees that purport to override bank privacy protections. In response to
money-laundering concerns, in 1994 President Yeltsin signed a decree requiring banks
to notify tax authorities of all transactions by individuals in excess of $10,000. See RF
President's Decree No. 1006, On Carrying Out Comprehensive Measures for the Timely and
Complete Payment Into the Budget of Taxes and Other Compulsory Payments pt. 8 (May 23,
1994) (available on Kodecks; translation on file with author); Ivan Zhagel, A Stupid Way
Out of a Stupid Situation, zvEs-A, Sept. 16, 1994, at 2, reprinted in CumRNr DIG. Posr-
SoviET PRESs, Oct. 12, 1994, at 5; Victor Yasmann, Law Against Dirty Money, RFE/RL
DAILY REP., Sept. 18, 1994 <http://www.omri.cz/Publications/Digests/Diges-
tIndex.html>. In a crackdown on tax arrears in August 1996, President Yeltsin signed
another decree subjecting all bank transactions by individuals to taxation. Decree Tax-
ing Bank Transactions, Other Measures Signed by Yeltsin, E. Eur. Rep. (BNA) 568 (Sept. 9,
1996). A similar tax on corporate bank accounts has encouraged firms to avoid bank
payments whenever possible, further weakening the deposit base of commercial banks
in Russia. See Oleg Krasheninnikov, Privatization Process in Russia and ajustice [sic] in
the Distribution of Property Rights 33-35 (1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
149. See Fein, supra note 97; see also Hill & Slavinski, supra note 51, at 40-41;
Kazmin, supra note 86, at 119; Rostowski, supra note 112, at 66; Sundararajan, supra
note 36, at 12. According to one economist, the ratio of private deposits to central bank
credits on bank balance sheets dropped from 75:25 to 46:54 between February 1992
and March 1993. Rostowski, supra note 112, at 66. This problem is especially severe in
banks in the Russian Far East, which are expected to funnel federal subsidies "to finance
seasonal delivery of goods to remote areas." Russian Far East Banks. Some Parameters to
Watch., RussiuA FAR EAsr UPDATE, Oct. 1995, at 9 (complaining that banks in the Rus-
sian Far East "simply distribute government money among end-users, while 'real' banks
in other regions of Russia form their own independent deposit base").
150. The term was coined by Rostowski. See Rostowski, supra note 112, at 66. See
also Krasheninnikov, supra note 148, at 33 ("the Central Bank's law regarding the dis-
count window simply states that banks 'with insufficient funds may apply for receipts of
credits from the Central Bank of Russia on conditions defined by the Central Bank of
Russia', making the law extremely arbitrary and open to abuse by undercapitalised com-
mercial banks looking for cheap money to engage in arbitrage or floating risky loans").
The inter-bank market is the other major financing source for most banks. The inter-
bank market provides banks with extra liquidity when the withdrawal demands of their
customers exceed their liquid assets on hand. See Vladimir Gurevich & Irina Yasina,
Credit Conflagration, MosxovsmvE NOVOSTI, Aug. 27-Sept. 3, 1995, at 4, reprinted in CUR-
REr DIG. Posr-SoviEr Paxss, Sept. 20, 1995, at 7. Reliance on such loans, however,
makes banks vulnerable to crises in the inter-bank market, as the August 1995 crisis
demonstrated. See Greene, supra note 124, at 66; Vysman, supra note 67, at 278; infra
notes 226-27 and accompanying text.
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system is chronically underfunded and fails to serve its intended function
as a financial intermediary. 5 1 Furthermore, central bank dependence
politicizes what should be a market process. It makes Russian private
banks susceptible to political demands from the Bank It also means that
the task of attracting bank funds is accomplished through lobbying and
political bargaining, instead of through competition in the marketplace.
The perverse interaction of these dynamics helped fuel subsidy demands in
1992.
C. Collective Action and Government Failure
"What we have now is not reform-we have liberated the Soviet system instead of
liberating society from the Soviet system."
- Grigory Yavlinsky 1
5 2
The incessant pressure for subsidies need not have become a self-fulfilling
prophecy had the government been able to resist those demands. In other
words, the market failure that the resurgence of the nomenklatura presaged
might have been nipped in the bud if not for concurrent government fail-
ure. 153 In the first two-and-one-half years of Russian reforms, however,
that was not the case. That government failure and the government's later,
partial success in reversing it sheds light on the economic factors condu-
cive to market-based bank reforms.
The Russian government's initial failure to reject subsidy demands was
thoroughly predictable from the vantage point of public goods theory.
Public goods theory predicts that the Russian government would be espe-
cially vulnerable to subsidy demands in the first stages of reform, because
communist-era managers had highly effective lobbies and faced little, if
any, organized opposition. Indeed, managers were in a unique position to
enlist other groups to aid in their cause. Managers and their companies
controlled banks that could be pressured to advocate subsidies. Banks had
their own reasons to clamor for subsidies, given their shaky deposit bases.
Similarly, managers were in a unique position to foment labor support by
exploiting fears of job loss through their power to hire, fire and withhold
pay. Fearful of a workers' revolt and hoping to maximize their own
chances for reelection, legislators and the government could be expected to
151. See Greene, supra note 124, at 80-81; Uno, supra note 139, at 170-71; Vysman,
supra note 67, at 281.
152. Quoted in Alessandra Stanley, Rough-Edged Russian Liberal Rides High, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 1, 1995, at Al. For similar sentiments, see V. Kudrov, One Way Out: Deepen
the Reforms, 37 PROBS. ECON. TRANsTON 55, 60 (1995).
153. See Christopher Clague, The Journey to a Market Economy, in EMERGENCE, supra
note 37, at 4 ("government failure as well as market failure must be taken into considera-
tion in designing institutions"). See also PHELPS Er AL., supra note 112, at 36 ("It is a
matter of crucial importance, however, for any clear thinking about the future of eastern
European reforms to realise at the very outset that... the state of the governments in the
region is no better than that of the industry or the service sector, and that the job of
reforming the former is no easier than the restructuring of the latter. Indeed, to a large
extent, it is one and the same.") (emphasis in original).
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fall in line and exert their influence to procure subsidies.' 54
A public goods analysis would also expect managers, at least initially,
to prefer subsidies over other types of public goods. Subsidies provided
the cash infusion that companies needed. When the reforms began, more-
over, nothing in managers' experience prepared them to regard subsidies
as finite in supply or as anything other than inclusive public goods. Loan
subsidies also had obvious economic advantages over true loans because
they did not bear market rates of interest and had no adverse consequences
if they were not repaid.' 5 5 As such, loan subsidies represented assurances
of continued soft budget constraints. Consequently, managers could be
expected to prefer loan subsidies and to lobby vigorously for them.
Public goods theory also explains why factory managers might seek
subsidies through intermediaries in the form of commercial banks rather
than directly from the government. At the breakup of the Soviet Union, the
Russian government had a severe budget deficit that made massive new
appropriations fiscally onerous.156 The resulting pressure on new appro-
priations, in fact, was one of the first hard budget constraints that factory
managers ever encountered. Accordingly, factory managers could be
expected to seek alternative conduits for government aid. The most impor-
tant such alternative was the refinance facility of the Central Bank of Rus-
sia, because the Bank was beholden to the Supreme Soviet, a majority of
whose members belonged to the nomenklatura. The best way for factory
managers to assure access to Central Bank of Russia refinancing, in turn,
was to control a private commercial bank that qualified for such
refinancing." 7
Experience bore out each of these predictions. In the politically tense
period surrounding the breakup of the Soviet Union on December 25,
1991, the government faced overwhelming subsidy demands from practi-
cally all quarters of society. The Gorbachev government was on its last legs
when the Russian Supreme Soviet enacted the 1990 banking laws. The
regime succumbed in December 1991 after the failed military coup in
August of that year. The democratic government that ensued, led by Presi-
dent Boris Yeltsin, rested on the support of workers dependent upon pub-
lic-sector jobs. When Yeltsin came to power in the fall of 1991, industrial
privatization had not begun, private-sector jobs were few and citizens
largely worked for state-owned firms that were bleeding losses. From the
outset, then, the Yeltsin government faced overwhelming pressure to avoid
mass layoffs at all costs. 158
154. See infra note 162 and accompanying text.
155. See infra notes 169-70, 173-74 and accompanying text.
156. See infra note 164 and accompanying text.
157. Cf. supra notes 96-97, 150 and accompanying text.
158. See KoRNAI, THE ROAD TO A FREE ECONOMY 111 (1990) (the state "is practically
incapable of deciding to liquidate jobs en masse"); MuuDMUX, supra note 109, at 9-10;
Mikhail Leontyev, Conflict: Parliament United Against the Central Bank, NEZAVISIMAYA
GAzETA, May 19, 1992, at 1, 4, reprinted in CURRENT DIG. Posr-Sovixr PREss, June 17,
1992, at 9. See generally KoRAI, supra note 28, at 545; Macey & Colombatto, supra note
2, at 414. In 1991, over half of the able-bodied population in Russia worked for one of
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During that early, crucial period, there was discussion of alternative
ways to soften the blow of plant closings without fueling political unrest.
Some analysts argued that a generous unemployment benefits plan would
be cheaper than keeping failing plants open, with their added maintenance
and materials costs.1 5 9 Other analysts called for massive investments in
brand-new entrepreneurial ventures, predicting that rapid new job creation
would absorb factory layoffs. 160 Reformers similarly emphasized the nega-
tive trade-offs of keeping obsolete plants afloat through subsidies, includ-
ing inefficient investment, continued economic decline and potential
hyperinflation. In particular, these sentiments were voiced by a small band
of highly-placed, young reform economists in the Yeltsin administration
who were imbued with market principles and who vigorously militated for
economic reform. Among them were Yegor Gaidar, the first minister of
economy and finance under President Yeltsin; Boris Fedorov, the minister
of finance and deputy prime minister in 1993; and Anatoly Chubais, first
deputy prime minister for economic affairs from 1992 to 1996.161
Nonetheless, during the Yeltsin administration's first years, these argu-
ments fell on deaf ears, largely due to the successful machinations of fac-
tory directors who had belonged to the old nomenklatura. Managers
painted grim scenes of massive layoffs that would ensue if subsidies were
not paid, inciting massive protests by workers. Local politicians, fearing
the public's wrath for failure to protect local industries, weighed in with
lobbying support as well. 162 Managers got further support from the Asso-
ciation of Russian Bankers, one of the most influential lobbying groups in
Russia and one of the most vociferous advocates of cheap loans.163
the country's 29,500 large state-owned industrial firms. See Khotin, supra note 111, at
49. For general historical background, see FRYDMAN Er A., supra note 83, at 4-5;
Fairlamb, supra note 143, at 82-83; Osakwe, supra note 68, at 314 & n.21.
159. See, e.g., NICHoLAs BARR, INCOME TRANsFERs AND THE SOCIAL SAFETY NEr IN RussiA
(The World Bank 1992); Ronald A. Cass, The Optimal Pace of Privatization, 13 B.U. INT'L
LJ. 413, 425-26 (1995); Edward W. Hill & Terry F. Buss, Government and Business
Finance in Russia (Dec. 1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
160. In their 1995 report, Andrea Richter and Mark Schaffer supplied data in support
of this hypothesis, noting that "newly-established private manufacturing [firms in Rus-
sia] are creating jobs at a much more rapid rate than state-owned or privatized firms; job
destruction rates, by contrast, are similar in the two ownership groups." Richter &
Schaffer, supra note 110, at i-u, 11-12.
161. See ASLUND, How RussiA BECAME A MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 65, at 322.
162. See Davis, supra note 132, at 62; McKinnon, supra note 37, at 114. Article 14 of
the 1992 Law on Bankruptcy gave local governments added rent-seeking incentives by
providing that a local government could rescue an insolvent firm from bankruptcy
where the firm had received government subsidies and the local government had guaran-
teed repayment. See RF Insolvency (Bankruptcy) of Enterprises Act, RF Act No. 3929-1,
art. 14 (Nov. 19, 1992) (Russ.), available in Westlaw, Ruslegisline Database, 1992 WL
472617; Davis, supra note 132, at 61.
163. See generally ASLUND, How RussiA BECAME A MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 65, at
308. Cf. Johnson et al., supra note 34, at 195, 200 (describing Ukrainian bank lobbying
"to keep rates down" and summarizing an interview with a Ukrainian bank director who
said he could "use ministerial contacts to lobby for subsidy payments to enterprises
which would otherwise default on their loans").
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In the face of those pressures, central bank loan subsidies were the
path of least resistance. Politicians feared tough bankruptcy laws and
plant shutdowns because they did not have confidence that the private sec-
tor would expand sufficiently quickly to avoid massive lay-offs. Increased
unemployment benefits required a massive outlay of funds that the govern-
ment did not have. For the same reason, the government lacked funds to
appropriate subsidies to failing enterprises outright. Under the circum-
stances, using Central Bank of Russia loan subsidies to prop up inefficient
enterprises had the obvious appeal of staving off immediate shutdowns
and unemployment without raising the government deficit.1 64
Similarly, the Central Bank of Russia had neither the political auton-
omy nor the will to fend off subsidy demands from the legislature. The
central bank that emerged from the 1990 banking reforms was headed by
Georgy Matyukhin, a middle-aged Soviet-era economics professor, and was
politically subordinate to the Russian Supreme Soviet, the branch of the
government most sensitive to subsidy demands.' 65 Although the Bank was
more "independent" than Gosbank insofar as the Law on the Central Bank
made it "independent of the executive and the administrative authorities of
the state," the Bank nevertheless remained "accountable to" the parliament
under that law.166 The resulting political subordination made the Bank
164. As Robert King and Ross Levine put it: "Although every effort should be made to
isolate government subsidies to loss-making enterprises from market-based credit deci-
sions, political economy pressures suggest that governments will attempt to hide these
losses in bank credit decisions." Robert G. King & Ross Levine, Financial Intermediation
and Economic Development, in CAIrrA. MARKrs AND FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION 188 n.II
(Colin Mayer & Xavier Vives eds., 1993). See also MARIE MoNTANEES, GovEuRiErr
FINANCE STATISTICS IN THE COUNTRIES OF THE FORMER SovIEr UNION: COMPILATION AND
METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES 17 & n.1, 40-41 (IMF Working Paper No. 95/2, Jan. 1995);
STEELE, supra note 145, at 300; Hansson, supra note 140, at 70, 73-75. King and Levine's
observation finds support in empirical data. Between 1992 and 1994, directed credits
from the Central Bank of Russia far outstripped subsidy payments out of the budget and
were the largest source of government transfer payments to enterprises in Russia. See
Gilles Alfandari et al., Government Financial Transfers to Industrial Enterprises and
Restructuring 5-6 (June 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
165. See Boris Fedorov, Monetary, Financial and Foreign Exchange Policy: A Key to
Stabilization and Economic Reform in the USSR, in THE Posr-SovIEr ECONOMY, supra note
81, at 105-06; Hill & Slavinski, supra note 51, at 38; Pettibone & Passer-Muslin, supra
note 68, at 710; Jeffrey D. Sachs, Prospects for Monetary Stabilization in Russia, in Eco-
NOMIC TRANSFORMATION IN RUssA, supra note 109, at 48; supra note 95 and accompany-
ing text. See also AsLuND, How RUssIA BECAME A MAuKE ECONOMY, supra note 65, at
323; BREDENKAmp, supra note 111, at 9-10 (recommending a high degree of central bank
independence for former Soviet countries); KORNM, supra note 28, at 547; MutiiNEUx,
supra note 109, at 12-13 (discussing aspects of central bank independence); Sachs &
Lipton, supra note 58, at 142-43 (recommending changes to increase central bank
autonomy).
166. Law on the Central Bank, supra note 77, ch. I, art. 1; 1995 Amendments to the
Central Bank, supra note 138, ch. I, art. 5. But see Constitution of the Russian Federa-
tion § I, ch. II, art. 75(2), in OFFCIL CODIFICATION WIm COMMENTARY, supra note 77 (in
defending the stability of the ruble, the Central Bank of Russia shall operate "indepen-
dently from other bodies of state power"). See also Fedorov, supra note 73, at 60;
Kazmin, supra note 86, at 114; Markalova, supra note 91, at 122-04 to 122-05, 122-09
n. 10; Vysman, supra note 67, at 266. As Boris Fedorov has noted, the Bank's continued
obeisance to the parliament impaired its independence:
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peculiarly susceptible to legislative subsidy demands.
Ideology, inertia and graft further conditioned the Bank to favor aid.
Chairman Matyukhin had moderate reform leanings, favoring gradual
price liberalization and interest rate reforms. At the same time, he had
been nominated by Ruslan Khasbulatov, the pro-subsidy chairman of the
Russian Supreme Soviet, and was ideologically sympathetic to aid in some
form to ailing, state-owned industries. 167 Many of the Bank's employees,
moreover, were holdovers from Gosbank and accustomed to issuing subsi-
dies and extracting kickbacks in return.168
Against this political backdrop, subsidy demands came to a head in
the spring of 1992, after price liberalization unleashed consumer demand
and, with it, rising prices. Hit by rapid inflation, factory managers found
factory reserves rapidly shrinking. Rather than cut costs, managers
hectored the parliament and the government for subsidies. With the Sixth
Congress of People's Deputies due to meet in April 1992, the government
and the Central Bank of Russia quickly succumbed. On April 4, 1992, the
government issued a decree authorizing massive subsidies to agriculture
and industry. Almost immediately, the Bank flooded the market with sub-
sidies in the form of cheap credits. 169 Consistent with the old Soviet preoc-
The idea of Central Bank independence became widely popular without people
understanding its meaning. The first mistake was to exchange the bank's depen-
dence on the government for a dependence on Parliament. The idea was to
lessen the inflationary influence of the government, but in reality it was substi-
tuted, with Parliament attempting day-to-day management of the Central Bank.
In what country does the speaker of Parliament ever have a direct telephone line
to the governor of the Central Bank? Since our Parliament is even more domi-
nated by lobbies than is the government itself, it is like giving the Central Bank
to vultures. The pro-inflationary pressures only increased.
Fedorov, supra note 73, at 65.
167. See ASLUND, How RussiA BECAME A MARer ECONOMY, supra note 65, at 97-98,
323.
168. Westerners made early reports of kickbacks to Central Bank of Russia staff in
return for low-interest loans. See id. at 169; Anders Aslund, Has Poland Been Useful as a
Model for Russia?, in ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION IN RussiA, supra note 109, at 157, 161;
Sachs, supra note 165, at 49. In January 1996, Radio Rossii reported that four high-
ranking officials of the Bank had gone on trial for granting loans in exchange for bribes
in 1992. Peter Rutland, Central Bank Reviews Work in 1995, OMRI DAILY DIG. (Jan. 11,
1996) <http://www.omri.cz/Publications/Digests/DigestIndex.html>.
169. See ASLUND, How RussiA BECAME A MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 65, at 97, 163-
65, 189, 191; OLIvIER B.ANCHARD ET AL., Posr-CoMMuNIsT REFORM: PAIN AND PROGRESS
19-20 (1993); Aslund, supra note 12, at 24, 31-32; Dabrowski, supra note 54, at 12-13;
Fischer, supra note 109, at 15; Iz Otcheta Tsentral'nogo Banka RF, 8 DEN'GI I KRDrr 6
(1993), reprinted as From the Annual Report of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation,
30 RussIAN & E. EuR. FIN. & TRADE 20, 21, 27, 33-34 (1994) [hereinafter From the
Annual Report of the Central Bank]; Sachs, supra note 165, at 48-49. See generally STEELE,
supra note 145, at 302-03. Central Bank of Russia credits to commercial banks
increased 92% during the first quarter of 1992, in violation of the Bank's commitment to
the International Monetary Fund to limit credit growth to 15% during that period. See
Aslund, supra note 12, at 24; Alexei V. Mozhin, Russia's Negotiations with the IMF, in
CHANGING THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM IN RussiA, supra note 12, at 65, 69. In turn, short-term
loans by banks to enterprises shot up by 131.7% between December 1, 1991 and May 1,
1992. Dabrowski, supra note 54, at 12, tbl. 2. In 1992 overall, Bank subsidies funnelled
to companies through private banks amounted to 16% of the gross domestic product.
Vol. 30
1997 Levers of Law Reform
cupation with production quotas over profits, the stated purpose of the
subsidies was to jump-start production at state-owned plants.
The handouts from the Bank were called "directed" or "targeted" cred-
its and ranged from outright grants to subsidized loans that were issued
without underwriting or unambiguous expectations of repayment. The
principal recipients of those credits were banks controlled by state-owned
enterprises. 170 At the direction of the Bank, the recipient banks then fun-
neled those funds to designated, ailing state enterprises, including bank
shareholders, through payments styled as loans.171 Banks were also sub-
ject to pressure from shareholders to lend money regardless of
creditworthiness.1 72
See Fischer, supra note 109, at 10, tbl. 1.2, 14 & fig. 1.2, 15; Sachs, supra note 165, at 34,
39 & tbl. 3.1.
170. In addition to banks, the Bank extended subsidized credits directly to the govern-
ment and state-owned enterprises. See, e.g., FRYDIAN Er AL., supra note 83, at 12 (in the
first eight months of 1992, the Bank extended 1.050 billion rubles in credits to the
Ministry of Finance); Financial Mudslinging, E. EUR. MARCErs, Apr. 16, 1993, available in
LEXIS, Europe Library, Allnws File; From the Annual Report of the Central Bank, supra
note 169, at 26-28; Gerashchenko, supra note 123, at 8-9 (describing Bank credits to the
Ministry of Finance, private enterprises and commercial banks); Khotin, supra note 111,
at 53. During this period, Izvestia also charged that the Bank issued "interest-free cred-
its for financing the activity of the parliament and of individual Deputies." Sergi
Chugayev, The Central Bank Is Torpedoing the Reform, IzvESTA, May 15, 1992, at 1,
reprinted in CuRam, r DIG. Pos-SoviEr PREsS, June 17, 1992, at 7.
As had Gosbank in Soviet times, the Bank sent commercial banks mixed messages as
to the collectibility of their subsidized loans. According to the Bank, "When centralized
credit resources were allocated, specific deadlines for their repayment were usually set."
When borrowers had difficulties making repayments, however, the Bank routinely post-
poned repayment dates. From the Annual Report of the Central Bank, supra note 169, at
28.
171. See Fein, supra note 97; From the Annual Report of the Central Bank, supra note
169, at 30 (conceding that "bank stockholders (shareholders) are usually given priority
in receiving credits"; noting that some banks loaned up to eighty to ninety percent of
their total loan funds to a single shareholder); Glinkina, supra note 127, at 386-87; Rud-
nick, supra note 112, at 158. See also Yuri N. Afanasyev, Russian Reform Is Dead: Back to
Central Planning, 73 FOREIGN AFFias 21, 25 (1994) ("[p]seudo-commercial banks that
merely redistribute state finances and do not depend on deposits from people or enter-
prises now prevail").
172. See Fischer, supra note 109, at 15; From the Annual Report of the Central Bank,
supra note 169, at 22, 27 ("Out of the sum total of centralized credit extended to com-
mercial banks, about 1.9 trillion rubles were allocated (as targeted credits and credits to
various branches to meet pressing needs) in accordance with the decisions of the
Supreme Soviet and the government"); Greene, supra note 124, at 76 & n.137; Rudnick,
supra note 112, at 158; Sachs, supra note 165, at 42, 58 n.3; Shake Up at Vos-
tokinvestbank, RussLAN FAR EAST UPDATE, June 1995, at 3-4 (reporting that "several Vladi-
vostok banks have been 'asked' by the Administration to make" unprofitable loans to
specified borrowers). Matyukhin's 1992 successor as chair of the Central Bank of Rus-
sia, Viktor Gerashchenko, described the magnitude of this policy:
Considering the extremely grave situation that ha[d] developed in the national
economy, the government and the Bank of Russia decided to supply credit
resources to commercial banks, so that they [might] in turn grant credit to enter-
prises and organizations in priority branches in order to sustain the normal
activity of enterprises and branches of the economy.
As of 1 May 1993, commercial banks had been allotted a total 4,841.2 billion
rubles for these purposes, including 2,335.6 billion rubles in the current year.
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In the subsidy campaign, another chief goal of management was to
maintain highly favorable negative real interest rates on directed credits
from the Central Bank of Russia. In the fall of 1991 and the first half of
1992, Chairman Matyukhin took extremely modest steps toward hard
budget constraints by raising the Bank's refinance rate closer to the real
price of credit. But Matyukhin's moderation proved his undoing. Inflation
was so out of control, with March 1992 prices 1,300% higher than prices
one year before, that refinance rates would have had to be raised dramati-
cally to approach a positive real rate. Fearful that such a high rate hike
would make managers explode, Matyukhin merely toyed with interest, rais-
ing it from single digits to eighty percent per annum without coming close
to positive real rates. Having stopped with half-measures (and having
refused to reform the payments system), Matyukhin infuriated managers,
bankers and reformers alike. Soon, all camps were demanding a replace-
ment for Matyukhin. The nomenklatura won out, with the appointment of
former Gosbank chairman Viktor Gerashchenko on November 4, 1992.173
As Anders Aslund describes it, Gerashchenko was an old-line central
planner who "was popular among the old elite because he gave everyone
the cheap credits they asked for and kept the refinance rate very low." 1 7 4
Matyukhin's ouster showed the fierce resistance of the old elite to any
attempts, even feeble ones, to institute hard budget constraints, whether in
the form of market-rate interest or otherwise. To them, the concept that
unprofitable plants should pay higher interest for higher risk (let alone be
barred from credit at all) was utterly foreign. Instead of adjusting to the
new economic environment, the manager class successfully closed ranks to
insure that subsidies were plentiful and factories did not close.
A recent set of World Bank studies confirms that management lobby-
ing was the moving force behind the Central Bank of Russia's program of
Of this sum, 1,075.7 billion rubles were to be extended as credit to enterprises
and organizations in the agro-industrial complex, 238.4 billion rubles were to be
used to pay for goods shipped ahead of schedule to regions of the Far North,
63.9 billion rubles were to go to enterprises in the fuel-energy complex, 237.5
billion rubles were to be for industrial enterprises, 312.5 billion rubles for other
branches, and 407.6 billion rubles for pressing regional needs.
Gerashchenko, supra note 123, at 8-9.
173. See ASLUND, How RussiA BECAME A MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 65, at 67, 97-98,
182, 188, 296; FRYDMAN Er AL., supra note 83, at 13; Aslund, supra note 168, at 161;
Aslund, supra note 12, at 24; Dabrowski, supra note 54, at 13; Fedorov, supra note 73, at
60; From the Annual Report of the Central Bank, supra note 169, at 21, 33-34; Leontyev,
supra note 158, at 9; Mozhin, supra note 169, at 69; but see Victor Ivanov, Supreme Soviet
Demands Release of Promised Credits, RusDATA DIALINE-BIzEKON NEws, Feb. 13, 1993,
available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Allnws File; Explanatory Note-On the Question,
Raised at a Meeting of the Presidium of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet, 'On the
Chairman of the Russian Federation Central Bank,' NE ZAViimAYA GAZErA, May 19, 1992, at
4, reprinted in CuFirr DIG. Posr-Sovwr PREss, June 17, 1992, at 8 (criticizing the inter-
est rate hike as political usurpation); Vysman, supra note 67, at 282 (same).
174. ASLUND, How RussiA BECAME A MAP= ECONOMY, supra note 65, at 98; see also id.
at 210. Referring to Gerashchenko, Marshall Goldman has noted: "In Russia, paradoxi-
cally, it was the prime minister (or at least Gaidar as long as he was the acting prime
minister) who fought for monetary restraint, while the Central Bank director was deter-
mined to print hoards of money." MARSHALL I. GOLDMAN, LOST OPPORTUNrry 107 (1994).
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directed loans. In a survey of 439 Russian industrial enterprises conducted
in the summer of 1994, World Bank researchers concluded that:
"[O]verall, whether and how much transfers [were] given [was] related con-
sistently to the size of employment and membership in industrial associa-
tions of the enterprises. In other words, the main allocation criterion of
government financial transfers [was] the bargaining power of the enter-
prises."175 According to the survey, the key to management's success in
obtaining subsidies was manipulating workers' fears of job loss:
"[W]orkers, more than the firm itself, [were] of real concern to the authori-
ties, in their decision to provide transfers." 176 Managers exploited work-
ers' fears by setting "wages higher.., than the cash they ha[d] available to
pay them, necessarily leading to wage arrears, turning workers' protests on
to government authorities." This tactic was so pervasive that one-third to
one-half of wages in Russia were in arrears at the time of the study.177
The survey also confirmed that managers preferred subsidized pay-
ments to other types of public goods. According to the researchers, "the
most commonly requested form of government assistance (after tax
breaks) was credit on preferential terms."' 78 Thus, both the private and
public sides of the Russian banking system acted as if money was infinitely
plentiful rather than scarce. That attitude was so entrenched that when the
175. Alfandari et al., supra note 164, at 30. See also id. at 11, 17-25; Gilles Alfandari
& Une Lee, Are Russian Enterprises Restructuring?, TRANSITION (The World Bank, Wash-
ington, D.C.), July-Aug. 1995, at 11, 12.
176. Alfandari et al., supra note 164, at 24 (from the viewpoint of the government,
"employment appear[ed] to be one of the main variables determining the amount of
transfers as well as the probability of being a recipient").
177. The authors also attribute the high degree of wage arrears to labor's weak negoti-
ating strength. See Gilles Alfandari & Mark E. Schaffer, On "Arrears" in Russia 12-13,
30 (June 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). See also Alfandari & Lee,
Are Russian Enterprises Restructuring?, supra note 175, at 11, 12; Kharkhordin &
Gerber, supra note 133, at 1083 ("[E]nterprises engaged in city-wide competition in
wage rises-first unintentionally, later quite consciously. If a director could not afford
wage rises, he/she could close down an enterprise for the summer and let everybody
have unpaid leave."); id. at 1077; Jeni Klugman, Poverty in Russia-An Assessment, TRausi-
TnON (The World Bank, Washington, D.C.), Sept.-Oct. 1995, at 6 ("[djuring 1993 and
1994 only 40 percent of the [Russian] workforce was being paid fully and on time");
Oleg Savelyev, Number of Potential "Rioters" Increases, SEVODNYA, Dec. 11, 1996, at 3,
reprinted in CuRRENT DIG. Posr-SovIEr PREss,Jan 8, 1997, at 14 (noting that wage arrears
worsened in 1996).
In 1996, in a move to clamp down on wage and tax arrears that was a throwback to
Soviet practices, the government issued decrees requiring Russian firms to have a single
bank account, barring those firms from withdrawing funds from their accounts except
for wages and business travel expenses, and taxing all bank transactions. Business inter-
ests objected that the decrees were unconstitutional and contrary to election promises.
See Decree Taxing Bank Transactions, Other Measures Signed by Yeltsin, supra note 148, at
568; Peter Rutland, Proposal to Tighten Control of Bank Accounts, OMRI DAILY DIG. (Apr.
5, 1996) <http://www.omri.cz/Publications/Digests/Digestlndex.html>; Yeltsin to
Restrict Companies' Access to Cash, MoNrroR (Mar. 22, 1996) <http://
www.jamestown.org>. See Law on Banks and Banking, supra note 78, ch. IV, art. 29; id.
ch. VI, art. 38; Civil Code of the Russian Federation, pt. 2, arts. 845, 847 '12, 854, 855 1
1, 856, 858 (1996) (giving bank depositors autonomy in controlling disposition of their
funds); id. art. 861 '1 2 (permitting businesses to pay with cash).
178. See Schaffer et al., supra note 111, at 12.
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chairman of the Central Bank of Russia increased the refinance rate, an
important market mechanism for allocating scarcity, he was ousted and
replaced by an old-style Soviet central banker.
Thus, what public goods theory would predict in fact came to pass.
Factory managers continued to treat financing as a public good to be
secured through lobbying rather than a private good to be supplied by the
market. Their lobbying campaign was highly successful, not only because
managers met with little opposition, but because they were able to use their
powers of coercion to enlist banks and workers to support their cause.
Moreover, managers preferred subsidies to any other form of public good
because they did not perceive subsidies to be in short supply. As inflation
exploded and the problem with subsidies became more transparent, how-
ever, that perception began to erode, creating the possibility for market-
based bank system reforms.
D. The Problem with Subsidies
In 1992, subsidy demands emanated from nearly every segment of Russian
society and were virtually unopposed domestically, save by a small band of
economic reformers. By mid-1992, however, the harmful effects of subsi-
dies began to be felt. The Central Bank of Russia's directed loans qua sub-
sidies spawned a number of severe problems, most visibly inflation.
The initial cause of inflation in 1992 was not subsidies but rather
pent-up consumer spending. But once inflation ate into firms' bottom lines
and subsidy demands were granted, the money supply ballooned, pushing
inflation even higher. By year-end 1992, the inflationary spiral was so
severe that the annual rate of inflation had reached 2,318%.179
The runaway inflation of 1992-1993 introduced severe distortions into
the credit market. One major distortion was a marked bias toward short-
term trading loans. To hedge for inflation, Russian banks limited loan
terms to one to three months, both to reduce interest rate risk and to boost
prospects of repayment. Banks that did not lend exclusively to sharehold-
ers restricted their other loans to businesses with high turnover. Generally
those borrowers were traders who imported quickly-sold goods such as
electronics, groceries, cigarettes and stockings, goods which could serve as
collateral. As a result Russia suffered from a dearth of medium- to long-
term manufacturing and capital investment loans. 8 0
179. See TRANSION REPORT 1995, supra note 90, at 186. See generally Gur Ofer,
Budget Deficit, Market Disequilibrium and Soviet Economic Reforms, 5 SoviEr ECON. 107,
140-44 (1989) (cataloguing the inflationary pressures that awaited liberalization).
180. Even today, a six-month loan is extremely rare, with only slightly over one per-
cent of loans being made for more than three months. See Davis, supra note 132, at 74
n.51. See also AsLuND, How RussiA BECAME A MA"Er ECONOMY, supra note 65, at 208;
FRYDmAN Er AL., supra note 83, at 13 (by September 1, 1992, "short-term credits consti-
tuted 95 per cent of the stock of outstanding credits"); DMrrmY V. NEPHEDOV, PRAVOVOI
STATUS KOMMERCHEsKOVA BANKA 5 (1994) (original and translation on file with author);
Blinov et al., supra note 62, at 89 ("since the inflation-induced cutback in domestic pro-
duction aggravated the scarcity of goods and made it possible to jack up prices of
imported goods sharply, importers received considerable profits from the sale of foreign
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The only banks that made industrial loans were banks that received
cheap directed credits, mostly captive banks that were heavily exposed to
their shareholder-borrowers. The Central Bank of Russia had justified
directed credits in 1992 as necessary to boost capital investment and hence
production. But as subsidies ignited inflation and buying power dropped,
loans slated for capital investment went instead to replenish working capi-
tal. Subsidies thus did little or nothing to rejuvenate production, contrary
to the assertions of the Bank' s8
goods in the domestic market in spite of high-interest loans (what is more, a considera-
ble part of these profits went to the commercial banks)"); From the Annual Report of the
Central Bank, supra note 169, at 22, 29 ("a considerable share" of directed credits
"financed trading activities"); Gerashchenko, supra note 123, at 12 ("commercial banks
are not interested in crediting investment projects"); Hill & Slavinski, supra note 51, at
42; Kazmin, supra note 86, at 121; Rudnick, supra note 112, at 160; Sachs, supra note
165, at 42; Schaffer et al., supra note 111, at 11 (long-term loans are "difficult or impos-
sible to obtain"). Cf. Johnson et al., supra note 34, at 195 (in Ukraine, "[m]ost commer-
cial bank loans have short maturity, usually 3-6 months, and the majority of credits are
explicitly intended to finance a trading operation or the manufacture of scarce goods,
such as food, furniture or housing"). After the government instituted the sale of govern-
ment securities to finance the budget deficit, banks began to invest in treasury bonds,
further diverting capital from new enterprises. See Ben Slay, Editor's Introduction, 30
RusstuA & E. EUR. FIN. & TRaDE 3, 3 (1994).
In February 1995, the Central Bank of Russia instituted differentiated reserve require-
ments in an effort to stimulate longer-term bank loans. Effective May 1, 1995, commer-
cial banks were required to place an amount equal to 20% of their loan proceeds on
reserve with the Bank for loans up to 30 days; 14% for loans up to 90 days; and 10% for
loans over 90 days. SeeJulie Tolkacheva, Bankers Slam Central Bank Regulation, Moscow
TIMES, Apr. 23, 1995, at 31. The Bank relaxed those requirements, however, in the wake
of the August 1995 inter-bank loan market crisis. See Jim Kennett, Central Bank to
Revoke 80 Licenses, Moscow TIMEs, Sept. 10, 1995, at 26.
181. The Bank admitted as much in its 1992 annual report, stating: "Credits to com-
mercial banks.., did not perform their task in full measure, because [of] the high level
of inflation." From the Annual Report of the Central Bank, supra note 169, at 22. See also
ASLUND, How RussiA BECAME A MIA= ECONOMY, supra note 65, at 192; CA.vo &
KumAR, supra note 109, at 11, 13; Mikhail Delyagin, The Most Dangerous Thing Now
Would Be a Drastic Change in the Government's Course, POLITICHESKAYA SREDA, Dec. 14,
1995, at 3, reprinted in CuRRENT DIG. PosT-SovIEr PRESS, Jan. 17, 1996, at 18, 27 ("The
money put into the economy was more and more inflationary, and the effect on produc-
tion was less and less real"); Andrei Grigoryev, The Central Bank Chairman Toughens His
Position on Credits, SEVODNYA, Apr. 26, 1994, at 12, reprinted in CuRRENr DIG. POST-
SovIEr PRESs, May 25, 1994, at 12; Sachs, supra note 165, at 42; Schaffer et al., supra note
111, at 2 (half of all loans were used for working capital, while about 15% were used for
productive fixed investment). In the World Bank survey of Russian industrial firms
taken in the summer of 1994, Alfandari, Fan and Freinkman found that the average size
of subsidies was too small to finance real restructuring and that subsidies were mostly
used to cover operating expenses such as supplier payments and wages. The authors
further found that subsidy recipients had lower average labor efficiency and profits than
non-recipients because they used subsidies to avoid shedding workers. See Alfandari et
al., supra note 164, at 6, 12-13, 27-28. Svetlana Glinkina also attibutes the lack of
increased productivity to rakeoffs of loan proceeds by bankers and industry managers.
See Glinkina, supra note 127, at 387. Contrary to assertions that the Russian govern-
ment should institute development banks, see, e.g. ALICE H. AMSDEN ET L., THE MARKET
MEETS ITS MATCH: RESTRUCTURING THE ECONOMIES OF EASTEm EUROPE 4-5, 120-123
(1994), the Russian experience thus suggests that directed credits by the Central Bank
of Russia were too imbued with the old mentality of soft budget constraints to reliably
result in productive investment.
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Even longer-term working capital and capital investment loans were
nominally issued on a short-term basis. Inflation helped some borrowers
retire those debts because they could repay in inflated rubles.' 8 2 Other
borrowers were so cash-strapped that they could not meet payments at all.
In those instances, most banks responded by tacking the overdue interest
onto the principal and then rescheduling the principal payments. With
each loan rollover, the borrower got deeper and deeper in debt, masking
increasingly serious bad loan problems on the bank's books.18 3 Exacer-
bating matters, some banks tried to offset losses by charging higher inter-
est to their better borrowers, further discouraging quality borrowers from
seeking bank loans. 184
As this irrational interest charge structure suggests, the directed loan
program further distorted the credit market by siphoning off credit from
truly entrepreneurial ventures to inefficient state-owned firms and their
182. See V. Kokorev & A. Remizov, Modernization of Russia's Credit System Under Con-
ditions of a Liquidity Crisis, 39 PROBS. ECON. TRANSmON 41, 46 tbl. 1 (1996) (between
1994 and 1996, at least 85% of all commercial bank credits were short-term in nature);
AsLUND, How RussiA BECAME A MARKEr ECONOMY, supra note 65, at 208. Cf. POHL &
CLAssu's, supra note 83, at 4 ("[h]yperinflation facilitatefs] ... a new start by wiping
out old debts").
183. Mark E. Schaffer, Qimiao Fan and UneJ. Lee noted: "Our survey indicates that
in Russia that [sic] the practice of rolling over overdue bank credit is very common
indeed." Schaffer et al., supra note 111, at 7 (emphasis omitted). See also BoRISH ET AL.,
supra note 117, at 25-26; FISCHER & GELB, supra note 112, at 13-14 ("firms may simply
refinance growing interest charges, in a giant Ponzi scheme that initially delays reform
and then renders it extremely costly"); PHELPS ET A., supra note 112, at 26; Slay, supra
note 180, at 3 ("state enterprises of questionable creditworthiness continued to receive
loans (or to have existing loans rolled over), while small startups in the private sector
frequently had no access to bank credit"); Salvatore Zecchini, The Role of International
Financial Institutions in the Transition Process, 20J. COMP. ECON. 116, 131 (1995) ("mon-
etary policy tightening did not prevent banks from having to support heavily indebted
public enterprises toward which they were heavily exposed"). Cf. Greene, supra note
124, at 71 ("although banks appear prosperous in terms of reported earnings, the integ-
rity of their financial reporting systems does not conform to Western standards") (foot-
notes omitted).
The potential dangers posed by directed credits were highlighted by the fact that
under Gerashchenko, the Bank waived safety and soundness regulations at some 500
banks in order to permit them to funnel directed loans to their shareholders without fear
of license revocation. See Bloomstein & Lange, supra note 109, at 18. Cf. Ger-
ashchenko, supra note 123, at 14. During his tenure, the Bank's regulating scheme did
not mandate strict loan loss reserves or loan classification standards. See Blommestein
& Lange, supra note 109, at 18. Cf. Kokorev & Remizov, supra note 182, at 56-58 (dis-
cussing changes in policies on loan loss reserves and write-offs for bad loans); Rudnick,
supra note 112, at 157. In fact, Russian tax laws discouraged the creation of loan loss
reserves by making such reserves subject to profit tax. See Borish et al., supra note 127,
at 10; From the Annual Report of the Central Bank, supra note 169, at 29, 49; Ger-
ashchenko, supra note 123, at 14; Kazmin, supra note 86, at 118-19. Compounding
matters, in 1992 the Bank took the view that it could not regulate the use of loan loss
reserves due to their taxability, whereupon some banks spent their reserves on items
such as bonuses, office equipment and buildings. See From the Annual Report of the
Central Bank, supra note 169, at 49.
184. Cf. CA'iao & LvNm, supra note 109, at 15. In a similar vein, Enrico Perotti
concluded that banks in former socialist countries had incentives to prefer long-time
debtors over new customers in order to recover past unpaid debts. See Enrico C. Perotti,
Bank Lending in Transition Economies, 17 J. BA-KNG & FIN. 1021, 1030-32 (1993).
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managers. The Central Bank of Russia blatantly favored the state-owned
sector in the granting and terms of targeted loans. Market-oriented banks
complained that the Bank gave preferential interest rates to former state-
owned banks;' 8 5 new businesses complained that directed credits went
only to their state-sector competitors.' 86 The directed loan program was
also lambasted for providing old-line managers with a ready source of
funds from which they lined their pockets.
Directed credits also had the undesirable effect of reinforcing the
hopes of factory managers and outside investors for continued soft budget
constraints. Banks that charged below-market rates of interest failed to
penalize state-owned borrowers for their inefficient practices.' 8 7 Factory
managers who received directed credits were thus conditioned to expect
more credits from the state. Directed credits also made private investors
prefer the state sector over the private because the credits lent the appear-
ance that the old manufacturing companies were operating with implicit
government guarantees. 188 The result was to prop up obsolete Soviet-era
factories at the cost of denying financing to new private ventures.
Privatization combined with subsidies thus proved to be the worst of
both worlds. Under communism, subsidized enterprises at least were
accountable to some degree to the government through the device of cen-
tral planning. With privatization, however, accountability to the govern-
ment vanished. Further, the continuation of subsidies, together with the
absence of a working system of involuntary bankruptcy, meant that state-
owned firms were not accountable to the market.' 8 9 If anything, inefficient
firm practices became worse during the early phases of liberalization than
they had been under communism.
Paradoxically, however, subsidies had the unintended effect of open-
ing the door to market-based bank reforms. As inflation shot up to unprec-
edented heights, public outcry led to divisions in the pro-subsidy forces.
Public calls for reduced inflation lent political credence to the campaign to
curb subsidies.
185. The point spread between loans to the old ministerial banks and loans to brand-
new banks was as much as 60% per annum. See Hill & Slavinski, supra note 51, at 41.
See generally KoRNAI, supra note 28, at 453 (in reform economies, the "authorities allo-
cating resources discriminate against the private sector in favor of the public sector[ ]");
Greene, supra note 124, at 64, 73; Mellow, supra note 121, at 15; Rudnick, supra note
112, at 158. Cf. MAmIESON & HAAs, supra note 89, at 19-20.
186. See CA=o & LEvn'i, supra note 109, at 15; FRYDMAN & RAPAczYNSKa, supra note
112, at 84-85, 183-84; Schaffer et al., supra note 111, at 19. See also Sachs, supra note
165, at 42.
187. See David Begg & Richard Portes, Enterprise Debt and Economic Transformation:
Financial Restructuring in Central and Eastern Europe, in CArrAL MAAi s AND FINANcLAL
INrERMEDIA-ION, supra note 164, at 230, 239. Cf. Uno, supra note 139, at 168.
188. See Pistor & Turkewitz, supra note 82, at 216-17; Zecchini, supra note 183, at
131 ("steep rises in the cost of credit ... tended to crowd out the credit demand of
fledgling private enterprises in favor of public enterprises ... because of government
guarantees").
189. See FISCHER & GELB, supra note 112, at 10-11; Clague, supra note 153, at 4, 12
(noting this situation "may lead to worse results than central planning"). Cf. McKinnon,
supra note 37, at 112.
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V. Struggle for Reform
Notwithstanding this discouraging state of affairs-indeed, because of it-
countervailing forces came to bear in 1993 that enabled the Russian gov-
ernment to better withstand subsidy pressures. The frightening takeoff of
inflation in 1992 and 1993 and the market crises that ensued were the
turning point for truly market-based banking reforms. As inflation
careened out of control, the general public demanded relief. A rift devel-
oped within the business community as its more enterprising members
came to realize that crippling inflation was the price of subsidies. While
enterprises in the worst straits campaigned desperately to hold on to their
subsidy lifelines, stronger enterprises, some of which qualified for subsi-
dies and many of which did not, fought subsidies in order to reduce
inflation.
In public goods terms, the business community thus underwent a radi-
cal change in its conception of subsidies. No longer did firms invariably
view subsidies as inclusive public goods in limitless supply. Rather, firms
began to view subsidies as exclusive public goods in limited supply, whose
net per capita value declined as the flow of subsidies increased. As a con-
sequence, firms in the least need of subsidies could be expected to demand
lower inflation and to oppose subsidies in favor of other public goods.
Conversely, firms that were dependent upon subsidies could be expected
to continue to press for them, while seeking to cap the number of recipi-
ents in order to maximize their per capita share. In the process, public
goods theory would predict that the old consensus in favor of subsidies
would be replaced by a pitched battle over their use. The only governmen-
tal good that supporters and opponents of subsidies might both support
would be public goods other than subsidies, such as entry controls, that
would cap industry membership.
Events since 1993 in Russia unfolded as public goods theory would
predict. Inflation came to dominate the Russian economic agenda. Infla-
tion's toll gave reform forces the political impetus they needed to take up
the fight against subsidies. Before that juncture, the struggle over subsidies
had been virtually non-existent; ever since, the struggle over subsidies has
been fierce, constant and turbulent.
A. Inflation's Wedge
By the spring of 1993, Russians had been reeling from ruinous inflation for
almost a year and were demanding relief. Three events that spring gave
Russian reformers the power and momentum to institute the battle against
inflation and for monetary reforms.
The first event was President Yeltsin's April 25, 1993 referendum on
the program of economic reforms. In a bold and risky bid for a popular
mandate, President Yeltsin asked voters to approve his economic overhaul
program. His gamble paid off in victory, with voters approving the govern-
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ment's program for economic reforms.190
Second, the government finally succeeded in launching a market for
government bonds, which helped to relieve the pressure on the Central
Bank of Russia to finance the deficit. 191 The Soviet government's prior
attempt to float government bonds in 1990 had been a failure, with Gos-
bank having to buy back over eighty percent of the offering. 192 But by
March 1993, market conditions had sufficiently improved that the Russian
government was able to successfully float a modest offering of three-month
bonds. As demand for the bonds grew, the government gradually
increased the size of the offerings and twelve-month bonds were intro-
duced in 1995.193
Finally, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) admitted Russia to full
membership in April 1993, enabling Russia to qualify for IMF assistance.
The first such assistance was in the form of a $3 billion Systemic Transfor-
mation Facility. In return for that facility, Russia agreed to massive price
liberalization, cutbacks in unemployment compensation, deficit reduc-
tions, increased taxes, higher interest rates, caps on directed credits, lower
inflation and foreign trade liberalization. Henceforth, conditional IMF
financing would be a pivotal (if erratic) inducement toward economic
reform.194
As an integral part of the IMF's conditions, the Central Bank of Russia
and the Russian Ministry of Finance signed a joint economy policy com-
mitment on May 22, 1993 agreeing to reforms. In a historic provision, the
Bank agreed to cap the growth of credits to firms at 2% of gross domestic
product by year-end 1993, a reduction of 90%. The Bank further agreed to
raise the official interest rate to no less than 7% below the prevailing mar-
ket rate and to abandon subsidized credits in favor of commercial bank
loans pegged at market rates. Under this commitment, any future requests
190. See Celestine Bohlen, Yeltsin, Fresh From His Victory, Is Attacked by Political Ene-
mies, N.Y. Tiwms, Apr. 27, 1993, at Al; Serge Schmemann, Russians Appear to Hand Yelt-
sin a Victory in Vote, N.Y. Timas, Apr. 26, 1993, at Al. The referendum asked voters to
cast votes on four questions. With respect to the first question, confidence in President
Yeltsin, 59.2% of voters answered yes. The second question asked voters whether they
supported the president's economic reforms, with 53.6% voting to approve. On the
third, whether there should be early elections for the president, a scant 49% agreed. In
contrast, responding to the fourth question, 67.5% of voters called for early elections for
the conservative Supreme Soviet. See Bohlen, supra, at Al.
191. See 1 IMF, supra note 20, at 42.
192. See Greene, supra note 124, at 86.
193. See ASLUND, How RussiA BECAME A MARKEr ECONOMY, supra note 65, at 196;
Kazmin, supra note 86, at 115; Thomas Sigel, Finance Ministry to Develop Securities Mar-
ket, OMRI DAILY DIG. (Mar. 1, 1995) <http://www.omri.cz/Publications/Digests/ Diges-
tIndex.html>. See also Fedorov, supra note 73, at 63; From the Annual Report of the
Central Bank, supra note 169, at 30-32 (describing 1992 attempts to establish a market
for government bonds). A savings bond program was instituted in the fall of 1995. See
Thomas Sigel, Government Begins Issuance of Savings Bonds, OMRI DAILY DIG. (Sept. 27,
1995) <http://www.omri.cz/Publications/Digests/DigestIndex.html>.
194. See ASLuND, How RussiA BEcAhm A MA.=c ECONOMY, supra note 65, at 55-56,
194; Mozhin, supra note 169, at 65-71; Kim Reisman, Note, The World Bank and the IMF:
At the Forefront of World Transformation, 60 FoPDHAm L. REv. S349, S382-86 (1992);
Zecchini, supra note 183, at 125-26. '
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by firms for government credits additionally had to be approved by the
Government Commission on Credit Policy (the Credit Commission), which
was staffed by reform economists, rather than solely by the Bank.195
The Credit Commission's presence exerted a moderating effect, both
by achieving macroeconomic targets and by applying a partial brake to
cheap credits. Between March and October 1993, for the first time in mem-
ory, the official annual interest rate approached positive real levels, rising
from 80% to 210%. In 1993, the Credit Commission worked to wean
enterprises and the government off of central bank loans, reducing the total
outstanding sum of such loans from 35% to 12.8% of gross domestic prod-
uct. Also due to the Credit Commission's intervention, quarterly credit lim-
its were achieved for every quarter in 1993 except the third. As a result, the
annual rate of inflation dropped nearly two-thirds, from 2,318% in 1992 to
841% in 1993.196
Nonetheless, the targets set forth in the May 1993 commitment
aroused fierce political opposition and proved painful to satisfy. Describ-
ing the period of early- to mid-1993, a frustrated deputy prime minister
Boris Fedorov summed up the continuing impediments to reform:
The president and prime minister gave insufficient and inconsistent support,
and the majority of the government did not really support the financial stabi-
lization plan or the reforms. Throughout the year most reform policy meas-
ures were opposed by the Central Bank and Parliament, which constantly
tried to undermine reforms at any cost.19 7
One of the most intractable roadblocks proved to be one of the May
1993 commitment's own signatories, the Bank, and its chairman Viktor
Gerashchenko. Within months after signing the commitment, the Bank
demonstrated through its actions that its agreement to the commitment
had been little more than a ruse. At Gerashchenko's direction, the Bank
broke its promise to halt credits to specific industries, regions and firms,
violating the credit cap targets for the third quarter of 1993. The Bank
further violated the commitment by issuing direct subsidies to enterprises
on its own without first obtaining the approval of the Credit
Commission.198
195. See ASLuND, How RussiA BECAME A MARKEr ECONOMY, supra note 65, at 4, 194;
Fedorov, supra note 73, at 62; Boris G. Fedorov & Andrei I. Kazmin, 1993: The First
Experiences of the Russian Financial and Monetary Stabilization Policy, in ECONOMIC
TRANSFORMATION IN RussiA, supra note 109, at 27; Sachs, supra note 165, at 49-50, 54.
Four months later, on September 25, 1993, the Council of Ministers issued a directive
prohibiting subsidized credits altogether. This directive set a significant precedent, even
though in the short-term it was honored mostly in the breach. See ASLUND, How RussA
BECAME A MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 65, at 4.
196. See TRANSITION REPORT 1995, supra note 90, at 186; Fedorov, supra note 73, at 62
(citing inflation figures of 900-1,000% in 1993). See generally THE WORLD BANK, FISCAL
MANAGEMENT IN RussiA 2, 4 (1997) [hereinafter FISCAL MANAGEMENT IN RussIA]; Kokorev
& Remizov, supra note 182, at 60-61 (discussing transition to positive real refinancing
rates).
197. Fedorov, supra note 73, at 60-61.
198. The Central Bank of Russia made direct loans to ailing enterprises when com-
mercial banks refused to serve as loan conduits or where enterprises did not want the
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Notwithstanding its intransigence, the Bank nevertheless took one
major step toward banking system reform in 1993. That July, it increased
the minimum capital required to start a new bank from five million rubles
to one hundred million rubles. In February 1994, it raised minimum capi-
tal requirements again to two billion rubles. 199 While any reform during
this period might appear puzzling given the Bank's generally reactionary
stance under Gerashchenko, entry controls were in fact consistent with the
theory of public goods. Unlike the struggle over subsidies, entry controls
favored both the captive banks and the independent banks. Strong banks
wanted entry controls to keep new competitors out; weak banks wanted
entry controls to maximize their loans from the Bank. Consequently, the
successful campaign to raise minimum capital levels sent a signal that
banks and bank shareholders were beginning to realize that subsidies were
in short supply.
The consensus over entry controls was mirrored by a breakdown in
consensus over subsidized loans. It was only with the onset of inflation,
when the toll of subsidies was directly felt, that the first real movement
against subsidies got underway in the form of an anti-inflation campaign.
In its earliest phase, the campaign achieved temporary interruptions in sub-
sidies and a short-term drop in inflation. Its most enduring contributions
to reform were the establishment of macroeconomic targets, movement
toward positive real interest rates and the activation of the Credit
Commission.
In sum, inflation had precisely the effect that public goods theory
would predict. For the first time, under the banner of reduced inflation,
opposition coalesced against subsidies in favor of other, non-monetary
types of public goods. Strong banks succeeded in winning entry barriers,
which the pro-subsidy forces supported for their own reasons. Similarly,
there were calls for a rollback in directed credits in order to reduce infla-
tion. In the short run, however, neither business support nor IMF funding
was enough to sustain the anti-inflation campaign on anything more than
an episodic basis. For as long as the key instrumentality of monetary
reform-the Bank-remained in revanchist hands, a consistent reform pol-
icy would remain beyond reach.
B. From Constitutional Showdown to Market Collapse
By mid-1993, the anti-inflation forces were sufficiently well-entrenched
that, even though they were unable to consistently prevail, they posed a
genuine threat to the pro-subsidy lobby. With their appearance, the battle
over subsidies had begun. The subsidy battle would prove so divisive that
it would trigger armed conflict and ultimately the collapse of the ruble.
inconvenience of having to deal with a commercial bank See ASLUND, How RussiA
BECAME A MARKEr EcoNoMY, supra note 65, at 56, 131, 182; Fedorov & Kazmin, supra
note 195, at 27, tbl. 2.1, 28-29; Schaffer et al., supra note 111, at 2 (survey of Russian
firms taken in the summer of 1994 indicated that 13% of enterprise loans came directly
from the Bank). Cf. Hill & Slavinski, supra note 51, at 40.
199. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
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In the summer of 1993, the Central Bank of Russia's loose spending
drove up inflation, causing it to hit twenty-six percent a month in August
1993, an all-year high. With anxieties over inflation already high, the Rus-
sian Supreme Soviet exacerbated matters by approving an inflationary
budget with a projected deficit of one-quarter of the gross domestic prod-
uct. In short order, the showdown over the budget precipitated a constitu-
tional crisis.
Twice President Yeltsin vetoed the proposed budget and twice the
Supreme Soviet overrode that veto. His veto powers depleted under the
constitution, Yeltsin faced an unavoidable emergency: permit the budget to
become law, with certain hyperinflation, or dissolve the parliament and
subvert the constitution. Yeltsin chose the latter course. He dissolved the
Russian Supreme Soviet by presidential decree on September 21, 1993. In
response, members of parliament barricaded themselves inside the parlia-
ment building, the now-infamous White House. Resorting to force, Yelt-
sin's forces stormed the building on October 4, 1993, forcibly removed the
legislators and put them in prison.200 In a gesture laden with symbolism,
Yeltsin also encircled the Bank with tanks.20'
That fall, between the Supreme Soviet's dissolution and the December
1993 elections, reformers had a brief interlude in which to keep subsidies
in check Their most enduring success was the adoption of market rates of
interest. In a fight for political survival, Gerashchenko finally agreed to
raise the refinance rate to 17.5% per month as a condition of keeping his
job. By year-end 1993, real interest rates reached positive levels for the first
time in memory and have remained positive ever since, but for the three-
month period between November 1994 and January 1995.
The reform team similarly made inroads on directed credits. Four
days after Yeltsin ordered the parliament dissolved, reformers Boris
Fedorov and Yegor Gaidar issued a renewed order banning subsidized
loans, which the Bank observed from October 1993 to the spring of 1994.
Monthly inflation dropped to between six and nine percent for the second
quarter of 1994, down from fifteen to twenty percent for the previous six
months. The resulting drop sent firms the important messages that infla-
tion could be controlled and that loan subsidies from the Bank were not
200. See Serge Schmemann, Revolt in Moscow: How Yeltsin Turned the Tide, Hour by
Hour, N.Y. TimEs, Oct. 11, 1993, at 6; Serge Schmemann, Yeltsin Sends Troops to Oust
Armed Foes from Parliament; Fierce Battle Rages in Capital, N.Y. TIMFs, Oct. 4, 1993, at
Al. See generally Alexey Alyushin, Russia: The Constitutional Sources of Disarray, 4 E.
EuP. CONST. Rv. 61, 66 (1995) (Yeltsin "rested his right to dissolve the legislature on...
his duty to protect natural security and socioeconomic reforms"); Claudia Rosett, Obsta-
cle to Reform: Rooted in Soviet Past, Russia's Central Bank Lacks Grasp of Basics, WAL ST.
J., Sept. 23, 1993, at Al ("At heart, Russia's dramatic clash between President Boris
Yeltsin and Parliament is a battle to decide who sets economic policy in the struggle to
recover from 74 years of Soviet misrule"). The Russian Supreme Soviet's predisposition
toward subsidies was predictable, given the fact that it was elected in March 1990,
almost two years before the fall of the Soviet Union. Fully 87% of the Supreme Soviet's
members had been Communist Party members at the time of their election. See
BLAqcHARm Er A ., supra note 169, at 33.
201. MARJORIE DEANE & ROBERT PINGLE, THE CENTRAL BANKs 295 (1995).
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assured.20 2
Complete success, however, was not had. Demands for cash handouts,
while diminished, never ceased, and the government was prone to accede
to them whenever opposition forces gained ascendency. Those forces came
to a head in the December 1993 elections, when voters were asked to
approve President Yeltsin's proposed new constitution and elect a new leg-
islature (the Duma). The election results were mixed. Voters approved the
new constitution, which strengthened the presidency vis-a-vis the legisla-
ture and increased the independence of the Bank 20 3 At the same time,
voters rebuked Yeltsin and registered their protest against the pain of eco-
nomic reforms by electing a conservative new parliament.
With the pro-subsidy Agrarian Party in control of a significant bloc of
seats in the Duma, Yeltsin's lead reform economists, Yegor Gaidar and
202. See A suND, How RussiA BECAME A MAR=E ECONOMY, supra note 65, at 56, 165,
198-99; EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, TRANSITION REPORT
UPDATE APRIL 1995, at 10 (1995); TRANSITION REPORT 1995, supra note 90, at 56, 205.
Cf. Fedorov, supra note 73, at 62. Due in part to Fedorov's and Gaidar's policies, federal
transfer payments to firms (in the form of budget and import subsidies and directed
credits) fell from 32% of the gross domestic product in 1992 to 5% in 1994. Govern-
ment Financial Transfers to the Largest Recipient Enterprises in Russia, WORLD BANK POL-
Icy RESEARcH BULLETIN, Aug.-Oct. 1995, at 10. President Yeltsin's January 1996 decree
authorizing government guarantees for private bank loans to enterprises could reduce
demands on the federal budget for enterprise financing, but only if the default rate on
such loans is low. Cf. Nikolai Podlipsky, There's Nothing Cheaper Than State Guarantees,
KOMERSANT-DAiLY, Jan. 23, 1996, at 1-2, reprinted in CuRRENT DIG. POST-SOVIT PRESS,
Feb. 14, 1996, at 23.
203. The new "Constitution contains some disturbingly strong Executive powers, in
some cases stronger than those exercised by the American President." OFFcIt CODIFI-
CATION WITH COMMErTARY, supra note 77, at 1-54. Because the constitution does not set
forth the topics on which the parliament can enact laws, it is unclear whether the legisla-
ture has any authority to legislate in certain areas. In contrast, the constitution gives the
president broad powers to issue binding decrees and executive orders without legislative
approval. When the parliament does legislate, the president can delay the enactment of
a bill indefinitely by not signing it. Similarly, the president can appoint cabinet minis-
ters without legislative approval and can "appoint a new Prime Minister, dissolve the
State Duma, and call new Legislative elections if his first three choices for Prime Minis-
ter are rejected." Id. (citing articles 83 and 111). See Alyushin, supra note 200, at 65.
The 1993 constitution and subsequent legislation instituted additional checks and
balances to promote the independence of the Central Bank of Russia from the parlia-
ment as well as from the rest of the government. The chairman of the Bank and the
other members of its board now serve for four-year terms upon nomination by the presi-
dent and approval by the Duma. See Constitution of the Russian Federation § I, ch. II,
art. 83(d), in OFFIcIAL CODIFICATION WIm COMMENTARY, supra note 77; id. § I, ch. V, art.
103(1)(c); 1995 Amendments to the Law on the Central Bank, supra note 138, ch. I, art.
5, ch. III, arts. 12-13. The Duma can remove the chairman only upon motion of the
president and only in case of incapacitating illness, criminal conviction or breach of
applicable banking laws. The Duma can remove other Bank directors only upon motion
of the chairman of the Bank. See Constitution of the Russian Federation § I, ch. II, art.
83(d), in OFICIAL CODIFICATION WITH COMMENTARY, supra note 77; id. § I, ch. V, art.
103(1)(c). Neither legislators nor members of the Russian Federation government may
serve on the board of the Bank See 1995 Amendments to the Law on the Central Bank,
supra note 138, ch. III, art. 17. The efficacy of those provisions, however, was subse-
quently called into doubt by the circumstances surrounding the ouster of chairman Ger-
ashchenko. See infra note 207.
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Boris Fedorov, resigned from the government in January 1994. Their
departures removed what had been a significant constraint on chairman
Gerashchenko's proclivity for subsidies. By early summer 1994, Ger-
ashchenko had authorized the Bank to resume subsidized credits to farms,
northern territories and the government. 204 The Bank showed such lar-
gesse that the ratio of directed credits to total government subsidies actu-
ally increased between 1992 and 1994.205
By the summer of 1994, Russian banks were laboring under such high
bad debt loads as a result of directed credits that prognosticators began to
warn of a coming financial crisis.20 6 Soon after, monthly inflation flared
up to fifteen percent for the fourth quarter of 1994, fueled by the outflow of
subsidies. After the Bank devalued the ruble and dropped the real interest
rate to nearly zero, Gerashchenko's free-wheeling spending finally trig-
gered the financial crisis that led to his demise. With foreign reserves near
depletion, the value of the ruble collapsed on "Black Tuesday," October 11,
1994, and massive interventions were required for the ruble to recover.
The press reviled Gerashchenko for his role in the collapse, finally giving
President Yeltsin the political leverage he needed to force out Ger-
ashchenko and appoint Tatyana Paramonova as acting chair.20 7
204. See ASLUND, How RussA BECAME A MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 65, at 165-67,
200-01, 203; TRAqsrnoN REPORT UPDATE APRIL 1995, supra note 202, at 10; Delyagin,
supra note 181, at 18; John Lloyd, Russian Inflation on the Rise Again, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 2,
1994, at 3; Thomas Sigel, Government Runs Debt to Central Bank of Russia in 1994, OMRI
DAILY DIG. (Feb. 15, 1995) <http://www.omri.cz/Publications/Digests/Diges-
tIndex.html> (describing Bank credits in 1994 to the federal government and commer-
cial banks).
205. See Alfandari et al., supra note 164, at 6. "[S]oft financing" in the form of "gov-
ernment subsidies, bank loans, and payment arrears (in particular due taxes) ...
dropped substantially [but] still accounted for 6 to 7 percent of GDP in 1994."
Alfandari & Lee, supra note 175, at 11.
206. See, e.g., ECONOMICA WEEKLY BRIEF, Oct. 15-22, 1994 (on file with author); Expert
Appraisal Institute, Russian Banks Face Threat of Mass Bankruptcy, IzvEsTri, Oct. 5, 1994,
at 9, reprinted in CURRENT DIG. Posr-Sovmr PREss, Nov. 2, 1994, at 19; Elif Kaban, IMF
Warns of Banking Risk, Moscow TIMES, Oct. 20, 1994, available in LEXIS, Europe
Library, Allnws File. See also Kokorev & Remizov, supra note 182, at 45 (discussing
high rate of loan defaults). Gerashchenko responded to those warnings by requiring
loan loss reserves, stepping up license revocations, and authorizing the appointment of
temporary administrators for ailing banks. See RF Central Bank Letter No. 106, Tempo-
rary Regulations for Temporary Administrators for Commercial Banks and Other Credit
Organizations (Aug. 31, 1994) (available on Kodecks, translation on file with author);
POHL & CLAESSENS, supra note 83, at 9; Leonid Nikitinsky, Central Bank to Send "Com-
missars" to Insolvent Commercial Banks, Sept. 2, 1994, at 1, reprinted in CURRENT DIG.
PosT-SoviEr PREss, Sept. 28, 1994, at 21. Previously, insolvency procedures had been
limited to license revocation, with no procedures for resolutions or appointment of a
receiver. See Markalova, supra note 91, at 122-04; Pettibone & Passer-Muslin, supra note
68, at 711; Rudnick, supra note 112, at 157. See also BoRsH ET AL., supra note 117, at 10,
32. In 1994, the Central Bank of Russia revoked the licenses of 65 commercial banks on
grounds of risky lending and/or banking law violations, up from 19 revocations in
1993. See TRANSITION REPORT 1995, supra note 90, at 56; Thomas Sigel, Central Bank
Recalls Licenses of 10 Banks, OMRI DAILY DIG. (Feb. 21, 1995) <http://www.omri.cz/
Publications/Digests/Digestndex.html>.
207. See AsLUND, How RUSSIA BECAME A MuA R ECONOMY, supra note 65, at 205-06;
TRANSITION REPORT UPDATE APRIL 1995, supra note 202, at 10; Baidina & Baidin, supra
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The events of 1993 and 1994 proved to be of profound significance for
the future of economic reforms. Although President Yeltsin had been
equivocal toward subsidies in the past, the October 1993 assault on the
White House showed that if inflation made the political stakes sufficiently
high, he would defend the anti-inflation campaign to the point of force.
Similarly, Black Tuesday and Gerashchenko's ouster showed that no one
man could suppress the economic consequences of subsidies, including
inflation and the debasing of the ruble. Black Tuesday was thus the first
economic crisis to demonstrate that market effects alone could generate
sufficient political opposition to discredit the chairman of the Bank and the
pro-subsidy cause.
Those developments, however, came at high cost to the future credibil-
ity of reform. Yeltsin undermined the principle of constitutionalism
through his brute show of force. Likewise, Black Tuesday revealed a degree
of market instability that was thoroughly frightening to a citizenry accus-
tomed to a controlled economy. The crisis-prone nature of the battle
against subsidies would continue and would eventually undermine Ger-
ashchenko's reform-minded successor, Tatyana Paramonova, as well.
C. Paramonova's Campaign for Reform
If 1993 and 1994 witnessed the rise of the anti-subsidy forces, 1995 wit-
nessed their triumph. In 1995, under pressure to cut inflation, the Central
Bank of Russia reduced inflation by more than half through stringent sub-
sidy cutbacks and severe monetary restraint. Reforms, moreover, were not
restricted to the Bank. That same year, the Duma passed the first major
banking reform law since 1990. The single most important impetus for
those reforms was Black Tuesday and its fallout.
When the little-known chairwoman Paramonova took the helm of the
Bank, the banking industry was in a tailspin and her own permanent
appointment was by no means assured. By every account, she should have
been a lame-duck appointment, lacking sufficient political independence
from the Duma. Within six months, however, Paramonova confounded
those who underestimated her seriousness about economic reform.
When Paramonova took office, she inherited a banking industry that
was undergoing serious deterioration. The day of reckoning for poor credit
underwriting and loan rollovers had finally arrived. At numerous banks,
the volume of nonpaying loan renewals was so high that loan revenues had
note 115, at 11-12. Gerashchenko tendered his resignation to President Yeltsin on Octo-
ber 14, 1995, and Yeltsin then issued a decree dismissing Gerashchenko. Under article
103 of the constitution, the Duma has authority to dismiss the chairman of the Bank
upon the recommendation of the president. The Duma delayed its vote on Ger-
ashchenko's dismissal indefinitely. In the meantime, on October 18, Yeltsin circum-
vented the requirements of article 103 by appointing Paramonova as acting chair. The
Duma voted to refuse to confirm Paramonova in November 1995 on the grounds that it
had not yet confirmed Gerashchenko's ouster. See Constitution Watch, 4 E. EuR CONsr.
REv. 2, 23 (1995). If the constitution required the Duma to confirm Gerashchenko's
resignation-a proposition that is not without doubt-then Yeltsin's actions would appear
to have skirted the new constitution.
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practically vanished. By year-end 1994, Russia was still suffering from the
repercussions of Black Tuesday and at least one-fifth of Russian banks were
estimated to be unprofitable. 20 8
In the Duma, Black Tuesday gave Paramonova the leverage she needed
to push through legislative reforms. The Duma also was no doubt moti-
vated to cooperate by Russia's pending negotiations for a new $6.3 billion
standby credit with the IMF. With Black Tuesday still freshly in mind and
fearful that bank failures could bankrupt depositors and alienate voters,
the Duma enacted major new reforms to the 1990 banking laws in mid-
1995. On April 12, 1995, the Duma passed amendments to the Law on the
Central Bank, which President Yeltsin signed into law.20 9 That summer,
onJuly 21, 1995, the parliament enacted amendments to the Law on Banks
and Banking. 21 0
The 1995 amendments constituted a major breakthrough in reform
efforts to impose hard budget constraints upon the banking system. At a
macroeconomic level, the legislation clamped down on the Bank's ability to
finance the budget deficit and to forgive delinquent refinance facility loans.
The amendments, for example, prohibit the Bank from financing the
budget through credits, "except in the case provided for by the Federal Law
on the Federal Budget."21 1 This provision still permits the Duma to enact
208. See Josh Zander, Banking Shakeout Expected, RussIAN BUSINESS NEws UPDATE,
Mar. 1995. See also ASLUND, How RUSSIA BECAME A MARxEr ECONOMY, supra note 65, at
214; Baidina & Baidin, supra note 115, at 10; Begg & Portes, supra note 187, at 233;
Blommestein & Lange, supra note 109, at 17; Hansson, supra note 140, at 77; Rostowski,
supra note 112, at 72; Jacek Rostowski, The Inter-enterprise Debt Explosion in the Former
Soviet Union: Causes, Consequences, Cures, 5 COMMUNIST ECONOMIES & ECON. TRANSFOR-
MATION 131, 14142 (1993); Rostowski, supra note 73, at 447. Author Grigorii Khanin
had predicted this turn of events several years earlier. See Grigorii Khanin, The Soviet
Economy-from Crisis to Catastrophe, in THE PosT-SovIEr ECONOMY, supra note 81, at 9,
15-16, 18 (noting growth of loan arrears in 1991).
209. 1995 Amendments to the Law on the Central Bank, supra note 138. The original
bill, which was drafted in spring 1994 under the direction of Boris Fedorov, then the
chairman of the Duma sub-committee supervising the Central Bank of Russia, was twice
passed by the Duma and twice voted down by the Federation Council before finally
passing. See Yelena Kolokoltseva, Yeltsin Approves Banking Law, Moscow NEwS, May 5,
1995, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Allnws File.
210. 1995 Amendments to the Law on Banks and Banking, supra note 138. See also
Ivan Zhagel, Everything the People Deposit Must Be Reliably Protected, IZVESTIA, Nov. 19,
1994, at 2, reprinted in CuRum,7r DIG. PosT-SovIEr PRESS, Dec. 14, 1994, at 24; Mikhail
Dubik, Fall of the Thinking Man's MMM, Moscow TIMES, Oct. 29, 1994, available in
LEXIS, Europe Library, Allnws File. After President Yeltsin vetoed the provision on
grounds it restricted the president's ability to issue banking decrees, the Duma overrode
his veto on August 12, 1995 and Yeltsin eventually signed the bill in February 1996. See
Natasha Mileusnic, Duma Breaks Vetoes on Banks and Poverty, Moscow TIMES, Aug. 20,
1995, at 29; Ivan Zhagel, A Fresh Version of the Law on Banks and Banking Operations
Gets Its Passage, RusDATA DIALiN-BIzEKoN NEws, Feb. 8, 1996, available in LEXIS,
Europe Library, Alleur File.
211. 1995 Amendments to the Law on the Central Bank, supra note 138, ch. IV, art.
22. The purpose of that provision was to shift financing of the budget from the Central
Bank of Russia to tax revenues, bond issues, and international loans. See Julie
Tolkacheva, Credits Crackdown, Moscow TIMES, Mar. 5, 1995, at 30. See also Central
Bank Is Pleased with Newly Adopted Law, CuRRENr DIG. Posr-SovTi- PRESS, Feb. 22, 1995,
at 23.
Vol. 30
1997 Levers of Law Reform
legislation authorizing the Bank to extend inflationary credits, a loophole
that later proved to be a serious weakness during the 1996 presidential
election. 2 12 At the margins, nonetheless, the passage of a law requires
more effort than had the previous, self-executing provision in the 1990 law
that allowed the Bank to finance the budget through indirect means on its
own initiative. Similarly, the amendments ban the Bank from renewing or
extending the maturity dates of its credits unless the board of directors
specifically approves. 2 13 As long as Bank loans continue to be pegged at
market rates of interest, the practical effect of this provision will be to out-
law Bank subsidies.
At the microeconomic level, the 1995 legislation contains landmark
provisions that regulate shareholder loans for the first time. Under the
amendments, total credits, guarantees and sureties by banks to their share-
holders may not exceed twenty percent of a bank's total funds, and the
Bank may further reduce that cap. 2 14 Similarly, the amendments permit
the Bank to review bids for bank control. Under the new provisions, any
individual or group seeking to purchase more than five percent of a bank's
shares must notify the Bank The Bank can veto acquisitions of blocs of
over twenty percent within thirty days of notification where the purchasers'
financial condition is unsatisfactory or where the purchasers have violated
antimonopoly or other federal laws.2 15 Admittedly, both of these provi-
sions are crude first steps because the terms and conditions of shareholder
loans are not regulated by legislation, let alone prohibited outright.2 16
Nevertheless, both provisions demonstrate an important shift in attitude
acknowledging the dangers of shareholder loans.
Paramonova also pursued reforms on the administrative front. She
directed the Bank to take aggressive enforcement measures to forestall
widespread bank failures. Paramonova's most controversial step in that
regard was increasing mandatory reserves, both to reduce inflation and to
provide a surrogate for deposit insurance. On January 18, 1995, the Bank
sharply increased mandatory reserves and raised them again in May 1995,
forcing banks to raise additional funds or cut their loan portfolios by a
third. Additionally, the largest banks, those with capital in excess of ten
billion rubles, were required to report their activities on a daily basis.2 17
Paramonova instituted other anti-inflationary measures as well. Under
her aegis, the Bank reduced credits to finance the budget deficit and finally
212. See infra notes 266-68.
213. See 1995 Amendments to the Law on the Central Bank, supra note 138, ch. VIII,
art. 48(5).
214. See id. ch. X, arts. 61(12), 72.
215. See id. ch. X, art. 60; 1995 Amendments to the Law on Banks and Banking, supra
note 138, ch. I, art. 11.
216. Cf. Black et al., supra note 115, at 274 (proposing that insider loans should be
prohibited in the general corporate context in Russia).
217. See Vladimir Gurevich, Bank Industry Faces Prospect of More Government Control,
Moscow NEws, Nov. 25, 1994, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Allnws File; Josh
Zander, Central Bank Issues New Rules, RussLAN BusiNESs NEws UPDATE, Feb. 1995 (on
file with author). See generally Kokorev & Remizov, supra note 182, at 54-56 (discussing
Russian policy toward mandatory reserves).
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brought those credits to a halt as of April 1, 1995.218 Paramonova's strong
anti-inflation policies, including tough reserve requirements, positive real
refinance rates, sharp reductions in subsidies generally and the stabiliza-
tion of the ruble against the dollar, succeeded in reducing annual inflation
from 841% in 1993 to 131% in 1995.219
By the summer, however, Paramonova's daring reversal in course had
turned her into a lightning rod for industry criticism, jeopardizing her
prospects for permanent appointment. Banks castigated Paramonova for
raising the mandatory reserve requirement.220 Paramonova's political
stock further dropped as inflation fell, worsening the financial condition of
banks. Before, in 1992 and 1993, banks had thrived because the Bank's
refinance rate had been artificially low, interest rates on loans had been
deregulated and inflation was rising. Under those conditions, banks made
enormous profits on currency speculation and loans because of the high
spread between the low interest that banks paid the Bank for refinance
loans and the returns they earned on currency arbitrage or loans. Simi-
larly, when inflation had been at its worst, loan portfolio quality had not
been such a problem because cheap interest and eroded principal made it
easier for borrowers to repay. 221
218. See Central Bank, MONITOR (Nov. 9, 1995) <http://www.jamestown.org>; Dely-
agin, supra note 181, at 18. In the first quarter of 1995, the government had borrowed 5
trillion rubles from the Central Bank of Russia at 10% per year, a fraction of the normal
annual refinance rate of 180%. See Alexander Gordeyev, Credits Pledge Broken, but Little
Fallout Predicted, Moscow TiMES, Jan. 8, 1995, at 44. Chapter IV, article 22 of the 1995
Amendments to the Law on the Central Bank, supra note 138, formalized Paramonova's
ban by forbidding the Bank from financing the government budget through credits.
219. See TRANsITON REPORT 1995, supra note 90, at 186; Richard Beeston, Yeltsin Car-
ries Out Second Reshuffle From Hospital Bed, THE TIMES, Nov. 10, 1995, available in LEXIS,
Europe Library, Allnws File; Mikhail Lantsman, Tatyana Paramonova Expresses Concern
Over the State of the Budget, SEVODNYA, July 12, 1995, reprinted in CURRENT DIG. PosT-
SOVIET PRESS, Aug. 9, 1995, at 17; Sergey Lukianov, Central Bank Opts for Crawling Peg,
Russi REV., June 3, 1996, at 21; V. Maevskii & 0. Rogova, On Activating Credits for
Production, 39 PROBS. EcON. TRANsrnoN 26, 27-28 (1996) (summarizing the Bank's
restrictive credit policies in 1995); Peter Rutland, Inflation Hits Record Low, OMRI DAILY
DIG. (May 7, 1996) <http://www.omri.cz/Publications/Digests/Digestlndex.html>;
Thomas Sigel, Central Bank Lowers Refinancing Rate, OMRI DAILY DIG. (May 17, 1995)
<http://www.omri.cz/Publications/Digests/Digestlndex.html>.
220. Bankers later charged that the increased reserve requirement was the cause of
the August 1995 inter-bank market crisis. See, e.g., Vladislav Borodulin, Central Bank
and Commercial Banks Make Policy Decision, KOMMERSANT-DAILY, May 27, 1995, at 1,
reprinted in CuRRErr DIG. PosT-SoviET PRESS, June 21, 1995, at 17. See also infra notes
226-27 and accompanying text. After the August 1995 crisis, the Central Bank of Russia
reduced mandatory reserves and mandatory levels have fluctuated ever since. See Gov-
ernment Seeks Political Alliance With Banks, MONrrOR (Oct. 3, 1995) <http://
www.jamestown.org>; Natalia Gurushina, New Regulations on Banks' Reserve Funds,
OMRI DAILY DIG. (Apr. 4, 1996) <http://www.omri.cz/Publications/Digests/Diges-
tlndex.htnl>; Lev Makarevich, Central Bank Resolutely Rejects Criticism, FINANSOVrtE
izvasni, Sept. 21, 1995, at 1, 3, reprinted in Cuta'r DIG. PosT-SoVIET PRESS, Oct. 25,
1995, at 17; Russian Central Bank Lowers Mandatory Reserves, MONtrOR (Apr. 3, 1996)
<http://www.jamestown.org>.
221. See Baidina & Baidin, supra note 115, at 10; Gurevich & Yasina, supra note 150,
at 7; Reform or Ruin?, THE BA, NKER, Sept. 1993, available in LEXIS, Europe Library,
Allnws File (noting that a "popular way to make money through banking activity is
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But when the Bank became serious about fighting inflation under
Paramonova, bank profits suffered. With lower inflation, interest rates
dropped and banks could not charge borrowers enough interest to repay
the banks' previous, high-interest loans from the Bank.22 2 Similarly, banks
experienced increasing problems on the asset side of the ledger. Borrowers
who had repayment difficulties could no longer count on accelerating infla-
tion to inflate away their debts. 22 3 Firms conspired with each other to
pressure the Bank and the government for subsidies by refusing to pay
each other and then complaining that they did not have enough revenues to
repay their bank loans.224 Increasingly, firms defaulted on their bank
loans.2 2 5
based on the difference between the deposit interest rate, the interbank interest rate and
the commercial credit interest rate"). SimonJohnson, Heidi Kroll and Scott Horton, in a
survey of private Ukrainian banks in 1991 and 1992, reported no instances of default by
borrowers. SeeJohnson et al., supra note 34, at 195; accord Pullen, supra note 30, at 184.
222. See Leonid Bershidsky, Half of Russian Banks May Go Under, Moscow TimEs, July
15, 1994, at 52. For similar reasons, banks that had profited from currency speculation
lost money because the spreads were narrower. As the ruble stabilized and the cost of
funds increased, the large returns from investing funds in dollars disappeared. See
Grigoryev, supra note 110, at 10; Claudia Rosett, Russia Gives Its Banking System a Cash
Infusion, but Crisis Persists, WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 1995, at A10; Geoffrey Winestock, The
Road to Stability Will Be Hard on Banks, Moscow TIMEs, Apr. 22, 1995, available in
LEXIS, Europe Library, Mostms File. Banks that had invested in short-term state bonds
similarly suffered losses when yields in those instruments dropped. See Tatyana
Koshkaryova & Rustam Narzikulov, Money-Will There Be a Housecleaning in the Banking
System?, NEZAVISIMAYA GAzErA, July 18, 1996, at 1, 4, reprinted in CuIZrErr DIG. PosT-
SoviEr PRESS, Aug. 14, 1996, at 11-12.
223. See Schaffer et aL, supra note 111, at 10.
224. Privatization meant that for the first time, unprofitable firms could "borrow"
from their suppliers by simply not paying their bills. In a collective action problem,
firms stopped paying their bills, then demanded that the state pay. In 1992, Ger-
ashchenko turned those demands into a vicious cycle by netting out inter-enterprise
debts and financing the balance with state credits. The government exacerbated the
problem by reneging on payments for government procurements. See AsLUND, How Rus-
siA BECAME A MAR EcONOMY, supra note 65, at 189, 191, 210-11; CALvo & KuMAP.,
supra note 109, at 21; MuLLNBux, supra note 109, at 13-14; MULLINEUX, supra note 112,
at 26; M. Afanas'ev et al., The Payments Crisis in Russia, 39 PROBS. ECON. TRANSrrION 5
(1996); Begg & Portes, supra note 187, at 234-36; Fedorov, supra note 73, at 63-64;
Hansson, supra note 140, at 77; McKinnon, supra note 37, at 121; Rostowski, supra note
208, at 144.
The inter-enterprise debt problem in Russia has grown to staggering proportions. In
the first four months of 1992, trade debts grew from under 100 billion rubles to 1,800
billion rubles, resulting in arrears in about half of all sales. Rostowski, supra note 208,
at 131. In late 1994, approximately half of all trade credits owed by Russian firms were
overdue. See Qimiao Fan & Une Lee, Averting Debt Crisis in the Russian Economy, TRANSI-
TION, Nov.-Dec. 1994, at 5. The sluggish Russian bank payment system worsened mat-
ters by delaying those payments that were sent. See Rostowski, supra note 208, at 132-
33, 154 n.11. The new Russian Civil Code seeks to redress this problem through provi-
sions designed to improve the reliability of trade credits and bank settlements. See Civil
Code of the Russian Federation, pt. 2, arts. 822-823, 861-885 (1996). See also id. arts.
807-821. Recent new decrees taxing bank transactions and blocking corporate bank
accounts, however, pose a serious obstacle to an effective bank payment system. See
supra notes 148, 177.
225. See Kokorev & Remizov, supra note 182, at 45; Mikhail Leontyev, The Bank Crisis
Has Yet to be Overcome, SEVODNYA, Aug. 29, 1995, at 1, reprinted in CuRRmrr DIG. PosT-
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As loan delinquencies rose, banks began to have difficulty repaying
their inter-bank loans. By mid-1995, significant arrearages appeared in the
inter-bank market.226 By August 22, 1995, reports began to circulate that
some of the largest Russian banks (including Inkombank, the second larg-
est Russian bank) had defaulted on their inter-bank loans. Within days,
the entire banking industry was thrown into a liquidity crisis, as banks
refused to lend to other banks and the market for inter-bank credit dried
up. Numerous Russian banks experienced interruptions in service and
runs as depositors rushed to withdraw their accounts. The crisis passed
only after the Bank pumped 1.6 trillion rubles into the banking system.227
The August 1995 inter-bank crisis sealed Paramonova's fate with the
Duma. Paramonova had the support of President Yeltsin, who valued her
for reducing inflation and who twice nominated her for permanent
appointment. Nonetheless, enmity against her ran deep among bankers,
largely because of her actions in raising mandatory reserves. In a striking
show of strength, the banking community successfully lobbied against her
reappointment in the Duma, which consistently voted her down. Left with
no choice, President Yeltsin finally dismissed Paramonova in November
1995 and nominated former acting finance minister Sergei Dubinin as per-
SoviEr PREss, Sept. 27, 1995, at 4. In 1992, overdue loan payments rose twice as quickly
as the origination of short-term loans. See From the Annual Report of the Central Bank,
supra note 169, at 29. By June 1, 1994, about one-quarter of bank loans were overdue
and bank loan arrears comprised 5.7% of total enterprise arrears, up from 4.6% on
October 1, 1993. See Alfandari & Lee, supra note 175, at 12; Fan & Lee, supra note 224,
at 5. As a proportion of total credit, overdue bank loans rose from 9% in late 1993 to
34% in early 1995. See Schaffer et al., supra note 111, at 5. At some banks, the percent-
age of delinquent loans was as high as 50%. See Baidina & Baidin, supra note 115, at 9.
226. The president of the Russian Bank Association estimated that as of June 29,
1995, almost 80% of overdue debts to banks consisted of inter-bank debts, with the
remainder constituting delinquent loans to non-bank businesses. See Thomas Sigel,
Banking Sector Non-Payments Overdue, OMRI DAILY DIG. (June 29, 1995) <http://
www.omri.cz/Publications/ Digests/DigestIndex.html>. See also Baidina & Baidin,
supra note 115, at 9-10.
227. See, e.g., Banking Crisis, RussIAN Bus. NEws, Sept. 1995; Delyagin, supra note
181, at 18; Gurevich & Yasina, supra note 150, at 7; Jim Kennett & Michael Gulyayev,
Bailout for Banking Industry, Moscow TwMEs, Aug. 27, 1995, at 26; Kokorev & Remizov,
supra note 182, at 45-47; Elmar Murtazayev, The Crisis in the Interbank Market Is Called
'Temporary Difficulties,' SEVODNYA, Aug. 26, 1995, at 1, reprinted in CuRRENT DIG. POST-
SovIEr PREss, Sept. 20, 1995, at 6; Claudia Rosett, Russia's Banking System Begins to
Revive with Cautious Borrowing, Lending, WALL ST. J., Aug. 29, 1995, at All; Rosett,
supra note 222, at A10; Claudia Rosett, Banking Crisis Erupts in Russia Amid Rumors of
Unsoundness, WALL ST. J., Aug. 25, 1995, at A4; Russian Banks Have Started to Default,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1995, at 18. Cf. Alexander Gubsky, Credit Rumors Push Bank
Toward Brink, Moscow TIMES, Aug. 20, 1995, at 31 (describing one bank); Rachel Katz,
Loans Sought for Stricken Bank, Moscow TIMEs, Aug. 20, 1995, at 33 (same); Leading
Russian Banks in Trouble, MoNrrOR (Aug. 24, 1995) <http://www.jamestown.org>; Peter
Rutland, Commercial Bank Woes, OMRI DAILY DIG. (Sept. 21, 1995) <http://
www.omri.cz/Publications/Digests/Digestlndex.html>.
The inter-bank crisis came as no surprise. Commentators previously had predicted
that when smaller banks began to fail, the large banks that had lent them money in the
inter-bank loan market also would be at risk. See Leonid Bershidsky, Bankers Blame
Government for Looming Credit Crisis, Moscow TIMwEs, July 17, 1994, at 55; Vysman,
supra note 67, at 278.
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manent chairman of the Bank 2 28 The Duma confirmed Dubinin shortly
thereafter by a vote of 344 to 1, with two abstentions. 229
Undoubtedly to the dismay of the pro-subsidy forces, Dubinin not
only continued Paramonova's reforms, but instituted structural changes
designed to place the operations of the Bank on a more permanent market
footing. Key in this regard was Dubinin's reform of the Bank's refinance
facility, which under Gerashchenko had served as the conduit for directed
loans. In February 1996, Dubinin announced that instead of setting inter-
est rates by fiat, the Bank would henceforth use competitive auctions to set
the interest rate on short-term loans to commercial banks (the "repo rate"),
as well as Lombard rates, the rate at which commercial banks can borrow
unlimited sums of money from the Bank Dubinin further announced that
the Bank would henceforth require commercial banks to post government
treasury bills as collateral for refinance loans from the Bank. The Bank
also required bank liabilities to consist entirely of customer deposits by
1999 in order to wean banks off of central bank credits. 230
Dubinin similarly used the Bank's new enforcement powers to crack
down on insider loans. According to Dubinin, eighty percent of all banks
examined after the August 1995 crisis were in violation of banking laws,
228. See Beeston, supra note 219; Leonid Bershidsky & Natasha Mileusnic, Duma
Votes to Reject Paramonova, Moscow TIMES, July 23, 1995, at 25; Chrystia Freeland, Rus-
sian Banking Reserves Row Deepens, FIN. TiMEs, May 25, 1995, at 3; Glazyev Blames Gov-
ernment for Banking Crisis, MoNrrOR, pt. B (Sept. 1, 1995) <http://wwv.jamestown.org>;
Penny Morvant, Yeltsin Renominates Paramonova as Central Bank Head, OMRI DAILY DIG.
(May 23, 1995) <http://www.omri.cz/Publications/Digests/DigestIndex.html>; Thomas
Sigel, Budget Committee Rejects Paramonova, OMRI DAILY DIG. (June 7, 1995) <http://
www.omri.cz/ Publications/Digests/Digestlndex.html>. The banking lobby was later
accused of bribing legislators, an accusation that was fueled when Speaker Ivan Rybkin,
in an apparent slip of tongue, said during one of the Paramonova debates that a motion
had been "bought" rather than "made." See Alexander Gubsky, Massaging the System:
How Russia's Increasingly Clever Duma Lobbyists Conspire to Get the Legislation They
Want, RussIA REv., Feb. 26, 1996, at 1, 8. In addition to alienating bankers, Paramonova
also lacked support from the reform wing, particularly from Boris Fedorov. See Ex-
Finance Minister Urges Yeltsin to Name New Bank Chief, MoNIToR (Aug. 22, 1995) <http:/
/www.jamestown.org>.
229. See Leonid Bershidsky & Julie Tolkacheva, Duma Approves Dubinin as Bank
Chief, Moscow TIMES, Nov. 26, 1995, at 31; Dubinin Tapped as Central Bank Chief, Mos-
cow TIMES, Nov. 19, 1995, at 13; Julie Tolkacheva, Head of Central Bank Sacked, Moscow
TIMES, Nov. 12, 1995, at 26. Dubinin previously served as acting finance minister,
where he earned a reputation as an anti-inflation fighter. He was fired from that post
after Black Tuesday in October 1994. See Dubinin Tapped as Central Bank Chief, supra;
Duma Approves Dubinin's Candidacy, MONrIOR (Nov. 24, 1995) <http://
www.jamestown.org>.
230. See FiscAL MANAGEMENT IN Russi, supra note 196, at 6; Grigoryev, supra note
110, at 10; Glenn Hoggarth, Monetary Policy in Russia, in Russius FINANCIu. MARKETS
AND T E BAMNG SECTOR IN TaNsrnoN, supra note 98, at 53, 61-65; Steve Liesman, Rus-
sia's Central Bank Will Set Rates in a Shift Toward Western-Style System, WALL ST. J., Feb.
12, 1996, at All; Maevskii & Rogova, supra note 219, at 27; Elizabeth Owen, Stable as a
Rock?, RussIA Ray., Mar. 11, 1996, at 26-27. See generally Fedorov, supra note 73, at 63
(discussing credit auctions as a replacement for veiled subsidies); MATHIESON & HAAs,
supra note 89, at 20-23 (same).
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often due to free or low-interest shareholder loans.231 In a statement fore-
shadowing stricter loan underwriting standards, the Bank admonished
commercial banks to tighten their lending standards and base lending
decisions "on real results rather than friendly relations. 232
The events of 1995 thus demonstrated both the strength of the cam-
paign against subsidies and its continued political volatility. 1995 was the
first year that anti-subsidy forces decisively prevailed. They were swept to
victory principally on the coattails of Black Tuesday. The rising string of
bank failures similarly drove home the toll of Gerashchenko's former pro-
gram of directed loans. In 1994 and 1995, hundreds of banks capsized
due to bad debt loads and hundreds more found their solvency
impaired.233 Financial disaster thus provided the catalyst for reform.
The success of monetary reforms generated widespread political sup-
port for low inflation. Under Paramonova, subsidies were banned long
enough to permit the public to savor a large and continuous decline in
inflation, a decline which has continued. During that period, anti-subsidy
reforms were institutionalized to a much greater degree than before. For
the first time, restrictions on subsidies and shareholder loans were not just
a matter of agency decree but were elevated to legislative mandate. Positive
real interest rates had prevailed for over a year with little sign of slippage.
Dubinin strengthened the instrumentalities supporting market interest
rates (and insulated the refinance facility from serving as a subsidy con-
duit in the process) by instituting credit auctions and by requiring banks to
post collateral.
Nonetheless, Paramonova's short and stormy tenure showed the con-
tinued political divisiveness of subsidy reforms. In the wake of the August
1995 inter-bank crisis, pro-subsidy forces gained enough momentum to
oust her from office. Those forces gained additional momentum as public
231. SeeJulie Tolkacheva, And Then There Were None.... RussiA REv.,Jan. 29, 1996,
at 24.
232. See Lev Makarevich, Central Bank Resolutely Rejects Criticism, FINANsovrYE IzvEs.
TA, Sept. 21, 1995, at 1, 3, reprinted in CuRaaiNT DIG. PosT-SoVIEr PRESS, Oct. 25, 1995,
at 17. The Russian Civil Code attempts to discipline delinquent borrowers by authoriz-
ing banks to deny further credit disbursements when circumstances make it clear that
amounts lent will not be timely repaid. See Civil Code of the Russian Federation, pt. 2,
art. 821 111 (1996).
233. In 1995 alone, the Central Bank of Russia revoked the licenses of 12% of all
Russian banks (315 institutions), restricted operations of another 16% (423 banks), and
appointed temporary managers at five institutions. See Tolkacheva, supra note 231, at
24. In 1996, the Bank assumed management control of several major banks, including
Avtovazbank, Natsionalnyi Kredit, Tveruniversalbank, and Unikombank, hoping to
restore them to financial health. See Central Bank Takes Control of Financial Institutions,
DOING BusiNEss IN EAsrmN EuRoPE, Mar. 1996, at 58; Poul F. Larsen, To the Rescuel,
RussiA Ray., July 29, 1996, at 20-21; Poul F. Larsen, Government to the Rescue, RussIA
RE.,June 17, 1996, at 26; Steve Liesman & Neela Banerjee, Russia's Regulators Step in to
Clean Up Sprawling, Inefficient Banking Sector, WALL ST. J., July 9, 1996, at A15; John
Thornhill, Troubled Russian Banks Get Help to Survive, FIN. TiMES, Mar. 7, 1996, at 2.
Notwithstanding those actions, banking industry observers criticized the Bank for slow-
ing down the pace of bank closures for political reasons in the first half of 1996. See
Poul F. Larsen, Would It Be Safer in a Shoe Box?, RussiA REV., June 3, 1996, at 24.
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protests mounted over unemployment and wage arrears. While Dubinin's
permanent appointment may help him weather political buffeting better
than Paramonova, the forces that swept her out of office will not soon
disappear.
D. Levers of Law Reform
[T]he main result of the Russian reform experience is a common understanding
that the Russian economy reacts to market and monetary levers in a standard
way. It is especially important that this postulate is no longer being debated in
the government ....
- Yegor Gaidar2 34
In the five scant years since price liberalization in 1992, the Russian bank-
ing industry and the Central Bank of Russia have lurched from a Soviet-
style system of loan subsidies to a bank finance system with distinct market
features. Today, the rudiments of monetary policy are in place, inflation
has been sharply reduced and directed credits have yielded to competi-
tively priced refinance loans conditioned on repayment. In one of the most
significant emblems of this change, shareholder loans are now discouraged
by law and are subject to increasingly harsh quotas.
Despite the Russian banking industry's manifest problems, the rapid-
ity and depth of these changes is impressive. Lurking beneath the surface,
however, are serious questions about the legitimacy and permanence of
these Russian economic reforms. The shift from subsidies to a market-
driven system of bank finance was accomplished at extremely high political
cost, including derogation of the old constitution, ousters of central bank
chairmen and outright bloodshed.
Many have assumed that this turbulence and the resulting political toll
were due to the imposition of reforms upon an unwilling citizenry by neo-
liberal international financial institutions, in particular the IMF. That
assumption, however, begs the question of whether there was significant
domestic support for monetary reforms from segments of the Russian busi-
ness community or populace. The answers to these questions are essential
to understanding both the preconditions for and permanence of Russian
banking reforms.
1. International Intervention
There can be no dispute that in recent years international financial institu-
tions such as the IMF have served as a major catalyst for Russian banking
reforms. Indeed, Boris Fedorov specifically noted that economic reformers
within Russia used outside economic pressure from international financial
institutions as a key political tool:
We adopted an aggressive style and used pressure from the "international
community" to fight for reform. Money from the West was never crucial, but
234. Quoted in Mikhail Leontyev, 'Permanent Bandit' on the Road to Stabilization,
SEVODNYA, Apr. 22, 1995, at 3, reprinted in CuRPawr DIG. Posr-SovIEr Piy.ss, May 17,
1995, at 9.
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influence on policy definitely was. Messages coming from Western advisors
and international financial institutions were listened to, sometimes more
than what domestic reformers admit. Because the mild academic style was
found ineffective, the reformers' aggressive stance was a forced necessity. 2 35
At the same time, as Fedorov's remarks suggest, it would be overly simplis-
tic to assume that international financial institutions were able to foist
monetary reforms on post-socialist countries such as Russia in complete
disregard for domestic support. To the contrary, the IMF made virtually no
headway in its monetary goals for Russia until the domestic anti-subsidy
coalition gained the upper hand in 1995.
Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, international financial institu-
tions, most notably the IMF, the World Bank and the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), have aggressively provided tech-
nical advice and finance to Russia to facilitate monetary and financial
reforms. In the banking sphere, Russia has received substantial technical
assistance and funding from the West to revamp commercial banking prac-
tices. 236 The most ambitious project to date has been the $600 million
Financial Institutions Development Project, jointly sponsored by the World
Bank and the EBRD in conjunction with the Central Bank of Russia, to
improve the allocation of bank financing. The project seeks to upgrade the
forty strongest Russian banks through computerization, improved account-
ing systems and tighter loan underwriting to create a core group of Russian
banks that meet international banking standards and qualify for reciprocal
privileges. 237
235. Fedorov, supra note 73, at 61.
236. See generally Greene, supra note 124, at 71-73; So Many Banks, So Few Bankers,
Moscow NEws, June 16, 1995, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Allnws File. Cf. Vys-
man, supra note 67, at 276-77. International financial institutions, the United States and
the European Community have furnished such assistance. In June 1991, for example,
the Federal Reserve and top American banks formed the Russian-American Bankers
Forum to offer advice on retail banking and payments systems in Russia. As part of that
program, the Federal Reserve and American banks furnished technology and skills and
offered "twinning" arrangements to train Russian bankers. See CAIRIO & LEVINE, supra
note 109, at 25-26; SovIEr/AmE~icAN BANKING LAw WORKING GROUP (SABLAW), THE
1992 Moscow CONFERENCE ON BANKING: THE ECONOMIC ROLE, OPERATION AND REGULA
TION OF BANKS (1992); Gianmaria Ajani, By Chance and Prestige: Legal Transplants in
Russia and Eastern Europe, 43 Am. J. COMP. L. 93, 111 & n.54 (1995); The Emerging
Russian Commercial Bank Sector, supra note 123, at 1, 2-3; Robert J. McCartney, Fed,
Banks Plan Mission to Russia; Americans to Help Build New System, WASH. Posr, June 20,
1992, at Cl; Russia Pulls the Shutters, THE BANKER 8 (Feb. 1993); Russian Banks Play
Catch-up, A.B.A. BANKING J. 9 (May 1993); Vysman, supra note 67, at 283, 285-86. The
European Community also put up 2 million ECU ($2.2 million) to revamp payment
systems in Russia and improve transparency in financial reporting by banks. See EC to
Oil Rusty Soviet Banking System, AGENcE FRANCE PREssE, Jan. 26, 1994, available in LEXIS,
Europe Library, Allnws File; Rudnick, supra note 112, at 157.
237. To date, approximately 30 of the strongest Russian banks have qualified under
this program for loans to finance computerization and foreign technical assistance. See
Banking and Finance, RussLkN FAR EAsT UPDATE, July 1995, at 3; Tools of the Trade, Russia
REV., Sept. 23, 1996, at 8, 10. A new supervisory body formed by the Central Bank of
Russia, known as "OPERU-2," supervises this group. Selection for OPERU-2 supervision
is considered a sign of financial strength and stability. See McKay, supra note 136, at 27.
See generally Ajani, supra note 236, at 110-11 & n.52; From the Annual Report of the
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But by far the biggest player has been the IMF, which has exerted enor-
mous influence on Russian economic reforms through loans premised on
conditionality. The IMF has pursued a high-stakes strategy in this regard,
for Russia as well as for the IMF. From the IMF's perspective, its financial
stake in Russia is second only to its record $17.8 billion standby facility to
Mexico in 1995. From Russia's perspective, IMF financing is so essential
that Russia cannot bridge its budget deficit today without IMF support. 3 8
However important IMF funding is to Russia, the question remains:
was the IMF capable of unilaterally imposing monetary reforms in the face
of near-total domestic resistance? The facts suggest not. The IMF did not
make a noticeable dent in Russia's monetary policy until 1993, when Rus-
sia gained IMF membership and the IMF approved a three billion dollar
Systemic Transformation Facility, which was Russia's first major IMF
loan.239 Even then, Russia's compliance with the monetary conditions
attached to that facility was highly unsatisfactory. Apart from a few short-
lived gestures at reform, the Central Bank of Russia made no serious
attempt at monetary discipline until Black Tuesday, October 11, 1994,
when the value of the ruble collapsed. It was only after Black Tuesday, with
Gerashchenko's ouster and his replacement by Tatyana Paramonova, that
Central Bank, supra note 169, at 46; Peter Garber et al., Comment, in BUILDING SOUND
FINANCE IN EMERGING MARKEr EcoNoMms 206 (Gerard Caprio et al. eds., 1994); John
Linarelli, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Post-Cold War
Era, 16 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 373 (1995).
238. See Euan Craik, Economy May Fail Without Key Loans, Moscow TIMES, Jan. 15,
1995, at 49; Michael R. Gordon, Russian Aide Calls for Higher Tariff, Reneging on Vow,
N.Y. TIMES, March 2, 1996, at 1; IMF Will Loan Russia $10.1 Billion Over 3 Years, WALL
ST. J., Mar, 27, 1996, at C17; Dirk Willer, Why Russia Still Needs the IMF, RussI REv.,
Dec. 16, 1996, at 25; CENTRAL BANKING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO COUNTIES IN TRANSI-
TION 33-35, 59-61 (J.B. Zula et al. eds., 1994). Now that the Central Bank of Russia has
largely stopped subsidizing the budget deficit, the government is in desperate need of
other sources of financing. In addition to IMF loans, other potential revenue sources
include higher tariffs; proceeds from the sale of government assets, including privatiza-
tion sales; sales of treasury bonds; and improved tax collection. See Gordon, supra, at 1.
Cf. Delyagin, supra note 181, at 18.
239. See Fedorov & Kazmin, supra note 195, at 27-28. Cf. ASLUND, How RUSSIA
BECAME A MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 65, at 55-56, 194-96; MULLINEuX, supra note 109,
at 11; Mozhin, supra note 169, at 68-69.
Previously, in 1992, the IMF had imposed conditions in the course of negotiations
over Russia's admission to the IMF. Russia made substantial progress on some of those
conditions, particularly price deregulation and the privatization of industrial and retail
establishments. Oh the monetary side, however, Russia fell seriously short of its 1992
commitments. In particular, the Central Bank of Russia reneged on its promise to
increase loans to commercial banks by no more than 15%. Instead of reducing directed
credits, the Bank flooded the market with such credits while keeping interest at negative
real rates, fueling inflation. The only new monetary tool that the Bank successfully
implemented in 1992 was a 20% reserve requirement, a relatively crude monetary tool.
It comes as no surprise that communist-era bankers agreed to require reserves because
they closely resembled blocked accounts from Soviet times. See ASLUND, How RussIA
BECAME A MARKEr ECONOMY, supra note 65, at 182; 1 IMF, supra note 20, at 66; YAVLIN-
sKY Er AL., supra note 81, at 73; Aslund, supra note 12, at 24; From the Annual Report of
the Central Bank, supra note 169, at 20-21, 44; Rostowski, supra note 73, at 446; supra
notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
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the Bank finally switched aisles and became receptive to the IMF's propos-
als for monetary reforms.
As soon as Paramonova was in place, the IMF gambled on improved
prospects for reform by opening negotiations with Russia for a $6.4 billion
standby credit, at the time its largest loan to Russia. Doubtlessly the pros-
pect of that funding strengthened the Duma's resolve in passing the 1995
amendments to the 1990 Law on the Central Bank, which prohibited gov-
ernment financing through Bank credits. Paramonova also paved the way
by bolstering positive real interest rates, slashing subsidies, and increasing
mandatory reserves. Those measures were successful and resulted in IMF
approval for the standby credit in the spring of 1995, on the condition that
the government control the budget deficit, liberalize trade policy, abolish
tax privileges and lower inflation. Wary of Russia's past lapses, however,
the IMF insisted on an extraordinary proviso restricting disbursements to
monthly rather than quarterly tranches. 240
Russian compliance with IMF conditions improved markedly when it
reduced inflation in 1995. Based upon that performance, the IMF
approved a new, three-year $10.2 billion extended fund facility for Russia
in March 1996. This latest credit, like its predecessor, is limited to
monthly tranches and is conditioned, among other things, on widespread
banking reforms and monthly inflation of one percent. Although the IMF
insisted otherwise, observers interpreted the loan as a show of support for
President Yeltsin's June 1996 bid for re-election. President Yeltsin, in fact,
bragged in his election campaign that it was his clout and Russia's prestige
that secured IMF financing. For his part, IMF Managing Director Michel
Camdessus publicly warned that IMF loan disbursements would be halted
if the Communists captured the presidency and nationalized private indus-
try or otherwise reversed economic reforms. 241
In Russia, thus, the IMF served as a crucial catalyst to banking system
reforms in at least two respects. First, the enormity of the IMF's financial
investment in Russia-and Russia's dire need for that assistance-gave Rus-
sian reformers the financial clout they needed to push through monetary
reforms. Second, the IMF and its sister institutions, the EBRD and the
World Bank, provided badly needed technical assistance as Russia retooled
for a market economy. IMF assistance was especially important in formu-
lating monetary targets and developing new tools of monetary policy.
240. See Steven Erlanger, I.M.F. Agrees to Give Russia $6 Billion Loan, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar.
11, 1995, at 4; Charles Hecker & Natasha Mileusnic, Conditional Approval, Moscow
TIMES, Mar. 12, 1995, at 28.
241. IMF Announces New Loan, DOING BUSINESS IN EASTERN EUROPE, Mar. 1996, at 57;
IMF Will Loan Russia $10.1 Billion Over 3 Years, WALL ST. J., Mar. 27, 1996, at C17;
International Monetary Fund, Statement on Approval of $10.1 Billion Credit for Russia,
March 26, 1996, E. Eur. Rep. (BNA) 246 (Apr. 8, 1996);Jim Kennett, Communist Victory
Threatens IMF Loan, RussiA REv., Apr. 22, 1996, at 29; Thomas Sigel, And Then There
Was None, EAsT/WEsr LEmrER, Dec.-Jan. 1995-96, at 1, 5-6; Richard W. Stevenson, In
Borrowing From the I.M.F., Did Yeltsin Get a Sweetheart Deal?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1996,
at All.
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That said, it is evident from the historical evidence that the IMF was
powerless to push through monetary reforms on its own before domestic
support developed for those reforms. During the first phase of IMF involve-
ment in 1992, when negotiations were underway but before Russia won
IMF membership, inflation was just taking off and the anti-inflation lobby
had not yet coalesced. Almost no progress was made toward monetary
reforms during that period (apart from mandatory reserves), because there
was little domestic support for market-based interest or the cessation of
subsidies.
More progress was made during the second phase of IMF involvement
in 1993 and 1994, after Russia joined the IMF and the Fund disbursed its
first loan. During the eighteen months preceding Black Tuesday in Octo-
ber 1994, the government agreed to monetary targets, real interest rates
became positive, the Credit Commission became active and subsidies were
partially pared. Nevertheless, improvements lagged because the linchpin of
monetary policy-the Central Bank of Russia-remained in Soviet-era
hands. It was only when domestic outrage over Black Tuesday forced Ger-
ashchenko out of office in October 1994 that the Bank finally threw itself
behind reforms.
As recent Russian experience shows, the IMF would have been largely
ineffectual had it not been for the Russians' own support for monetary
reforms. While it is true that the monetary targets were largely imposed by
the IMF from above, those targets could not have been fulfilled without
pressure from the business community and the populace to reduce infla-
tion. The genesis of that domestic support is therefore key to understand-
ing the political dynamics of market discipline measures.
2. Domestic Forces for Reform
However instrumental the IMF and international financial institutions were
in instituting Russian economic reforms-and their role in that regard was
concededly enormous-it would be a mistake to conclude that such
reforms were accomplished without internal Russian support. Indeed, as
the experiences of 1993 and 1994 showed, without domestic support, IMF
monetary conditions were worth little more than the paper on which they
were written. It was only when a domestic coalition formed against infla-
tion that IMF conditionality truly took hold.
The first Russians to oppose subsidies publicly were reform econo-
mists in the Yeltsin administration, including Fedorov, Gaidar and
Chubais, who vocally militated for economic reforms. In contrast with the
reformers' rapid strides towards privatization and price liberalization,
however, they made little headway with monetary reforms in the early
stages of the transition. The fact that the Central Bank of Russia eluded
their control until late 1994 only impeded their effectiveness. But the more
important reason why the intelligentsia found themselves stymied was that
there was virtually no public support for halting subsidies until inflation
exploded in 1992 and 1993.
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In the earliest stages of reform, mass unemployment was the problem
that the Russian government was most intent on avoiding, and that policy
exerted pro-inflationary pressure on the government. But as inflation
began to soar and citizens' savings began to erode, popular sentiment
began to coalesce in favor of reducing inflation.
To be sure, the message was mixed, with many groups continuing to
take the stance that higher transfer payments were the cure for inflation.
Nonetheless, popular sentiment against inflation gave Russian reformers
the political impetus they needed to institute anti-inflationary measures.
By 1993, inflationary pressures were so severe that even the conservative
Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin was berating Gerashchenko for stok-
ing inflation and thereby undercutting the administration's popular
support.
24 2
In the meantime, the subsidy experience paradoxically demonstrated
that Russia could withstand large-scale layoffs without violence in the
streets. By 1993, the touted rationale for subsidies-revived production-
had been discredited at the worst-off plants. Poor sales, graft and runaway
costs had shown that no amount of money could turn those firms
around.243 As the inevitable happened, workers at the worst plants found
their salaries frozen or were laid off entirely yet massive uprisings did not
occur. To the contrary, numerous laid-off workers entered the
entrepreneurial ranks by securing private employment or starting small
businesses on their own.2 4 4 Necessity thus provided the reassurances that
242. See Grigoryev, supra note 181, at 12; Lloyd, supra note 204, at 2. Inflationary
pressures ultimately caused Gerashchenko to raise the refinance rate to 100% per
annum in March 1993. See Gerashchenko, supra note 123, at 13.
243. See ASLUND, How RussiA BECAME A MARuer ECONOMY, supra note 65, at 309;
Delyagin, supra note 181, at 18 ("Each cycle destroyed inviable enterprises and gave the
rest an incentive to modernize ....").
244. See Simon Commander et al., Social Benefits and the Russian Industrial Firm ii,
13 (June 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). Simon Commander, Une
Lee and Andrei Tolstopiatenko found that workers normally chose to moonlight rather
than quit their old firms altogether in order to retain their benefits packages. Id. at ii,
12-13. See also Black et al., supra note 115, at 12 n.19; SIMON COMMANDER & ANDREI
ToLsToPIATENKo, WHY IS UNEMPLOYiE NT Low IN TE FORMER SOVIEr UNION? 4, 19 (World
Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 1617, June 1996).
Kudrov noted in a related vein:
I am certain that we are living better and that the slump in production is less
than indicated by these statistics. Who is taking entirely into account all pro-
duction in the private sector, "shuttle" imports, interest earned by the popula-
tion at commercial banks, the appreciable increase in foreign business travel,
and mass private housing and vacation cottage construction? Against the back-
ground of the general slump in production, trade and banking-real enclaves of
initial capital accumulation-have experienced unprecedented development.
And it will not be long before this capital will enter production.
Kudrov, supra note 152, at 63-64. See also Betsy McKay, Russia's Little Guys Cast a Long
Shadow: Entrepreneurs Help Establish a 'New Middle Class', WALL ST. J., May 7, 1996, at
A14. There is evidence that Russians consider inflation a greater evil than unemploy-
ment. A recent survey concluded that six out of every ten Russians considered inflation
the greater threat, largely because inflation affects all citizens, whether they are
employed or unemployed. See Richard Rose & Christian Hearpfer, Fears and Hopes-New
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economic theory could not: that insurrection was not the necessary price
of layoffs and that full employment came at a high fiscal cost.
In the interim, the better-run firms began to speak out against infla-
tion. Once real interest rates became positive at the end of 1993, a rift
opened among factory managers, as viable firms and entrepreneurs began
to voice demands for an end to subsidies. By then, enough time had
elapsed that some understanding of monetary and fiscal principles had
filtered down to the managerial class. In dire need of bank loans to replen-
ish their depleted working capital, the better-run firms came to realize that
interest rates would not fall unless inflation fell as well.245 As entrepre-
neurs came to realize how inflation harmed them, those realizations trans-
lated into political demands.246
Democracies Barometer Surveys, TRaNSImON (The World Bank, Washington, D.C.), May-
June 1996, at 13.
245. Anders Aslund described this dynamic in mid-1994:
[T]he monetary squeeze divided the enterprises... into three parts. One group
of big enterprises had come close to a standstill and eventually had to be closed.
Another group was doing well and would survive, while the third experienced
serious trouble but could be restructured with considerable effort. The losers
were down and out, marked by their failure. They still demanded cheap credits,
but they could no longer convincingly argue that they were viable enterprises for
the future. The winners, on the other hand, suffered from a shortage of working
capital, which had been run down by inflation. They needed to replenish it with
ordinary bank credits, but in the spring of 1994, positive real interest rates
hovered at around 150 to 180 percent a year. The winners began to realize that
real interest rates would stay high until the budget deficit was reduced. As a
result, they no longer supported general demands for cheap credits, and they
wanted to cut the state budget deficit. The directors lobby had been severely
split because of decisive state measures.
AsLuND, How RussiA BECAME A MA= ECONOMY, supra note 65, at 309. See also
FRYDmAN & RAuACzYNsKi, supra note 112, at 195; Kharkhordin & Gerber, supra note 133,
at 1085-86 (describing the division of St. Petersburg industries in 1993 into competing
interest groups); V. Mau et al., Alternative Economic Policies and the Problems of Inflation,
39 PROBS. EcON. TRAsI'sroN 41, 43 (1996). The following year, in its 1995 annual
report, the Russian Federation's Chamber of Commerce and Industry called inflation
Russia's most pressing economic problem: "Inflation remains the central problem of the
country's socioeconomic situation." Russian Business: Priorities of the National Economy in
1995, 38 PROBS. ECON. TRANSITION 6, 7 (1995) (emphasis in original).
246. See Vincent Koen & Michael Marrese, Stabilization and Structural Change in Rus-
sia, 1992-94, in ROAD MAPS OF THE TRANSITION 53, 56, 58 (IMF Occasional Paper No. 127,
Sept. 1995); Mikhail Leontyev, Reformers: 'Permanent Bandit' on the Road to Stabiliza-
tion-Comments Made During an Economic Conference, SEVODNYA, Apr. 22, 1995, at 3,
reprinted in CuRuRNT DIG. Posr-SoviEr PPRss, May 17, 1995, at 9, 11 (reporting Sergei
Vasilyev's comment that "[n]umerous lobbying groups are competing among them-
selves, seeing to it that no one group gets more than it 'ought to"' in state subsidies); see
also CHERYL W. GRAY & KATHRYN HENDLEY, DEVELOPING COMMERCIAL LAW IN TRANSITION
ECONoMIEs 2, 8 (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 1528, 1995). Other
economic developments relieved the pressure for subsidies by easing the financial
squeeze on viable firms. Price liberalization permitted firms with attractive wares to
boost their revenues by charging what the market could bear. Similarly, businesses took
measures to prevent trade arrears from getting worse. In addition to conditioning deliv-
ery on prepayment, firms began to cut off further supplies to delinquent customers, to
charge interest on overdue bills, to institute collection either through the courts or
through private security services and to trade IOUs with trustworthy buyers. See
AsLUND, How RusstA BECAME A MA=KET ECONOMY, supra note 65, at 189, 210-11;
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The same dynamic was at work in the commercial banking industry.
As early as 1992, Sergey Yegorov, the president of the newly founded Rus-
sian Banking League, publicly stated: "Inflation is our biggest worry. It
hurts us, and it hurts the customers who owe us money."247 That same
year, some of the larger, better-capitalized banks took a controversial stand
against subsidies by refusing to participate in the Bank's directed credit
program altogether. Concerned that targeted loans would turn sour and
impair their liquidity ratios, those banks decided that the long-term cost of
serving as a conduit for directed credits outweighed the benefit. 248 In
1993 and 1994, the wisdom of that stance was vindicated, as the Bank of
Russia began revoking bank licenses and imposing fines on their competi-
tors for failures to repay directed credits.249 The Bank's sudden reversal in
course broadened the sentiment against subsidies by making sanctioned
banks wary of serving as conduits for directed loans in the future.
In lieu of subsidies, the more market-oriented banks lobbied for trade
protection in the form of other, non-monetary types of public goods. Early
on, both competitive and captive banks agreed on the utility of entry con-
trols in the form of higher minimum capital requirements. Later, profit-
oriented banks called for implementation of stricter Western banking stan-
dards in a move to squeeze out their financially-pressed competitors. 25
0
Some of those same banks instituted hard budget constraints by denying
Alfandari & Schaffer, supra note 177, at 24-25; Kharkhordin & Gerber, supra note 133,
at 1078-81; Julie Tolkacheva, Unbacked IOUs Ease Debts, Moscow TiMES, July 17, 1994,
at 49. For a useful discussion of other private dispute resolution mechanisms in Russia
that helped ease payment arrears, see Rubin, supra note 115, at 17-25, 34-47.
247. Fairlamb, supra note 143, at 83.
248. See Rudnick, supra note 112, at 160 (quoting Mosbusinessbank as "hardly
mak[ing] any use of the Central Bank's resources" and Credo Bank to the effect that
"[o]ne of our key principles is to refrain from any use of centralized credit resources").
See also Mau et al., supra note 245, at 43. In its 1992 annual report, the Central Bank of
Russia cited yet another reason why some commercial banks had "refused to grant pref-
erential credits," which was the Bank's long delay in compensating commercial banks
for targeted loan disbursements. The Bank conceded that such "delays caused commer-
cial banks to lose income and sustain losses." From the Annual Report of the Central
Bank, supra note 169, at 28.
249. See Bershidsky, supra note 227, at 55; Bershidsky, supra note 222, at 52;
Fedorov, supra note 73, at 62; Mekhriakov, supra note 131, at 85; Rudnick, supra note
112, at 157. The Bank's new-found enthusiasm for collection infuriated banks that had
accepted directed credits, which complained, often disingenuously, that the government
had pressured them in the first place to funnel those credits to failing firms with no
opportunity for underwriting. Gerashchenko tried to mollify the banks by floating a
proposal (which was never adopted) to convert overdue directed credits into state debt.
See Grigoryev, supra note 181, at 12. Notwithstanding that trial balloon, the Central
Bank of Russia commenced collection efforts in January 1994. By that July, the Bank
had revoked licenses of 53 banks and fined another 79 for failing to repay their Bank
loans. Bershidsky, supra note 227, at 55; Bershidsky, supra note 222, at 52.
250. See FRYDMAN & RAPAczyNsi, supra note 112, at 195; POHL & CLAESSENS, supra
note 83, at 9, 12; Michael Gulyayev, Cash Crunch Continues for Many Banks, Moscow
TIMES, Sept. 10, 1995, at 27 (quoting Stolichny Bank president Alexander Smolensky as
calling for stricter Central Bank of Russia regulation). Cf. Weingast, supra note 145, at 6
(noting in a related context that federalism reduces rent-seeking because "firms outside"
a locale that offers regulatory protectionism have "a competition advantage over those
being regulated").
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new loans to delinquent borrowers, by restructuring borrowers' manage-
ments and by forcing such borrowers into bankruptcy under the new Rus-
sian bankruptcy law.25 1
In short, inflation and the volatility of the ruble were the decisive fac-
tors that generated domestic political support for monetary reforms. It
took time for inflation to appear. Once it did, it took time for anti-inflation
forces to mobilize, and still more time for those forces to prevail. This his-
tory suggests that bank reforms that are completely at odds with long-
standing social norms will be almost impossible to adopt at the initiation
of reforms. Concomitantly, this sequence of events suggests that
macroeconomic shocks may generate political support for monetary
reforms where none existed before. Such shocks can do so by driving
home the high social costs of old, inflationary modes of finance. They can
also do so by illustrating the improvement in conditions when monetary
reforms are instituted. In the past four years, Russia has passed through
both phases, giving Russians a large vested stake in low inflation. Whether
Russians feel that they have a vested stake in the cessation of subsidies that
is necessary for lasting reforms, however, remains unclear.
VI. Russia at the Crossroads
For all of the manifest problems in the Russian banking system, too little
credit has been given to the enormous strides in Russian banking reforms.
The Central Bank of Russia has sharply curtailed subsidies, the market
now sets interest rates, the law has begun to regulate conflicts of interest
and the deficit is largely financed through the sale of government bonds
and IMF loans, rather than through the printing presses. This transforma-
tion, however, was achieved at enormous socio-political cost, including
extreme economic privation on the part of Russian citizens, the collapse of
the ruble, the failure of hundreds of banks, the ouster of three successive
chairs of the Bank of Russia and a constitutional crisis that culminated in
military force and bloodshed. What does this tumultuous landscape augur
for the permanence of reforms?
There are some grounds for optimism about the future course of
reforms. Over the past five years, Russian citizens have gained a personal
stake in at least some reforms, having endured the trade-offs of widely dis-
251. See Peter Rutland, Bankruptcies Loom in St. Petersburg, OMR1 DAILY DIG. (Nov.
14, 1995) <http://www.omri.cz/Publications/Digests/Digestlndex.htn1> (reporting
Menatep Bank's plans to force Petersburgskii Tekstil into bankruptcy); Financing
Problems for Amurstal, RussL~A FAR EAST UPDATE, Jan. 1996, at 3 ("NAKBank could force
Amurstal [(a major steel mill)] into bankruptcy courts, if a negotiated settlement with a
new investor does not take place"); Vladimir Gurevich, Bankers Navigate New Economic
Realities, Moscow NEws, Jan. 13-19, 1995, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Allnws
File; Betsy McKay, King of Turnarounds, CErr. Eum EcON. REv., June 1996, at 12; Schaf-
fer et al., supra note 111, at 13 (finding that "[chronic loss-makers] do find it signifi-
cantly harder to obtain short-term bank credit, even when controlling for size and
industry"); Julie Tolkacheva, Don't Call Me. Call My Lawyer!, RussIA RE.,Jan. 15, 1996,
at 18; We Asked ... Could NakBank Force Amurstal into Bankruptcy?, RussiAN FAR EAsr
UPDATE, Feb. 1996, at 6.
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parate economic policies through hard personal experience. Citizens now
know that subsidies plus price controls will result in shortages and that
price liberalization will restore goods to the shelves. They suffered through
runaway inflation, and their protests pushed inflation to the top of the
political agenda. Hearing these voices, the government slashed annual
inflation from 131% in 1995 to 21.8% in 1996.252 Inflationary pressures
have noticeably eased and citizens now know inflation can be controlled.
Thus, among citizens at large reforms have generated broad popular sup-
port for low inflation, coupled with unbridled access to consumer goods.
Moreover, citizens at large are not the only ones with a stake in contin-
ued low inflation: the government and significant segments of the business
community have large stakes too. One of Yeltsin's biggest trump cards
going into the 1996 presidential campaign was the government's success in
reducing inflation. The prospect of major new IMF funding was a major
spur towards low inflation as well. Similarly, the lobbying might of politi-
cally powerful banks and enterprises weighed in decisively against
inflation.
Another encouraging sign has been the formation of new market insti-
tutions that placed monetary reforms on a more secure footing. The crea-
tion of the reform-minded Credit Commission, for example, provided a key
counterweight to the Central Bank of Russia under Gerashchenko, which
was too imbued with the mentality of soft budget constraints to relinquish
subsidies on its own. The Credit Commission's success in cutting subsi-
dies over the Bank's objections showed that reforms could be launched,
even in the face of obstructionism, if assigned to new agencies unburdened
by the old Soviet mindset. Likewise, the Bank's grant of increased indepen-
dence through the 1995 amendments was designed to insulate the Bank, at
least in theory, from political pressures for future subsidies.
New instruments of monetary policy similarly took pressure off the
Bank to finance the budget and the economy through inflationary subsi-
dies. The introduction of government bonds was crucial to converting the
government to a non-inflationary means of budget financing and to
enabling the government to wean itself off of Bank credits. Dubinin's insti-
tution of commercial auctions to set the repo rate and Lombard rate was
similarly important in institutionalizing market-based rates of interest.
Despite these encouraging signs, however, Russia is in the throes of a
powerful political backlash that could easily endanger reforms. In this
regard, it would be a mistake to assume that because the Russian citizenry
has a stake in some reforms, it has a stake in all. To the contrary, the severe
economic privation that the economic austerity plan imposed bred deep-
seated public resentments. Unemployment is rampant and job security is
precarious, largely because industrial output in Russia has steadily
252. Peter Rutland, Inflation Hits New Low, OMRJ DAILY DIG. (Jan. 7, 1997) <http://
www.omri.cz/Publications/Digests/Digestindex.html>.
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dropped since 1989.253 Between 1990 and 1994, full-time employment fell
10%, while the number of employees who were laid off or whose work-
hours were reduced rose more than 250%. In 1994, only 70% to 80% of
the workforce was utilized.254 On average, laid-off workers found new jobs
within six months, but the average length of unemployment has continued
to increase. 255
As one might expect in view of these statistics, Russians saw their real
disposable incomes fall between 1992 and 1995.256 On top of unemploy-
ment and inflation, part of that drop was attributable to wage arrears, the
tactic managers used to goad workers to lobby for subsidies. For the unem-
ployed, unemployment benefits have not dosed the gap. Benefits paid have
been pitifully low (averaging 15% of average wages) and are not enough to
escape poverty. 257
Hence, for ordinary Russian citizens difficult economic straits have
been a painful day-to-day reality since the break-up of the Soviet Union. To
be sure, the economy improved in some respects in 1996: private sector
jobs are more plentiful, real wages are finally increasing and the number of
people in poverty has dropped.258 Goods are plentiful and increasingly
affordable. But for the average Russian, employment remains volatile and
life remains hard. Matters are worse for those who have no other source of
private income, such as pensioners and workers in the Arctic, on farms and
in one-company towns.
Consequently, while Russians have a large stake in low inflation, their
attitude toward the monetary reforms necessary for low inflation is at best
deeply ambivalent. Like their counterparts in Western economies, most
Russian citizens want low inflation and subsidies and see no inherent con-
flict between the two. There is deep and abiding anger over job insecurity
and over the steep drop in the Russian standard of living. Likewise, there
is deep and abiding anger over the chaos, crime and resort to military force
that have plagued the Yeltsin years.
253. See TRANsmON REPORT 1995, supra note 90, at 205; Bad Numbers ... RussIA
REv., Apr. 8, 1996, at 28; Klugman, supra note 177, at 6, 8; Russian G.D.P. Fell 6% in
1996, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 21, 1997, at C4.
254. See Alfandari & Lee, supra note 175, at 11. See also Black et al., supra note 115,
at 12 n.19; Kharkhordin & Gerber, supra note 133, at 1083 (describing layoffs).
255. See Klugman, supra note 177, at 7-8. In 1996, unemployment continued to rise,
reaching 9.3% by year-end. See Penny Morvant, Unemployment Up, Arrears Problem
Worse, OMRI DAImY DIG. (Jan. 20, 1997) <http://www.omri.cz/Publications/Digests/
Digestlndex.html>.
256. See, e.g., Increased Government Expenditure Could Backfire on Yeltsin, MoNITOR
(Feb. 26, 1996) <http://www.jamestown.org>; Russia/Inflation, MoNrroR (Nov. 8, 1995)
<http://www.jamestown.org>.
257. See Klugman, supra note 177, at 7-8.
258. In 1996, average real wages rose slightly. Similarly, in 1996 the percentage of
Russians living in poverty fell by 15%. See Jim Kennett, Happy Days Are Here Again?,
RussIA REv., Apr. 22, 1996, at 22, 22-23; Inflation at All-Time Low, MONrTOR (Mar. 1,
1996) <http://www.jamestown.org>; Inflation Steady, RussiA REv., Apr. 22, 1996, at 28;
Milestones of Transition, TRANsrmoN (The World Bank, Washington, D.C.), May-June
1996, at 19; see also Penny Morvant, 1996 Living Standards Reviewed, OMRI DAILY DIG.
(Jan. 15, 1997) <http://www.omri.cz/Publications/Digests/DigestIndex.htnl>.
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That anger has five targets. The first is the IMF, whose presence in
Russia has been criticized by liberals and conservatives alike. Reformers
have lambasted the IMF for its lenience in the face of Russia's repeated
failures to live up to IMF conditions. 259 Conservatives blame the Fund for
Russia's economic decline, for harshness and inflexibility, for the appear-
ance of partisan support for President Yeltsin and for Russia's financial
dependence on IMF aid. As such, the IMF is a principal object of Russian
xenophobia, and its activities have helped to spark a resurgence of Russian
nationalism. 26
0
Company managers are the second target, based on suspicions that
higher-ups are diverting loans and profits to personal foreign bank
accounts. Such suspicions have been all too often justified. Aggregate cap-
ital outflows from Russia have been so large, and industrial output in Rus-
sia has declined so steeply, that numerous specialists have concluded that
a large percentage of investment funds never reach their intended
destination.26 1
The third target is the banking industry, which has never enjoyed the
public's trust and is continuing to experience high rates of failure. The
latest round of bank insolvencies was triggered by unpaid loans and by
bank speculation in short-term domestic government bonds, which turned
sour when interest rates on the bonds fell. As a consequence, the total
number of Russian commercial banks shrank by nearly one-fifth in 1996,
bolstering depositors' fears and hampering the banking industry's ability
to serve as a true financial intermediary.2 62
The obvious fourth target is President Yeltsin. Ever since he stormed
the parliament in October 1993, Yeltsin has been the subject of public dis-
enchantment, which only deepened with the war in Chechnya, continued
economic difficulties and reports of Yeltsin's drinking, declining health and
corrupt associates. The public registered that disenchantment in the 1993
and 1995 parliamentary elections, when Yeltsin's legislative allies suffered
defeat at the hands of conservative forces. Yeltsin was able to continue the
reforms in part because the December -1993 constitution considerably
259. See Dmitri Tulin, The IMF and the World Bank Prevents [sic] What?, TRANSITION
(The World Bank, Washington, D.C.), Sept.-Oct. 1995, at 11-12.
260. See, e.g., Peter Murrell, The Transition According to Cambridge, Mass., 33 J. EcoN.
Lrr. 164, 175-77 (1995); Zecchini, supra note 183, at 126-33.
261. See, e.g., Black et al., supra note 115, at 27-28; Glinkina, supra note 127, at 386-
87; Shelley, supra note 127, at 828, 831.
262. Crisis in Russian Banking Sector ... Produces Contrasting Proposals, MoNrroR
(Apr. 10, 1996) <http://www.jamestown.org>; Grigoryev, supra note 110, at 10; Natalia
Gurushina, Banking System Review, OMRI DAILY DIG. (Nov. 26, 1996) <http://
vww.omri.cz/ Publications/Digests/Digestlndex.html>; Natalia Gurushina, Central
Bank's New Measures to Control Commercial Banks, OMRI DAILY DIG. (Apr. 11, 1996)
<http://www.omri.cz/ Publications/Digests/DigestIndex.html>; Peter Rutland, Bank Cri-
sis Looming?, OMR1 DAILY DIG. (Jan. 29, 1996) <http://www.omri.cz/Publications/
Digests/DigestIndex.htm1>. While the small size of most Russian banks reduces the
danger of systemic bank failures, see POHL & CLAESsENS, supra note 83, at 9-10, that
danger is not unfounded, as the August 1995 inter-bank crisis showed.
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strengthened the presidency's powers vis-A-vis the parliament.263 But Yelt-
sin averted losing the presidency to the Communists in the summer of
1996 only because of ward-heel politics and because a majority of voters
feared a return to communism even more than the Yeltsin alternative. 264
The final targets are the fiscal and monetary reforms themselves. Sub-
sidy cut-offs were never popular with the general public, and President Yelt-
sin, in the heat of the presidential campaign, succumbed to pressures to
restore handouts. In the feverish last months before the presidential elec-
tion, Yeltsin distanced himself from reform economists as much as possi-
ble and used the powers of the presidency to raise pensions and pay long
overdue wages to public workers. The administration's decision to forbear
from collecting tax arrears, both before the election and after, has caused
the IMF to delay the payment of successive tranches.265
Many of Yeltsin's pledges were nothing but empty promises, however,
until the waning days of the presidential campaign. Then, Yeltsin pushed
through a law forcing the Central Bank of Russia to lend money to cover
the budget shortfalls caused by those pledges. In early June 1996, Yeltsin
convinced the parliament to enact fast-track legislation commanding the
Bank to advance five trillion rubles (approximately $990 million) to cover
the government's deficit spending. The Bank strongly protested the move,
both on grounds of its independence and due to fears of renewed inflation.
With Chairman Dubinin away in the hospital for minor surgery and not
available to wage a fight, however, the Bank quickly capitulated and trans-
263. Conservatives Resurgent in Russian Vote, EAsT/WEst Lrra, Dec.-Jan. 1995-96, at
6.
264. In the July 3, 1996 presidential runoff election, Yeltsin received an absolute
majority and beat the communist candidate, Gennady Zyuganov, by a margin of approx-
imately 13%. See Michael Specter, Yeltsin Defeats Communist Foe by a Surpisingly Wide
Margin; Health Issue Looms for 2d Term, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 1996, at Al; Alessandra Stan-
ley, Yeltsin Appeals to Nation to End Political Breach, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 1996, at Al.
265. See Gleb Cherkassov, Presidential Election Campaign in Russia: The First Stage,
PRIsM, pt. 3 (May 3, 1996) <http://www.jamestown.org>; The Dismal Science: IMF
Delays Loan Payment, PRISM (July 26, 1996) <http://www.jamestown.org>; The Fortnight
in Review: Will Yeltsin Abandon Economic Reform in Search of Votes?, PRISM, pt. 1 (Feb. 10,
1996) <http://www.jamestown.org>; IMF Delays Payment of Monthly Loan to Russia,
MONITOR (Feb. 24, 1997) <http://www.jamestown.org>; IMF May Delay Russian Loan,
MONITOR (Jan. 27, 1997) <http://www.jamestown.org>; Penny Morvant, Yeltsin Signs
Decree on Pensions . . . and Savings, OMRI DAILY DIG. (Apr. 3, 1996) <http://
www.omri.cz/Publications/ Digests/DigestIndex.htmln>; Sigel, supra note 241, at 5; Ales-
sandra Stanley, Spendthrift Candidate Yeltsin: Miles to Go. Promises to Keep?, N.Y. TIMFS,
May 4, 1996, at 1, 5; Yeltsin Pledges to Clear Wage Arrears, MoNIToR (Mar. 15, 1996)
<http:// www.jamestown.org>.
Many observers interpreted the forced resignation in January 1996 of Yeltsin's top
economic official, Anatoly Chubais, as a move by Yeltsin to publicly disavow economic
reforms. Chubais was forced out after a scandal over Yeltsin's loans-for-shares privatiza-
tion plan triggered charges of bid-rigging and corruption. His resignation disconcerted
the IMF, which had relied on Chubais' presence as a mainstay of economic reforms.
After his dismissal, however, Chubais continued to exert influence behind the scenes as
Yeltsin's presidential campaign manager. See Neela Banerjee, Russian Communists
Exploit Loan Flap: Swaps for Shoes, Backed by Yeltsin, Are Example of Privitization, WAL
ST. J., Feb. 14, 1996, at A10; Cherkassov, supra; Sigel, supra note 241, at 1, 5-6.
Cornell International Law Journal
ferred the funds.266
Yeltsin's raid on the Bank's coffers was deeply disturbing in a number
of respects, not the least of which was its disregard for the Bank's auton-
omy. Yeltsin's actions in that regard revealed a fundamental weakness in
the 1995 amendments to the Law on the Central Bank, which provide that
the Bank cannot finance the budget deficit through credits "unless provi-
sion is made ... in the law on the federal budget."26 7 As it turned out,
once the president made up his mind to raid the Bank's coffers, the pro-
subsidy Duma was only too eager to comply. That turn of events revealed
how easy such legislation is to enact and how fragile the Bank's real auton-
omy remains. It further revealed Yeltsin's propensity for subverting laws he
deems inconvenient, particularly because it is not clear whether the 1995
amendments permit the parliament and the president to force the Bank to
furnish credits it does not wish to lend. To compound matters, the transfer
exceeded the Bank's 1995 profits three-fold, requiring the Bank to dip into
mandatory reserves that had been earmarked for emergency loans to trou-
bled Russian banks.268
Despite these troubling developments, Yeltsin's high-level appoint-
ments immediately after the election indicated that the subsidy surge
might be short-lived. The reappointment of Viktor Chernomyrdin as Prime
Minister and the appointment of Anatoly Chubais as Chief of Staff and
266. See RF Federal Law No. 62-FZ, On Transfer of the Central Bank's Income into the
Federal Budget (June 5, 1996); Duma 'Raid' on Central Bank Is Yeltsin's Gain, CuRr'r
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later as First Deputy Prime Minister, who together forged the government's
anti-inflationary policy in 1995, is an encouraging sign of greater fiscal
restraint.26 9 Similarly, Yeltsin has shown an increased commitment to eco-
nomic reforms between elections and particularly after electoral victories.
Consequently, now that the election is past, monetary reforms may gain
some breathing room.
Yeltsin's very ability to recapture the presidency, however, was jeopard-
ized due in large part to the toll exacted by those reforms. Notwithstand-
ing his victory, the communist threat will not go away and can be expected
to rear its head in the 1997 parliamentary elections. Thus, despite reforms
there is still no consensus in favor of market principles, and Russia's eco-
nomic course remains deeply divisive. Consequently, it is worth consider-
ing whether Russia is consigned indefinitely to a purgatory of political
turbulence or whether public goods theory can offer a way out of the appar-
ent impasse between low inflation and employment.
In the first years of the Russian Federation, democracy's challenge was
to foster support for monetary reforms where there was none. Public goods
theory is useful in understanding how the collapse of central planning, and
the macroeconomic shocks that ensued, triggered the breakdown of the old
pro-subsidy consensus. It further explains how major market discipline
measures came to be legislated and how inflation fell as a result. Now that
the anti-inflation forces are close to realizing their goal, their numbers can
be expected to increase. As inflation drops, savings will increase, working
capital will stretch further and a more favorable climate will develop for
viable businesses. With an improved business climate, the number of new
businesses should grow and the anti-subsidy segment of the Russian busi-
ness community should grow as well. Pro-subsidy forces, in the meantime,
will dwindle as businesses come to grips with hard budget constraints and
failing firms are shut down.270
Public goods theory explains this turn of events by focusing on the
coalition-building potential of inclusive goods. Low inflation is an inclu-
sive public good that lends itself to broad-based support because everyone
in society benefits from it, at least to some degree. As the Russian experi-
ence demonstrates, those coalitions will be able to organize, despite their
large size, if inflation is so severe that citizens' economic survival is at
stake. The more that those coalitions succeed, moreover, the more support-
ers they can win to their cause. Conversely, as proponents of exclusive
goods in the form of subsidies seek to limit those who receive such subsi-
dies, their opponents can exploit the resulting social resentment to attract
269. See Neela Banerjee, Yeltsin Picks Ex-Economics Czar to Be His Powerful Chief of
Staff, WALL ST. J., July 16, 1996, at A6; Matt Bivens, Chubais Comes Back, RussiA REv.,
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270. Already, the curtailment of subsidies has forced firms to compete with private
financing. See Betsy McKay, Down to Basics, CENr. Eut. EcoN. REy., Mar. 1997, at 8, 11.
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new supporters. These dynamics give anti-subsidy forces added potential
to prevail over time.
That said, for pro-subsidy sentiment to fall, unemployment fears must
be assuaged. As inflation drops, business growth should create new jobs,
which should ease job concerns as workers from failing plants find new
work in the entrepreneurial sector. As job security grows, low inflation
should increasingly replace unemployment as workers' fundamental con-
cern. The results of the 1996 presidential election provide some evidence
(albeit evidence that is admittedly ambiguous) that this process has
already begun.
That is not to say that this course of events is unalloyed or even inevi-
table. The Yeltsin government is highly unstable, Yeltsin's own health is
questionable, millions of workers remain unpaid, joblessness is rampant
and there is renewed talk of an insurrection or a coup.
But even if Yeltsin were ousted, reversing reforms would not be easy for
the new regime. Any new leader would face the same political pressures in
managing the economy that Yeltsin faces. As Gerashchenko's tenure
showed, a significant rise in subsidies would re-ignite inflation and fuel
public protests. The only way to hold down inflation without slashing sub-
sidies would be to confiscate bank accounts, provoking panic, or reinstitute
price controls, resulting in a resurgence of lines and shortages. In the brief
lifespan of reforms, however, Russian consumers have acquired a taste for
plentiful goods which would be politically difficult to squelch. Further-
more, any resumption of subsidies to ailing factories would do nothing to
fix the basic problem underlying Russia's industrial decline, which is its
sheer lack of competitiveness. For as the past five years have shown, subsi-
dies will not restore moribund factories to profitability where their output
consists of obsolete products that no one wants to buy.2 71
Consequently, the only way a new regime could resume subsidies
without ruinous inflation would be through subversion of law and through
force. If subsidies were resumed, the Central Bank of Russia would be
under enormous pressure to provide the necessary financing because the
government lacks sufficient revenues to finance even its own operations.
Such pressure would increase if the IMF curtailed funding, as it has done
episodically in the recent past. Accordingly, a new regime most likely
would pressure the Bank for the necessary funds, provoking a renewed
confrontation with the Bank and likely subverting banking laws in the
process.
Assuming subsidies were restored, a new regime would similarly have
to deal with their inflationary consequences. To do so, it would have to
intervene through such means as price controls, import bans or possibly
even industry renationalization. In the latter case, consumers once again
would be consigned to shortages and inferior goods.
271. In a similar vein, Barry Weingast noted that local authorities in China exploited
fears of unemployment and other detrimental fiscal consequences to successfully block
the central government's attempts to reverse economic reforms after Tiananmen Square
in 1989. See Weingast, supra note 145, at 23.
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In sum, it would be possible to revert to revanchist practices, but not
without a struggle. A return to the old economic status quo would inevita-
bly provoke fierce public opposition, which either would find expression
in the streets and the polls or else be brutally put down. But as the failed
August 1990 coup attempt and protests against the war in Chechnya have
shown, no regime can have total assurance that it will control the army and
hence that mass protests can be suppressed through military force. Thus,
any attempted return to the past would accomplish very little at an
extremely high cost. Those costs are an added inducement against a rash
reversal of market discipline reforms.
This discussion culminates in the question: could efforts to reduce
inflation in Russia have been instituted any faster? In Eastern European
countries such as Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, where once-
thriving traditions of capitalism were only displaced by communism after
World War II, the prospects for fast-track law reforms were somewhat more
encouraging, if simply because market discipline and its benefits were a
real memory for older citizens. In contrast, at the outset of reforms, Rus-
sians had no acquaintance with market discipline and no groups were
poised to lobby for its benefits. Nor could Russia's economic reform wing
simply impose economic reforms through military conquest, as had been
the case in post-war Germany and Japan. For all of these reasons, market
discipline provisions, whether they consisted of conflict-of-interest rules,
tough bankruptcy laws or other provisions, were virtually impossible to
enact before the onset of economic reforms in Russia's nascent democracy.
But that is not to say that reforms could not have proceeded at a faster
pace.
For instance, Gaidar and other reformers in the Yeltsin government
took a serious misstep in April 1992 by lending their support to renewed
subsidies by the Central Bank of Russia. In fact, their support was so well
publicized that the press dubbed the subsidies "Gaidar" credits. 27 2 Simi-
larly, the reform wing missed a valuable opportunity to induce Ger-
ashchenko to resign immediately after the parliament was dissolved in
October 1993. Had the reformers acted decisively, instead of waiting until
Black Tuesday in 1994, inflation might have been curbed a full year earlier.
That wasted time, which was practically an eternity in Russia's telescoped
political climate, supplied another year of economic pain and another year
for backlash to grow.
The IMF also made a major mistake in not supporting generous unem-
ployment benefits sooner. Unemployment pay admittedly has an inflation-
ary effect, but that effect would have been less costly than keeping obsolete
plants afloat, with their attendant added costs for supplies and over-
head.273 Similarly, significant unemployment pay would have gone a long
way toward reducing potential backlash by alleviating the human pain of
272. See ASLUND, How RussiA BECAME A MAR=ET ECONOMY, supra note 65, at 97, 163-
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layoffs and closures once subsidies were finally cut. A transition that had
shown such concern for the real human toll of reforms would have moved
much further toward securing true political legitimacy for market-based
reforms.
Conclusion
As this Article has discussed, economic liberalization and its discontents,
including inflation and market crises, proved to be the single most impor-
tant catalyst for market discipline reforms. That catalyst, however, was a
double-edged sword. On the one hand, the Russian experience gives
grounds for concern. It suggests that market discipline can only be legis-
lated when public disenchantment with the distortions resulting from mar-
ket manipulation has set in and the public demands a change. Thus, the
attitudinal changes that must precede market discipline reforms will neces-
sarily be borne out of cynicism. The Russian experience further suggests
that measures to instill market discipline, whilenot incompatible with
democracy, nevertheless have the potential to generate civil strife, to pro-
voke disregard for democratic procedures during times of crisis and thus
to risk undermining democracy.
At the same time, the Russian experience gives grounds for guarded
optimism, with its message that earlier attitudinal impediments to law
reforms can be overcome through market forces. In this sense, recent Rus-
sian history reveals a dynamic relationship between severe macroeconomic
shocks and changing patterns of collective action that has barely been
explored.274 Particularly in transitions from planned to market economies,
such shocks can alter the public's perception of subsidies as a social good.
As a consequence, old coalitions in favor of subsidies are likely to become
unstable and fragmented while opposition coalitions that support low
inflation will experience a surge in momentum. This observation may help
illuminate a path out of the economic impasse that has characterized tran-
sition economies in the past five years.
As market forces take hold and reshape citizens' attitudes towards
public goods such as subsidies, old economic ideologies will recede among
growing segments of the population. The old attitudes had significant
force in large part because they were part of a broader ideological vision.
Once those attitudes begin to change, however, the larger ideologies that
fostered them will increasingly lose coherence.
Finally, the Russian experience suggests that the normative attack on
public goods theory as immoral may be premature. As Russian events
show, in certain situations the narrow self-interest of smaller groups-in
this case, the Russian entrepreneurial sector-may well comport with the
broader social good and can build on broad-based support to achieve those
Ickes, Macroeconomics in Russia, in ECONOMic TRANSITION IN EASTERN EUROPE AND RussIA
65, 102 (Edward P. Lazear ed., 1995).
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ends. As Macey and Colombatto concluded in their recent work on Eastern
European currency reforms,2 75 I also conclude that public goods theory
need not necessarily be reduced to the nasty and the brutish. To the con-
trary, at least in certain circumstances, public goods theory suggests that
inclusive public goods can be wealth-maximizing in the aggregate and can
serve the larger social good.
275. See Macey & Colombatto, supra note 2, at 415-16.

